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Abstract 
 
The absence of industry specific regulation of access to the incumbent’s 
telecommunications network in New Zealand for an extended period, between 
1989 and 2001, is unique compared with other countries with developed 
telecommunications markets that were opened to competitive entry. This feature 
of the New Zealand market provides an opportunity to compare the conduct and 
performance of antitrust regulation with industry specific regulation introduced 
in 2001. 
Of particular interest is the place of the concepts of natural monopoly and 
perfect competition in the regulation of a dynamic market. This thesis 
establishes the characteristics that contribute to dynamic supply and demand 
conditions in the telecommunications market including network effects, 
discontinuity in demand due to participation, ongoing technological progress of 
hardware, sunk costs of software development, and the irreversible investment 
of augmenting capacity to meet expected growth in demand. The economic 
literature on conjectural variations indicates that under such conditions the 
concepts of natural monopoly and perfect competition do not explain 
competitive conduct due to an unstable market equilibrium. The implication is 
that forming a reasonable view of competitive conduct is limited to the present 
period of time. 
It is shown that decisions made under antitrust regulation are limited to the 
particular context of disputed competitive conduct, and these decisions do not 
speculate on future competitive conduct. In contrast, industry specific regulation 
has formed a sequence of views of competitive conduct, looking forward, that is 
based on concepts of natural monopoly and perfect competition. It is observed 
that with time, these views of competitive conduct have evolved with the 
changing market conditions. If regulatory actions evolve with a changing view of 
competitive conduct they risk reducing dynamic efficiency.    
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1  Introduction 
The New Zealand telecommunications market has undergone significant change 
since it was opened to competition in 1989. This change has been dynamic, 
enabled by technological developments that greatly increased the scope of 
communicating information beyond making a voice call over the traditional 
telephone network. This change includes the emergence of the internet which  
transformed the organisation of the market for services resulting in significant 
growth in demand. There is also the appearance of new mobile technologies, 
resulting in call substitution between mobile and fixed-line telephony networks, 
evolving into the substitution of internet services between mobile and fixed-line 
broadband networks. In conjunction with these developments, there has been an 
evolution in regulatory processes since the market was opened up to competition 
in 1989.  
This thesis follows the technological and regulatory developments in the New 
Zealand market, using economic theory to explain and examine the 
consequences of a unique set of regulatory circumstances on efficiency. One 
reason for an interest in New Zealand is created by the fact that, up until 2001, 
general competition law enforced by the courts regulated competitors’ access to 
the incumbent’s network. This process of regulation is referred to here as 
antitrust regulation (ATR). In 2001, industry specific regulation (ISR) arrived 
with the establishment of an industry specific regulator to regulate price and 
non-price terms of access to the incumbent’s network. The absence of ISR for an 
extended period, between 1989 and 2001, is unique when compared with other 
countries with developed telecommunications markets that were opened to 
competitive entry. Other countries introduced ISR contemporaneously with 
allowing competitive entry. 
This thesis makes three contributions to economic study of the 
telecommunications market. The first is a comparison between the application 
of ATR and ISR in New Zealand, with particular emphasis on their treatment of 
the conduct of competition by a firm with market power. The reason for 
regulating the conduct of a firm with market power is that if it uses this market 
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power to lessen competition then this may also lessen efficiency. ATR defined 
conduct as being anticompetitive if the disputed conduct by the firm with 
market power could have been carried out by the same firm but hypothetically 
without market power. This requires the courts to first determine whether or not 
the firm has market power, and then consider whether the conduct was 
anticompetitive within the very specific circumstances of a particular dispute. 
Under ISR, once it has been determined that the firm (i.e. the incumbent 
telecommunications provider) has market power due to its natural monopoly, 
then regulation is seen as being required to ameliorate incentives created by a 
firm integrating natural-monopoly assets with downstream retail services. A 
difference between ATR and ISR in New Zealand is that under ATR a 
determination of anti-competitive conduct is not a consequence of finding 
market power, whereas the practice of ISR in New Zealand has associated the 
terms of access to the incumbent’s network with competition in downstream 
markets. 
Regulation of a natural monopoly can enhance efficiency; however, the 
definition of natural monopoly, and the related idea of the degree of market 
power on the interval between monopoly and perfect competition, relies on 
static supply and demand conditions. The second contribution this thesis makes 
is an examination of the general demand and supply conditions present, 
highlighting the fact that these conditions are not static, and identifying the 
features of the dynamic processes at work in the telecommunications market. 
This has led to a process of dynamic competition that has transformed industry 
structure. This transformation of industry structure cannot be explained by 
static supply and demand conditions. The literature explains that in dynamic 
conditions such as these, the concept of natural monopoly and perfect 
competition risks inaccurate inferences being drawn about market conduct. 
The third contribution to the economic study of the telecommunications market 
is the development of a comprehensive theory of two-part tariffs and relating 
this to the process of fixed-line to mobile substitution. The novelty of the two-
part tariff theory is the explicit treatment of subscription to a 
telecommunications service as a normal good within a general description of the 
utility function. A distinction is made between substitution effects and 
participation effects in the telecommunications market. This theory is used to 
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illustrate fixed-line to mobile substitution, and explain the empirical observation 
that differences in the form of fixed-line to mobile substitution depend on 
income. Consumers can either substitute their participation in fixed-line 
(mobile) telephony with mobile (fixed-line) telephony, or they can participate in 
both fixed-line and mobile services and just substitute the calls. These different 
forms of call substitution depend on not only the respective benefits that 
consumers may receive from subscribing to a fixed-line or mobile service, but 
also the income of consumers. If the benefits of fixed-line and mobile services 
are sufficiently different, then a consumer with sufficient income may 
participate in both services, whereas those on a lesser income may participate in 
only one.    
An overview of the transformation of the industry structure and a description of 
the regulatory setting is given here in order to provide the factual context for the 
thesis.   
1.1 Transformation of market structure 
Figure 1 illustrates the key differences between the organisation of the telephony 
market prior to the arrival of commercial broadband internet access in New 
Zealand in 1999.  
Figure 1: Comparison of telephone calling and internet services markets 
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Up until 1999, industry structure was largely determined by a view of the 
traditional telephone industry, with separate local access and long-distance toll-
calling markets. This began to change gradually after 1999 with the introduction 
of commercial broadband internet access. 
The diagram on the left of Figure 1 illustrates the provision of retail local access 
and toll-call services by the vertically integrated incumbent, Telecom, and an 
entrant’s toll-call service. The entrant is required to interconnect with the 
incumbent’s local access network so that customers connected to the 
incumbent’s local access network can make calls over the entrant’s toll-call 
network and receive calls carried over the entrant’s toll-call network. The heavy 
solid line represents the interconnection between the entrant’s network and the 
incumbent’s local access network. Determining the terms of interconnection was 
particularly contentious, as the entrant’s toll-call service was in competition with 
the incumbent’s toll-call service. This in turn was vertically integrated with the 
local-access network. The perception at that time was the local access network 
had features of a natural monopoly, and therefore there was a limited 
opportunity for competitive bypass of the local access network by an entrant. 
The diagram on the right of Figure 1 represents the industry structure that 
emerged with the internet. The main difference between the telephone services 
diagram and the internet services diagram is the separation of the provision of 
services from the network. The structure of the internet means services, 
including calling, are provided independently of the communications network. 
This is illustrated in the diagram above by the gap between the box representing 
services on the internet and the box representing the broadband internet access 
service. The implication for calling services provided over the internet is they do 
not rely on service-specific interconnection contracts. In contrast, service-
specific interconnection contracts are required for calling between telephone 
networks. These interconnection contracts are represented by the heavy solid 
line in the telephone services diagram on the left of Figure 1.  
Furthermore, with the internet there is no equivalent to the separation of 
services into local-call, national toll-call or international toll-call services, as the 
technical elements of services are incorporated into a retail broadband internet 
access service. Broadband internet access is both the local network and the 
internet, which is international in scope. Even though these network elements 
 5 
are integrated into a single retail service, they are not owned by one network 
operator and do not even have the same physical characteristics. The diagram of 
internet services shows the incumbent network operator owning both the local 
access network, which connects to the customer, and the transmission network 
elements needed to connect to the internet. In this diagram the entrant has the 
network elements needed to connect to the internet, but in order to provide 
consumers with a broadband internet service, it leases the access data circuits to 
consumers from the incumbent. This wholesale arrangement is represented by 
the heavy dashed line. The terms of this wholesale service are regulated, as the 
local access network is perceived to be a natural monopoly. 
1.2 New Zealand regulatory setting 
Before 1987, New Zealand Post Office, which was a Department of the State, 
provided telecommunications services as a statutory monopoly.1 On 1 April 1987, 
it was separated to form the State Owned Enterprises (SOE), Telecom, NZ Post 
Ltd (the postal service), as well as other SOEs. SOEs are corporations owned by 
the government and are required, with specific exceptions, to operate on a 
commercial basis, subject to the same regulatory and tax regimes as comparable 
private-sector companies. This is in contrast to the pre-1987 New Zealand Post 
Office, which was organised as a conventional government department under 
the direction of a Minister.2 
On 17 December 1987, the Minister for State Owned Enterprises (1987) 
announced the government’s decision to end Telecom’s exclusive right to 
operate a telephone network and associated services, thereby permitting 
competition in the telecommunications market. Reasons given for deregulating 
were to improve efficiency in the provision of services, to improve the allocation 
of the benefits to consumers, and to improve investment in new services.3 The 
market was deregulated and opened to competition in April 1989.  
                                                        
1 See the Touche Ross (1988, pp. 6-9) report for further background material regarding 
the corporatisation process. 
2 Refer to Touche Ross (1988, p. 6). 
3  The Minister for State Owned Enterprises (1987) stated: 
 “… deregulation was required in order to achieve: 
• a telecommunications system of an internationally competitive standard 
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The initial regulatory conditions established in 1989 included the following: 
1) Competition was only subject to ATR. General competition law under the 
Commerce Act 1986 governed the wholesale terms of access to Telecom’s 
network. Note that ISR of access to the incumbent’s network was not 
established in 1989.4 
2) Should the Commerce Act have failed to ensure effective competition, 
there was the threat of further regulation.5 
3) A universal service obligation called the Kiwi Share Obligation (KSO) 
required Telecom to provide a standard residential telephone service 
under the following conditions:6 
a) The monthly rental for the standard residential telephone service was 
not to increase in real terms above the rental as at November 1989, 
provided that profitability was not unreasonably impaired;  
b) Calls within a local call area were to be free;  
                                                                                                                                                     
• efficient use of resources with an adequate return on taxpayers’ 
investment 
• a service that satisfies customers 
• a service that keeps pace with technological change.” 
4 Minister for State Owned Enterprises (1988).  
5 The Minister for State Owned Enterprises (1988) stated “Should the Commerce Act fail 
to ensure effective competition in telecommunications, the Government will be prepared 
to re-examine whether further measures are needed.” It is unclear if the Minister had 
envisaged any particular circumstance; however, as well as regulating competition – i.e. 
ATR – the Commerce Act 1986 included the provision to regulate price under Part IV – 
i.e. ISR – where competition in a market for a service was limited.. 
The threat of further regulation, as government policy, was explicitly mentioned, later in 
a report prepared by the Ministry of Commerce & The Treasury (1995, pp. 1,11). A 
statement by Telecom’s Corporate Policy Manager also indicates an awareness of threat: 
“Consistent with [the Government’s] policy, at no point has there been formal 
government intervention although it chose on occasion to give stern reminders about 
policy objectives for competition. The Government continues to monitor competition 
and would undoubtedly intervene should it think necessary” (Saunders, 1994, p. 496). 
6 The Kiwi Share is a single non-voting share in Telecom that is held by the Minister of 
Finance on behalf of the Crown. As well as the limitations of pricing on the residential 
local telephone service, the KSO restricts foreign ownership of Telecom. The 
Government placed the KSO on Telecom recognising its dominant position in the market 
at the time of privatisation (Ministry of Economic Development, 2001, p. 5). In addition, 
there was strong public support for these provisions (Ministry of Commerce & The 
Treasury, 1995, p. 37). 
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c) The service would be available to all residential customers; and, 
d) The incumbent would make the residential telephone service as 
widely available as at 11 September 1990. 
 
In October 1990, the government privatised Telecom by selling all its shares, 
except for the Kiwi Share, to a consortium of Bell Atlantic and Ameritech for 
NZ$4.25 billion. As a term of the sale, the consortium sold its shareholding in 
Telecom down to 49%, publicly listing Telecom on the New Zealand, Australia, 
and New York stock exchanges. Telecom was initially listed on the New Zealand 
and Australian stock exchange in 1991. 
The next significant institutional change to the regulatory setting occurred in 
2001 with the advent of ISR, which the government instituted under the 
Telecommunications Act 2001.7 Regulatory controls were placed on the terms of 
interconnection between Telecom’s and other network operators’ networks.8 The 
purpose of access regulation was “… to promote competition in 
telecommunications markets for the long-term benefit of end users of 
telecommunications services ...” (Telecommunications Act 2001, s 18). In 
addition, the Telecommunications Service Obligation (TSO) was introduced, 
which carried over the obligations on Telecom set out in the KSO, with the 
additional inclusion of a requirement for Telecom to offer dial-up internet 
access. A mechanism for funding the TSO was also provided. The Act required 
the industry specific regulator (the Commerce Commission)9 to investigate 
whether or not to regulate access to individual ‘copper pairs’ in Telecom’s local 
                                                        
7 The Commerce Commission was and still is responsible for the administration of both 
ATR and ISR. 
8 Regulated, interconnection prices were either cost based or bill-and-keep. A cost-based 
price for interconnection is calculated using the total service long run incremental cost 
(TSLRIC) methodology. ‘Bill-and-keep’ is applied to local access interconnection (see 
section 3.1). It generally means two operators do not exchange money for call traffic 
exchanged between their local access networks. Sometimes an additional condition 
includes limiting bill-and-keep to traffic volume that is in balance – i.e. the traffic 
volume originating on one network and terminating on the other is approximately the 
same as the traffic volume in the reverse direction. In this case, if the traffic is out of 
balance then a uniform price per minute is charged for the portion of traffic that is out of 
balance.  
9 The Commerce Commission is New Zealand’s competition enforcement and regulatory 
agency. 
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loop, which connect consumer premises to Telecom’s telecommunications 
network. The regulator commenced its investigation in 2003, and this ultimately 
led to the government regulating access to the local loop in 2006. 
1.3 Thesis outline 
In chapter 2, a description of the process of dynamic competition as it relates to 
the internet is provided. The features of this process include the direct and 
indirect network effects of consumers’ choices; rapid technological change of 
hardware and the significant sunk cost of software; and the presence of large, 
irreversible investments required to meet demand. Chapter 3 draws on the 
literature that argues that market structure is determined by the conduct of 
rivals, and the structure cannot be assumed to be constant or stable as implied 
by the idea of natural monopoly or perfect competition. In contrast, it’s 
proposed that the literature on regulating access to a telecommunications 
network proceeds from the proposition that market structure is static and there 
are network assets that exhibit natural-monopoly characteristics. Chapter 4 
compares the performance of the New Zealand telecommunications market with 
markets in other countries. Chapter 5 describes the evolution of ATR and ISR in 
New Zealand and relates this back to aspects of market performance. 
Conclusions are brought together in chapter 6. A detailed description of the 
development of the internet, highlighting economic features, are provided in 
appendix A. Finally, a theory of participation with two-part tariffs is developed 
in appendix B.  
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2  Dynamic competition in the presence of network 
effects and innovation 
There are processes of dynamic competition within the telecommunications 
market between the providers of services available over the internet, the 
providers of network protocols and technologies that carry services over 
networks including the internet, and the providers of access to networks, 
including the internet. Dynamic competition takes place between “a small 
number of firms acting independently but aware of one another’s existence” 
(Carlton & Perloff, 2004, p. 157). This awareness of rivals means that firms can 
engage in as many actions (and perhaps more) as there are theories explaining 
oligopoly. In contrast to the many theories of oligopoly, Carlton & Perloff (2004, 
p. 157) observe there is only one model of monopoly because there are no rivals 
to consider, and there is only one model of perfect competition because there are 
too many rivals for a firm to consider individually.  
This chapter uses theories of dynamic competition to examine and explain 
competitive conduct associated with the development of the internet. It starts by 
drawing out the basic market conditions that led to a substantial transformation 
of the telecommunications industry. This, then, serves as an exemplar for 
applying theories to examine the features of dynamic competition present within 
the telecommunications market.10 In particular, conditions under which 
dynamic competition can be logically reduced to static models of natural 
monopoly and perfect competition, and the importance of the timing of 
investment decisions, are considered. The conclusions drawn here provide a 
model of dynamic competition for assessing the conduct of regulations.  
2.1 Network effects and dynamic competition 
Evans & Schmalensee (2002) highlight some basic conditions11 of the software 
market that influence the conduct of dynamic competition. These include (i) 
network effects; (ii) innovation and rapid technological change; and, (iii) large, 
                                                        
10 Other examples of dynamic competition within the telecommunications industry, 
specifically between access providers, are documented later in this thesis. 
11 This is an expansion of characteristics identified by Katz & Shapiro (1999), who also 
included durability.  
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sunk costs to build the capability or capacity to supply services and, once built, 
low marginal costs to supply services. They describe a process of dynamic 
competition in an industry with risky investment in high-cost intellectual 
property, decreasing average costs in production, network and systems effects, 
and input factors including some technologies that decrease in cost over time.12 
This implies that competition is not based on output volume and price at the 
margin. Competition is based on providing better quality and/or lower-cost 
services in order to gain a competitive advantage with the risk that a new 
competing service will emerge that will result in asset stranding.13 The 
discussion in this and the following subsections will examine each of these basic 
conditions for the internet. 
Much of the economic and social value associated with the internet is due to 
network effects.14 That is, consumers’ and service providers’ valuation of a 
physical or virtual network depends on the size of the consumer and service 
provider population connected to the network. 
The literature classifies network effects as either being direct or indirect.15 Direct 
network effects result when users directly benefit from the presence of others on 
a communications network. The classic example of a network that exhibits direct 
network effects is the telephone network. Other examples of services available 
on the internet that rely on direct network effects include Yahoo! Mail’s instant 
                                                        
12  Evans & Schmalensee (2002, p. 1) note that “In many of these industries, firms 
engage in dynamic competition for the market – usually through research-and-
development (R&D) competition to develop the 'killer' product, service, or feature that 
will confer market leadership and thus diminish or eliminate actual or potential rivals. 
Static price/output competition on the margin in the market is less important.”  
13 This is supported by Brynjolfsson & Smith (2000) observing “while there is lower 
friction in many dimensions of internet competition, branding, awareness and trust 
remain important sources of heterogeneity among internet retailers.” That is, with 
dynamic competition, firms trading on the internet attempt to differentiate from each 
other. 
14 This is a generalisation of the concept of direct network externality proposed by Katz & 
Shapiro (1985) and Tirole (1998, p.405). Whether or not these network effects are 
externalities depends on the particular circumstances as discussed by Liebowitz & 
Margolis (1994) and follows the classification set out in Liebowitz & Margolis (2002, p. 
77). 
15 See Liebowitz & Margolis (2002, p. 77) for discussion on classification of direct and 
indirect network effects. 
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messaging service, social networking websites such as Facebook™, and 
telephone over the internet provided by Skype. The value of using any of these 
services increases with the number of service participants, because participants 
benefit from being able to communicate with a larger number of other 
participants. 
Indirect network effects occur when a user’s valuation of a good depends on the 
availability and number of complementary services, which in turn depends on 
the number of users. The standard examples of indirect network effects in the 
economic literature include the pairing of DVD players and DVDs, consoles and 
games, computers and applications, cars and trained mechanics, auction sites 
and sellers, amongst others. In this case, for instance, a consumer’s valuation of 
a DVD player depends on the availability of films and other video content on 
DVDs where, in turn, the availability of films and video content on DVDs will 
depend on the size of the customer base. A hardware platform derives its value 
from the complementary software that operates on it. 
Rohlfs’ (1974) analysis highlights that networks are inherently dynamic. In the 
case where demand amongst consumers is interrelated due to consumers’ 
preferences to communicate with each other (i.e. direct network effects), Rohlfs 
(1974), using a static model, observes that for a single service (voice calling over 
the traditional telephone network), there is potential for multiple equilibria, 
depending on who participates. That is, assuming there is a population of 
individuals who have an equal preference for communicating with each other, 
then the number of network participants will depend on whether or not the 
number of network participants is initially greater than or less than some critical 
value. If the number of participants is initially less than the critical value, then 
there would be no network participants, whereas if the number of network 
participants initially is greater than the critical value, it will be a positive number 
of participants subscribing to the network and communicating with each other. 
Rohlfs also argues that due to interrelationship in demand, even if all else 
including price is held constant, demand could change over time either as it 
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converges to an equilibrium, or the equilibrium itself follows a pattern of 
changing demand that is periodic.16 
Katz & Shapiro (1994) raise the point in relation to indirect network effects that 
consumers’ consumption choice will be influenced by their expectation of the 
consumption choices made by others.17 For example, an expectation that 
hardware will become popular induces the production of more software than 
otherwise, resulting in the hardware becoming even more popular. They go on to 
say: 
The resulting positive-feedback effects have proven troublesome to 
economic theory, both technically (equilibrium may not exist, or multiple 
equilibria may exist) and in terms of market performance (the 
fundamental theorems of welfare economics may not apply) (Katz & 
Shapiro, 1994, p. 94). 
Although recognising the dynamics of these markets, particularly with the 
introduction of new services, the analysis draws conclusions based on static 
models. The static models only consider the transition from one equilibrium to 
another following the introduction of new hardware; however, they do not 
consider the options created for consumers or an ongoing process of dynamic 
competition. For example, Farrell & Saloner (1985) introduce the concepts of 
excess inertia and excess momentum. Excess inertia occurs when there is a less-
than-optimal rate of uptake of a new hardware platform due to positive network 
effects associated with the existing hardware. Alternatively, if consumers expect 
other consumers will switch to a new hardware platform then this may result in 
a more-than-optimal rate of uptake of the new hardware, and thus there will be 
excess momentum.  
The literature on network effects presents many other examples of proposed 
market failures due to network effects resulting from the potential for multiple 
                                                        
16 Furthermore, although not explored by Rohlfs (1974), it is possible to envisage models 
of interrelated demand that dynamically evolve over time in unpredictable ways. 
17 See Katz & Shapiro (1985) for their first reference to this particular proposition. 
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equilibria, particularly the presence of network externalities.18 Liebowitz & 
Margolis’s (1994, p. 135) response to the reference to network externalities is: 
“we reserve the term ‘network externality’ for a specific kind of network 
effect in which the equilibrium exhibits unexploited gains from trade 
regarding network participation.” 
The following section will expand on the idea that the presence of network 
externalities, within the context of the internet and associated services, provides 
the incentive for service providers to compete in order to internalise the 
“unexploited gains”.  
2.1.1 Unexploited gains of direct network effects 
Consumers value communicating with each other. Services available on the 
internet which enable or facilitate communication include Skype’s telephone 
service over the internet, Yahoo!’s instant messaging service, as well as 
Facebook’s social networking website. The theory of network effects suggests 
that the value consumers place on these sites will depend on the number of other 
users of these sites, particularly for individuals who belong to the same 
community of interest. 
Service providers have adopted various strategies to maximise the consumer 
benefits, due to direct network effects, in order to derive a competitive 
advantage. For example, Yahoo! Messenger service allows users to send instant 
messages to users of other instant messaging services19, thereby increasing the 
                                                        
18 For example, David (1985) argues that the failure of the Dvorak keyboard to displace 
the Qwerty keyboard is a market failure due to network effects. Katz & Shapiro (1992) 
consider the effect of direct network effects on the dynamics of uptake or a new 
hardware platform. Church & Gandal (1992) analyse the problem of competing software 
providers’ effect on determining whether or not there will be a single hardware platform 
or multiple incompatible hardware platform market, concluding that when consumers 
place a high value on software variety there is a suboptimal amount of standardisation in 
the market for hardware. Church, Gandal, & Krause (2002) extend this by considering 
adoption externalities, where consumers’ private decisions take into account the benefit 
others derive from the resulting increase in software variety. Farrell & Saloner (1992) 
consider the role of converters in a market where there are incompatible hardware 
platforms, which allow software developed for one platform to operate on other 
hardware platforms. 
19 Yahoo! Messenger allows users of its service to send instant messages to users of 
Windows LiveTM, Office Communications Server, Lotus Sametime, and Reuters 
Messaging. 
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value of participation in its service, even though it may reduce the ability to 
differentiate its service from competitors. In contrast, social networking sites 
such as Facebook do not allow access to an individual’s content from competing 
social networking sites, presumably in order to use the direct network effects to 
differentiate their services from competitors’. Nevertheless, this does not 
prevent a consumer from entering the same information on Facebook and 
another site. Skype does not charge its customers for telephone or video calls to 
other Skype customers, but it does charge for calls to customers on a traditional 
telephone network.  In this case, consumers benefit from being able to access 
consumers on both Skype’s network and a traditional telephone network; 
however, Skypes’ pricing reflects the differences in cost of terminating calls on 
different networks.  
These various strategies can be seen as a response to potential for dynamic 
equilibria due to network effects. If there was no interconnection or exchange of 
information between services in a static model, decreasing average cost quantity, 
and individuals’ preferences were homogeneous, then one service provider 
would monopolise the market. In contrast, in a dynamic market, new service 
providers such as Skype will seek interconnection in order to provide their 
customers with the same benefits associated with network effects available to 
established service providers, but with another technology, i.e. the internet. 
Furthermore, as there is a distinct possibility that a dominant service provider 
will lose customers to a new competitor, there is value in the incumbent allowing 
interconnection in order to mitigate the risk of a rapid change in market share 
due to a process of excess momentum. These strategies can be viewed as service 
providers responding to network effects. 
Service providers do not generally charge users for many of their services.20  
Instead, service providers earn revenue from advertising placed on their sites. 
The more consumers use a particular service, the more valuable the service is to 
advertisers. Even though these communications services are free, there is an 
incremental cost to providing them, which consumers do not directly bear as 
                                                        
20 An exception in the examples listed is Skype charging for calls terminating on a 
traditional-telephone network. It is assumed that these charges reflect the cost of 
interconnecting with a fixed-telephone network. 
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they are recovered from advertising revenue. Therefore, these services operate 
as a two-sided market. 
Rochet & Tirole (2006, p. 646) define a two-sided market as “… one in which the 
volume of transactions between end-users depends on the structure and not only 
the level of the fees charged by the platform.” In this case, the platform is the 
internet service, and the end-users are the consumer and the advertiser. The 
prevalence of not charging for services and earning revenue from Web 
marketing and advertising, as discussed in appendix A.2, suggests that price 
structure is important. It seems reasonable to assume that if one of these service 
providers were to charge consumers for their services and lower their 
advertising charges while their competitors did not, then consumers would 
switch to their competitors who did not charge. In turn, the loss of customers is 
likely to reduce the value of advertising on the service provider’s site.21 
Katz & Shapiro (1994, p. 101) raise the concern that “the total surplus generated 
by a service is maximised when the marginal benefits associated with a new 
user, including the benefits flowing to other users, just equals the marginal cost 
of serving the new user.”22 The problem raised is that an individual’s 
participation decision is based on their private benefits, which do not include the 
benefits received by other users from their participation. Therefore, if a service is 
provided at cost, then participation in the service may not be socially optimal. 
If the population of potential users of one of the services listed above is taken to 
be those consumers with access to the internet, then the fact that these services 
are available at no charge could potentially militate against such an externality.23  
Furthermore, if the objective of service providers is to maximise the number of 
                                                        
21 Even though some of the services available on the internet exhibit features of a two-
sided market, the internet itself, including access for consumers, does not. Economides 
& Tag (2007) also make the observation that the traditional internet is a one-sided 
market within the context of the analysis of the issues related to the Network Neutrality 
debate. The issues concern some network providers proposing to integrate the quality of 
connectivity provided to consumers with specific services offered by service providers 
resulting in a two-sided market. This specific issue is not considered here. 
22 Emphasis added. 
23 There is always the possibility that it may be efficient to simply pay some consumers to 
subscribe to the service. 
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consumers who use their service, then it would be rational to allow consumers to 
benefit from the network effects.  
Alternatively, if the population of consumers is taken to be the sum of those who 
subscribe to the internet and those who do not, then it might be argued that 
increasing the number of users would not only benefit the new users but also 
benefit existing users due to the direct network externality. Determining 
whether or not existing users benefit requires distinguishing between marginal 
and infra-marginal users of the internet, either by some observable 
characteristic24 or implied by the observed consumption of services.25 In theory, 
there may seem to be direct network externalities; however, if there is 
insufficient information to distinguish between the marginal user and infra-
marginal users then it may not be possible to directly make an allowance for the 
externality in the optimal price. 
In addition to the problem of distinguishing between marginal and infra-
marginal users, assumptions would need to be made regarding the extent to 
which marginal users are part of an infra-marginal users’ community of interest, 
and thus the extent to which infra-marginal users benefit from their presence. 
This would require information about the structure of communities of interest. 
However, as already noted, it seems reasonable to assume that communities of 
interest are continually changing unpredictably, which not only raises significant 
analytical challenges but also provides service providers with potential, 
unexploited gains and therefore commercial opportunities. 
2.1.2 Unexploited gains of indirect network effects 
Katz & Shapiro (1994) claim that indirect network effects reinforce a market-
determined equilibrium that may be locally but not globally optimal. The 
literature identified in the preceding discussion proposes a range of adverse 
consequences including, among others, sub-optimal rates of technological 
change, a market settling for a range of hardware technologies rather than a 
                                                        
24 Examples include the distinction between business and residential consumers, or the 
incremental network cost of providing consumers with access to the internet.  
25 An example includes assuming that, in the general population, individuals’ private 
valuation of subscribing to a telephone network increases their observed demand for 
calling and that demand increases with income.  
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single hardware technology, or the market settling on a particular sub-optimal 
technology.26 However, these analyses rely on static models and do not recognise 
that preferences change and competing technologies develop by the process of 
dynamic competition.  
According to this static approach, the public switched telephone network (PSTN) 
should have remained an enduring equilibrium due to its scale and the technical 
efficiency of its design for the supply of the telephone call, which had evolved for 
over a century. However, due to technological and commercial developments 
(described in detail in appendix B) over the past 10 years, the internet has 
eroded the dominance of the traditional PSTN. 
The internet is itself the product of indirect network effects, where the hardware 
is the internet and the software are the available services.27 In comparison with 
the PSTN, a wide range of services is available on the internet, whereas only one 
service dominated the PSTN, namely calling. 
The process by which this happened was the result of the unexploited gains that 
existed in the PSTN market structure, that the internet and the services available 
over the internet were able to exploited. Another gain was to enable a wide range 
of service providers to make services available which consumers valued, 
resulting in increased internet access and users, and the introduction of new 
services. The size of these substantial gains are illustrated by significant and 
rapid growth in revenues earned by internet service providers reported in Figure 
10, and the growth in the range of different internet services reported in 
appendix A2. 
                                                        
26 See footnote 18 and discussion citing Katz & Shapiro (1994) and Farrell & Saloner 
(1985) in section 2.1 for background. 
27 Examples of services available on the internet that exhibit features of indirect network 
effects include Google, Trade Me, YouTube and Wikipedia. The value of each of these 
services depends on the availability of complementary services or information which in 
turn depends on the popularity of the service. Trade Me depends on sellers auctioning 
products and services, which in turn depends on the number of buyers, who benefit from 
there being more sellers. YouTube users may value the number of videos posted on the 
site, which in turn depends on the number of users. Wikipedia users value the range of 
content available on Wikipedia, which in turn depends on the number of users of 
Wikipedia. 
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2.2 The cost of innovation and services 
These dynamic network effects result in an ongoing stream of decisions to invest 
in new opportunities that often take the form of intellectual property associated 
with a service. Abstracting from the particular architecture of the internet and 
the switched telephone network, this investment in intellectual property 
includes the cost of implementing the service either in the core or at the edge of 
a communications network.28 The effect of such an investment is a change to the 
core or the edge of the communications network. Where this change occurs can 
have a significant bearing on the cost of the investment. The cost of the change is 
the product of the rate at which changes are made and the complexity of the 
communications network that is being changed, where complexity increases 
with system size. 
As the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) (2002, p. 3) states “… complexity 
[in a system] is the primary mechanism which impedes efficient scaling, and as a 
result is the primary driver of increases in both capital expenditures (CAPEX) 
and operational expenditure (OPEX)”.29 It is for this reason that the IETF (2002, 
p. 3) recommends that the complexity of the internet belongs at the edge of the 
network.30 The IETF (2002, pp. 6,7) argues that one effect of moving this 
complexity to the edge of the network allows the internet to scale more 
efficiently than a traditional switched telephone network in response to 
technological improvements, growing demand and new services.31 The other 
                                                        
28 See appendix A.7 for an explanation of the network edge and core with respect to the 
internet. 
29 Factors that contribute to complexity and thus the subsequent costs result from 
growth in the number of nodes and interconnectivity in the network. Large-scale 
networks have the potential to exhibit behaviour that does not occur in small- or 
medium-scale networks. The IETF describes two principle causes for this complexity. 
First, in large-scale networks, small perturbations in network traffic may become 
amplified resulting in network instability. This amplification is due to non-linearities 
which do not occur in small- or medium-scale networks (Internet Engineering Task 
Force, 2002, p. 4). Second, as networks become large, they often exhibit increased 
interdependency amongst components resulting in the possibility that two or more will 
interact in unforeseen ways (Internet Engineering Task Force, 2002, p. 5). 
30 See appendix A.7 for an explanation of the network edge. 
31 The IETF (2002, pp. 6, 7) notes that the competition amongst the traditional 
telephone companies involved adding features such as call-waiting, messaging services, 
and caller identification services to the PSTN, which increased the complexity of the 
PSTN. This complexity was software, not hardware, driven. The IETF states: “Consider 
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effect is to reduce the cost of adding a new service to the edge of the network 
because changes to the network do not need to be made.32 The effect is 
highlighted by the rapid growth in the range of services available on the internet 
and the global span of the internet.  
Evans & Schmalensee (2002, p. 8) observe that in the case of new-economy 
industry products such as software, the development of intellectual property is 
labour intensive and entry costs are low, which means that “… the risk that a 
dangerous rival will emerge seemingly from nowhere can be quite high.” It 
follows that service providers need to continually update their intellectual 
property to ensure they do not lose customers to new entrants. This in turn 
suggests a competitive process of dynamic competition amongst service 
providers where there is ongoing investment in research and development into 
new services in order to gain or maintain a competitive advantage. 
In contrast, the relative stability of internet intellectual property suggests there 
are relatively fewer total resources working on changing the intellectual property 
of the industry. However, this does not mean that the intellectual property of the 
internet is not a critical asset; it is just that the economic consequences of 
constant change differ.33 
2.3 Reducing dynamic competition to static competition 
In the previous section the process of dynamic competition is described in 
general terms. That is, firms seek to gain a competitive advantage by investing in 
services and technology, in order to exploit gains from network effects and 
technological advancements. The process is dynamic because firms’ decisions 
                                                                                                                                                     
the cost of providing new features in a complex network. The traditional voice network 
has little intelligence in its edge devices (phone instruments), and a very smart core. The 
internet has smart edges, computers with operating systems, applications, etc., and a 
simple core, which consists of a control plane and packet forwarding engines. Adding a 
new internet service is just a matter of distributing an application to a few consenting 
desktops who wish to use it. Compare this to adding a service to voice, where one has to 
upgrade the entire core.” The cost of an upgrade to the entire core is significantly greater 
than the cost of upgrading the application on a few consenting desktop computers. 
32 However, as discussed in appendix A.8.2 the quality of communication over the 
internet, defined by the best efforts principle, may place limits on services. 
33 Constantly changing the intellectual property of the internet would result in 
complexity and costs as discussed in appendix A.8.1. 
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unfold over time in response to new information regarding demand, 
technological innovations, or the actions of rivals. In contrast to the description 
of dynamic competition, antitrust and industry specific regulatory authorities 
have mostly relied on static models of market conduct when assessing the effect 
of conduct on market performance. This raises the question of whether it is valid 
to reduce the process of dynamic competition to a model of static competition. 
Understanding the conditions under which dynamic competition logically 
reduces to a static competition defines the scope of the conclusions that can be 
logically inferred from static regulatory models. In other words, if inferences are 
to be drawn regarding the effect of actions of firms or a regulator on a process of 
dynamic competition, from observing conduct through the lens of static 
competition, then a theory is required to explain how these observations relate 
to dynamic competition. 
The theory of conjectural variations provides a useful framework for examining 
the conditions under which models of dynamic competition can be reduced to 
static competition, for two reasons.34 Firstly, the conjectural-variations model of 
static competition is analogous to static models used by antitrust and industry 
specific regulators examined later in the thesis, where a price greater than 
marginal cost indicates the potential use of market power. It also extends to the 
proposition that firms are assumed to compete by their choice price or output 
settings. The second reason is that Dockner (1992), Cabral (1995), and Figuières, 
Jean-Marie, Quérou, & Tidball (2004) provide conditions under which models 
of dynamic competition reduce to the conjectural-variations model of static 
competition. 
                                                        
34 Examples of the use of conjectural variations for assessing conduct in 
telecommunications markets include Kaestner & Kahn’s (1990) assessment of the effect 
of deregulation on of U.S. interstate toll-call prices. MacAvoy (1998) estimates 
conjectural variations as an indicator of the change in the competitiveness in the U.S. 
long-distance toll-call market from 1988 to 1996. He concludes that over the 1988 to 
1996 period, estimates of conjectural variation suggest that MCI and Sprint were 
consistent followers of AT&T, and therefore long-distance markets experienced 
decreasing competitiveness. Parker & Röller (1997) analyse conduct of mobile operators 
in the U.S. as the market developed from a monopoly to a duopoly through the 1980s 
and into the 1990s, concluding that mobile prices were significantly above competitive 
as well as non-cooperative duopoly levels. More recently, Grzybowski (2008) takes 
Parker & Röller’s framework and benchmarks country specific conjectural variations of 
mobile telecommunications markets across 15 EU countries from 1998 to 2002, 
concluding that the liberalisation of the fixed-line networks and the introduction of 
mobile number portability led to an increasingly competitive mobile market. 
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Bresnahan (1989) casts conjectural variations as an empirical means for 
evaluating market power. Price-setting or quantity-setting conduct, in a single 
product market, is explained by the general price relation35: 
  (1) 
The dependent variable is market price ,,where is an index of observations 
over time, and each firm’s quantity is , where  is an index of the firms. The 
single product market implies that . Furthermore, the inverse 
demand function is: 
  (2) 
where  are variables shifting demand, and the firm’s total cost function is: 
  (3) 
where Wit are all input factor prices paid by firm i , and Zit are other variables 
that shift cost. 
Bresnahan (1989, pp. 1019-1031) notes that the parameter  is an indicator of 
market power.  Equation (1) is interpreted as an oligopoly setting price or 
quantity such that marginal cost is equal to the ‘perceived’ marginal revenue, 
where “The parameters  index the competitiveness of oligopoly conduct” 
(Bresnahan, 1989, p. 1016). If  for all firms, then the firms’ conduct is 
perfectly competitive. If  for all firms, then their conduct is consistent with 
Cournot competition. Furthermore, if all firms act to maximise total industry 
                                                        
35 This relation and notation is based on Bresnahan’s (1989, pp. 1014-1016) discussion, 
excluding Bresnahan’s reference of equation pararmeters and error terms, except for the 
term. Bresnahan included the additional model parameters and the error terms, 
excluded here, as he was discussing the equation specification and the econometric 
estimation of equation parameters. These parameters and the error term have been 
excluded as they are not necessary for the present discussion. 
 22 
profit, then  for all . The value that  takes if all firms act to maximise 
total industry profit will then depend on firm i’s share of total industry output. 
For completeness,  for a monopoly. 
Bresnahan (1989, pp. 1026-1027) highlights two conflating explanations for the 
parameter . The first of these follows from Stigler’s (1964) theory of collusive 
oligopoly, which suggests that there are periods of collusion and then periods of 
price wars. Each firm makes a decision, which is repeated in successive periods 
to produce a designated quantity or to deviate from the designated quantity. 
Firms trade off the potential for greater profits in the current period, by 
producing more or dropping price, against a loss in future periods as a result of 
competitors retaliating to the firm’s deviation from the designated behaviour. 
Within this context the value of  may vary over time as a market moves from a 
period of collusion to a price war. 
The second explanation uses the language of conjectural variations. The 
conjectural-variations approach assumes that firms anticipate their rivals’ 
reaction as a function of their own pricing or quantity decisions (Tirole, 1988, p. 
244).36 If firms each believe that an increase in their own output will induce 
their rivals to increase output, then this leads to tacit collusion amongst the 
firms as they limit supply, thus increasing the sum of each firm’s profit. In this 
case, industry conduct converges on a monopoly. Alternatively, if firms each 
believe that an increase in their own output will induce their rivals to decrease 
output, this guides conduct towards perfect competition, as firms will increase 
output. Finally, if firms each believe that their output decision has no effect on 
their rivals’ decisions then this is a Cournot oligopoly. Bresnahan (1989, p. 1027) 
notes that the language of conjectural variations makes the following 
substitution in equation (1): 
  (4) 
                                                        
36 Tirole (1988, p. 244, footnote 11) notes conditions when the choice variable is price 
and quantity, highlighting that for homogeneous goods, use is generally made of 
Cournot competition.  
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where 
 
indicates that firms believe their output decisions and their 
rivals’ output decisions are positively (negatively) correlated, and  
indicates firms believe their output decisions and their rivals’ output decisions 
are not correlated, thus implying a Cournot oligopoly.37 
Tirole states that conjectural variations subsume the dynamic interaction 
between rivals “in some kind of ‘reduced-form’ static competition” (Tirole, 1988, 
p. 224). However, as Tirole explains, there is a theoretical inconsistency between 
the concept of static competition and the proposition that competitive rivals 
react to each other because, by definition, static competition is where each firm’s 
choices are independent of its rivals’.38 Not withstanding this criticism, Tirole 
(1988, p. 245, footnote 12) proposes that the conjectural-variations approach 
may have been useful for empirically estimating the degree of market power in 
an industry.39 
Cabral (1995) and Figuières, Jean-Marie, Quérou, & Tidball (2004, pp. 53-60) 
address this criticism by identifying conditions under which a process of 
dynamic competition would reduce to a static outcome described by equation 
(1).  
                                                        
37 Bresnahan (1989, p. 1027) notes that whether or not , and by implication  , is 
constant across firms or over time, or whether they are restricted to particular values or 
the values vary within a range, depends on prior assumptions implied by theory or 
inferences drawn from data.  
38 Friedman (1983, p. 110) levels the same criticism at the conjectural-variations 
framework, noting that dynamic interpretations are not possible as the models are not 
dynamic. Also, firms are assumed to maximise one-period profits rather than the 
discounted stream of profits over a given planning horizon, and firms have expectations 
about how their rivals will behave that need not eventuate. Furthermore, Farrell & 
Shapiro (1990, p. 120, footnote 27) state “Although the conjectural variation model is 
logically flawed, it is a useful way of parameterizing the degree of competition among 
oligopolists. Such behaviour might, for example, arise as the equilibrium of an 
(unmodelled) dynamic oligopolistic game.” 
39 This is pragmatic interpretation of the application of conjectural variations to analyse 
conduct by Schmalensee, who asserts that estimates of conjectural variations are “best 
interpreted as reduced form parameters that summarize the intensity of rivalry that 
emerges from what may be complex patterns of behaviour” (Schmalensee, 1988, p. 650). 
Also, Farrell & Shapiro (1990, p. 120, footnote 27), while recognising the logical flaw, 
suggest that conjectural variation “is a useful way of parameterizing the degree of 
competition among oligopolists. Such behaviour might, for example, arise as the 
equilibrium of an (unmodelled) dynamic oligopolistic game.” 
 24 
Cabral (1995) shows for any linear oligopoly structure, where firms make 
successive quantity-setting decisions over time in a repeated game, that each 
firm’s optimal quantity-decision path follows a conjectural-variations solution 
described by equation (1). In this case, the process of competition is where each 
firm decides in successive periods whether or not to produce a designated 
quantity, and if one firm deviates, then they are punished in the subsequent 
periods. Cabral defines a linear oligopoly as one where firms have a linear cost 
function and the demand function is linear, and claims that if these assumptions 
do not hold then the conjectural-variations “solution can only be taken as an 
approximate reduced form” (Cabral, 1995, p. 402). 
Figuières, et al. (2004, pp. 53-60) cast their analysis within the context of a 
differential game for a duopoly. They conclude that reducing the process of 
dynamic competition to a static conjectural-variations framework relies on 
identifying the conditions under which a stable, long-run, steady-state, 
equilibrium exists.40 They assume that, in a duopoly, a firm’s objective is to 
maximise the present value of a continuous stream of instantaneous pay-offs 
and costs. There is one state variable for each firm, which is each firm’s 
productive capacity, that determines their pay-offs and costs. Costs are not only 
a function of the capacity but also a continuous function of a change in capacity. 
Figuières, et al. assume firms choose feedback (subgame-perfect) strategies, and 
they design the firms’ optimal policies as decision rules dependent on the state 
variable.41 Figuières, et al. analyse a linear-quadratic pay-off and cost functions, 
and identify particular conditions that, under their description of dynamic 
competition, would reduce to equation (1). 
                                                        
40 The points identified in the following discussion are also consistant with analysis by 
Driskill & McCafferty (1989) and Dockner (1992).   
41 See Dockner (1992) for the description of feedback (subgame-perfect) strategies, 
which he refers to as closed-loop (subgame-perfect) strategies. In contrast to the 
feedback strategies, an open-loop strategy is the firm’s optimal policy expressed as a 
function of time that is independent of the current state of the market. In this case, as 
the firm’s path of actions over the entire game is set at the beginning of the game, then 
the use of open-loop strategies requires the firm to commit to a pre-announced plan. 
Therefore, open-loop strategies are static as there is no flexibility to make decisions once 
the firm commits to a pre-announced plan. Dockner also defines the Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium corresponding to closed-loop and open-loop strategies that maximise a 
firm’s profits assuming that their rivals hold their strategies constant.   
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The basic conditions of the internet and the telecommunications market do not 
suggest a linear oligopoly structure nor a steady-state equilibrium. The fixed cost 
of telecommunications-network capacity is significant and sunk, whereas the 
marginal cost of a consumer making a call is small. This is not consistent with a 
constant-average cost structure implied by Cabral (1995), and nor is the cost of 
capacity deployment reversible as implied by Figuières, et al. (2004). 
Furthermore, the potential for network effects to influence demand implies that 
demand cannot be assumed to be a single, linear function. Therefore, 
considering the basic conditions of supply and demand, Cabral’s (1995) and 
Figuières, et al.’s (2004) conditions do not support the proposition that the 
process of dynamic competition described above can be reduced to a model of 
static competition described by equation (1). This raises uncertainty regarding 
the inferences that can be drawn from the static economic models for assessing 
market power and/or the effect of regulatory action on the process of 
competition.  
An important feature of telecommunications markets that is not considered by 
Cabral (1995) and Figuières, et al. (2004), is the process of technological 
innovation of factor inputs. The process results in product differentiation and 
uncertainty. Cabral does note that his conclusion is robust to shocks in supply 
and demand; however, this is predicated on the linear oligopoly structure. 
Figuières, et al. do not consider the challenges in identifying a steady state 
equilibrium for firms that choose feedback (subgame-perfect) strategies if the 
cost of factor inputs are changing at potentially random intervals. 
2.4 Dynamic competition, timing of investment, and uncertainty 
The process of dynamic competition in the market for telecommunications 
services has firms making irreversible investments when there is uncertainty in 
supply and demand. Under these conditions, Dixit & Pindyck (1994, pp. 136-
140), utilising the real-options framework, point out that there is significant 
value in the timing of an investment, particularly in the option to delay an 
investment. The value of delay is that it allows the uncertainty to be resolved in 
time, thereby avoiding a potential loss of the sunk cost of an earlier, irreversible 
investment.  
Dixit & Pindyck (1994, pp. 136-140) emphasise that it is not optimal for a firm to 
make an irreversible investment unless the current value of the investment is 
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greater than the sunk cost plus a margin that at least covers the firm to invest at 
a future time. Furthermore, they emphasise that the value of the option to invest 
at a future time is not only a function of uncertainty in the basic conditions of 
supply and demand, but also the expected changes in supply and demand (Dixit 
& Pindyck, 1994, pp. 136-140). One of the features of the telecommunications 
market seems to be an inherent expectation of technological progress. This is 
captured by the concept of ‘Moore’s Law’, which is an assertion based on 
historical trends and a survey of trends in research and development, that the 
power of integrated circuits doubles approximately every two years. Integrated 
circuits are a key hardware input for the supply of telecommunications services. 
In addition, there is software – the programs and applications – which run on 
the hardware. The Moore’s Law concept has been extended from integrated 
circuits through to network technologies. 42 Therefore, in order to understand 
the effect of uncertainty and rivalry on the timing of investment decisions, it is 
useful to start by excluding these factors and consider the timing of investment 
decisions for the deterministic case.   
Dixit & Pindyck (1994, pp. 138,139) analyse the case of the optimal timing of a 
monopoly investing when there is no uncertainty. The future value of an 
irreversible investment is known to be , where  is the rate at 
which the value of the project changes. The objective is to find the time  when 
it is optimal to pay a sunk cost  that maximises the present value of the 
investment opportunity: 
  (5) 
where  is the discount rate.  
Dixit & Pindyck (1994, p. 138) highlight that if the value of the investment is 
increasing at a rate that is greater than the discount rate, or , then it would 
be rational to delay indefinitely the investment. In the case of 
telecommunications networks, if there is no or insignificant uncertainty that the 
performance of electronic technologies in the network would double 
                                                        
42 See appendix A.8 for detailed discussion of the history and role of Moore’s Law. 
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approximately every two years, as suggested by Moore’s Law, then . In 
this deterministic case, suppose that the discount rate is equivalent to a firm’s 
cost of capital of 10%. This implies that  is less than , which indicates that a 
monopoly would not invest, as the value of equation (5) would become 
indefinitely large by choosing a larger .  
However, for the deterministic case, Dixit & Pindyck (1994, p. 138) show that the 
monopoly will invest, when , if: 
  (6) 
That is, the investment will be made once the current value of the investment is 
equal to or greater than the sunk cost. This result follows from the observation 
that exercising the option to invest forgoes the future investment, thus resulting 
in an opportunity cost. The key point is that it is not optimal to make the 
irreversible investment unless the current value of the investment is greater than 
the sunk cost plus the cost of any future investment opportunities. 
Introducing competition into the deterministic case may induce firms to invest 
earlier; however, as discussed in section 2.3, any competitive equilibrium will 
depend on the nature of the rivalry that is assumed to exist. For example, 
suppose consumers incur a cost when switching between rivals, then the future 
value of the competing firms’ irreversible investment is not only a function of the 
timing of the investment but also the timing of any subsequent competing 
investment.43 If in the extreme case where switching costs are zero, thus 
allowing consumers to easily switch to the firm with the better performing 
technology, then competing firms are likely to wait to invest until just after their 
competitor invests. The reason is that if a firm attempts to invest before its 
competitor then its irreversible investment would become stranded once the 
competitor invests in a later, better-performing technology, giving it a 
                                                        
43 Farrell & Klemperer (2007, p. 1977) define a consumer’s switching cost between 
sellers as an investment the consumer has made with respect to the current seller that 
the consumer must duplicate for a new seller. Examples Farrell & Klemperer highlight 
include investment in equipment, setting up relationships, learning to use a product, 
and extends to non-linear tariffs involving volume discounts.     
 28 
competitive advantage. Therefore, there would be no incentive to invest as each 
firm would wait until the other firm to invest before it invested.  
If consumers incur significant switching costs then each firm may have the 
incentive to invest before their rivals, as they will not lose all customers to their 
competitors. Network effects may induce switching costs. Consumers may 
benefit from other consumers purchasing a service either directly due to an 
ability to communicate with each other, or indirectly due to technical 
compatibility with a greater range of support and secondary services. If 
consumers expect to lose these benefits if they switch to a rival product, then 
this may induce firms to invest earlier rather than later. However, this will 
depend on the size of the switching cost relative to the rate of technological 
improvement, and whether improvements will obviate any benefits induced by 
the network effects. The greater the switching cost, the longer a competitor will 
have to wait for the performance of the technology to improve and thus gain a 
competitive advantage sufficient to overcome the switching costs. Thus, the 
absence of a technology with a competitive advantage allows the firm making the 
initial investment to derive value from this investment.  
Reintroducing uncertainty, Grenadier (2002) and Novy-Marx (2007) show that 
the structure of production costs and the description of the strategic interaction 
between firms are significant determinants of the value of the real option 
premium required to induce competing firms to invest. Grenadier (2002), using 
a continuous-time Cournot-Nash description of a market for a homogeneous 
good, and production costs that vary linearly (and therefore continuously) with 
output, shows that the firms’ real option premia erode with the increasing 
number of competing firms. Grenadier concludes that the real option premium 
is positive and a maximum for a monopoly, and converges on zero as the 
number of competing firms increases to infinity. Grenadier also identifies the 
market with an infinite number of firms with a perfectly competitive market.44 
The firms’ real option premia in the case of the oligopolistic equilibrium is 
between the extremes for the monopoly and perfect competition. 
                                                        
44 In an industry with production-technology costs that are linear and incremental, 
Kogan (2001) and Leahy (1993) show that competition reduces the value of the real 
options back to the zero net present value investment rule. 
 29 
This suggests that the real option premium for an irreversible investment in a 
telecommunications technology is greater than zero as the number of firms in a 
telecommunications market is generally not exceptionally large.45 Grenadier 
(2002) also shows that the magnitude of these premia is socially optimal, given 
the objective is to maximise the present value of future consumer surplus 
assuming that the number of firms competing in the market is exogenous. No 
conclusion can be drawn regarding the optimal number of firms and the implied 
value of the premia, as Grenadier does not have the process of competitive entry. 
Novy-Marx (2007) models competition in a market that has many features 
consistent with a process of dynamic competition in telecommunications 
markets. Novy-Marx assumes competing firms’ assets are costly, built in 
increments, and produce a flow of goods or service flow. In the case of 
telecommunications, once the capacity of a network is installed, the marginal 
cost of a call is insignificant. Adapting Novy-Marx’s analysis to the 
telecommunications market, Novy-Marx assumes that the market-clearing price 
for calling conforms to a constant-elasticity inverse demand function, where 
demand stochastically evolves. 
Novy-Marx (2007) concludes: 
… in industries in which opportunity costs and heterogeneity are 
important, real option values are significant, investment decisions are 
delayed, and investment is lumpy and intermittent. Moreover, this is true 
even when competition drives oligopoly rents to zero, because significant 
rents still accrue to the production technology. (Novy-Marx, 2007, p. 
1462) 
Taking opportunity costs and heterogeneity into account leads to option premia 
greater than suggested by Grenadier, and firms continue to place significant 
value on the timing of investment even if an industry converges on vigorous 
competition. 
                                                        
45 See section 5.4 for discussion on entry and exit in the New Zealand market. In the case 
of telephony services, up until 2009 there were two mobile network operators and up to 
three standalone fixed-line operators in some regions.  
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Given irreversible, lumpy investments and uncertainty on timing, Novy-Marx 
(2007) shows that it is optimal for a firm to adopt a mixed strategy of either 
investing before or after its rival, but it is not optimal to invest at the same time 
nor on the same scale as the rival. The reason that this is optimal is because it 
minimises the inter-temporal competition between firms. The result is a 
heterogeneous mix in the scale and in the timing of investments amongst rivals. 
This suggests that there is potentially a complex mix of investment patterns 
amongst rivals in a dynamically competitive market as firms not only consider 
the uncertainties in technological developments and demand, but also actions of 
rivals. This will be illustrated later in this thesis when international evidence on 
timing of broadband investments is presented, along with evidence on the 
timing of investments in mobile technology in New Zealand.46 
2.5 Summary 
The internet exhibits the basic market conditions of (i) network effects; (ii) rapid 
development of hardware; (iii) significant sunk cost required to develop 
software; and (iv) large, sunk costs to build the capability or capacity to supply 
services and, once built, low marginal cost to supply services. These basic 
conditions have a significant effect on the conduct of dynamic competition. That 
is, the conduct of competition is not based on output volume and price at the 
margin. It is based on providing better quality and/or lower-cost services in 
order to gain a competitive advantage with the risk that a new competing service 
will emerge that will result in asset stranding. 
This process of dynamic competition is inconsistent with conditions that would 
logically reduce dynamic competition to static competition. Firstly, the models 
of dynamic competition that are reduced to static competition assume that 
competitive conduct is based on a firm’s choice of output quantity or price for a 
homogeneous good or service, which is consistent with conduct where firms seek 
competitive advantage through investment. Not withstanding this first 
inconsistency, and assuming that competition is based on a choice of quantity or 
price, dynamic competition is reduced to static competition for a linear 
                                                        
46 International evidence on timing of broadband investments is presented in Figure 6 
and evidence on the timing of investments in mobile technology in New Zealand is 
presented in Figure 7. 
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oligopoly structure or there is a stable steady-state market equilibrium in the 
long run. The description of the basic market conditions indicates that neither of 
these conditions hold. The average cost of telecommunications services is not 
constant with output due to incremental, fixed costs that are sunk, and demand 
is not linear due to network effects. 
The role of innovation and investment is a central feature of the conduct of 
dynamic competition within telecommunications markets. The resulting 
uncertainty and irreversibility associated with these investments implies that 
firms place significant value on the timing of these investments. Furthermore, 
the effect of the level of competition on the timing of the investment is sensitive 
to the structure of costs. If costs vary continuously with capacity, then at the 
limit with an infinite number of competing firms, investment timing has no 
value. However, if the investment in capacity is made in significant increments, 
then even at the limit with an infinite number of firms, firms will place a value 
on maintaining flexibility when making investment decisions. 
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3  Regulating access 
A justification for regulating segments of a telecommunications network is 
because they exhibit natural-monopoly characteristics. It is usual to start an 
analysis of optimal access pricing by proposing that some segments of a 
telecommunications network, particularly the local access network, are natural 
monopolies.47As an incumbent typically vertically integrates the local access 
network to its own services that are available in competitive retail markets, and 
competitors in the retail market require access to the local access network, 
regulation of access to the local access network is seen as a means to promote 
welfare.  
If the sunk cost of building the alternative access network is sufficiently large 
relative to the size of the market, then it is uneconomic for a competitor to 
bypass the local loop. It follows that without a competitor the incumbent faces a 
downward sloping demand curve, thus making it profitable for the incumbent to 
raise prices above the competitive level. Equation (1), section 2.3, is an index of 
the exercise of market power. It measures the extent to which prices in a market 
deviate from the perfect competition standard, where the deviation is measured 
by . However, a condition of drawing inferences from  regarding market 
power depends on the existence of a stable, steady-state, equilibrium. 
The telecommunications industry has undergone a transformation with the 
emergence of the internet that suggests the market equilibrium is not stable. The 
literature on the optimal pricing of network interconnection cited in sections 3.1 
and 3.2 assumes that retail access to a telephony network and calling are in 
separate markets, and that there is a stable association between these retail 
services and physical elements of a telephony network.48 The development of the 
                                                        
47 Analyses of optimal access pricing that start by proposing that access to a 
telecommunications network is a natural monopoly include Mitchell & Vogelsang (1991, 
p. 14), Vickers (1995), Armstrong, Doyle, & Vickers (1996), Armstrong (1998), Laffont & 
Tirole (1994) and (2000, p. 16), Armstrong (2002, p. 297), Dewenter & Haucap (2007, 
pp. 2, 5), and Gans (2007, p. 42). 
48 A distinction is made throughout this chapter between telephony services and the 
internet. Telephony services are the traditional access to, and calls carried over, a public- 
switched telephone network. The internet is access to the internet, which includes dial-
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internet altered this association, resulting in the significant transformation of 
the industry structure. It is this transformation that is of particular interest as it 
suggests that industry structure was not as stable as assumed by this literature. 
Carlton & Perloff (2004, p. 4) show that market structure depends on demand 
and supply conditions. If these basic conditions are stable, then market structure 
will be stable and thus exogenous to the optimisation problem. However, as 
discussed in the preceding chapter, these basic conditions are not stable. 
Uncertainty has a significant influence on firm conduct and thus industry 
structure. Furthermore, under these conditions, when investment is irreversible, 
optional regulated wholesale access prices compensate for the cost of a firm’s 
forgone investment opportunities. Not compensating for these forgone 
opportunities is likely to lead to under investment that is detrimental to dynamic 
efficiency. 
Defining separate markets for an access service and calling service, or 
alternatively treating access and calling as part of a single telephony service, 
determines the structure of any search for competitive substitutes. Defining and 
then finding a lack of competition in a ‘market for access’ or a ‘market for calling’ 
may result in suboptimal outcomes if the effect of a constraint on the access fee 
or calling price recognises neither a firm’s nor a consumer’s incentives. 
A numerical example, based on the theory of two-part tariffs set out in appendix 
B, is used to illustrate the effect on these incentives on the structure of a two-
part tariff and market performance. The central observation is that market 
performance is not separable into an optimal access fee or an optimal call price 
that can be determined independently. The optimal access fee and call price are 
not independent of each other, and the structure of the optimal two-part tariff 
differs depending on whether the objective is to maximise a firm’s profits or to 
maximise consumer surplus subject to a non-negativity constraint on the firm’s 
profits. 
This chapter starts by examining the assumptions made in the literature on 
optimal pricing of network interconnection about the structure of the telephony 
                                                                                                                                                     
up and broadband technologies, as well as the services carried over the internet. 
Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of the respective technologies.   
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market, and considers the role of conduct on determining industry structure.  
The discussion then turns to the implications of treating access and calling as 
separate services on allocative efficiency. This is followed by a discussion on the 
economic objective of regulation, which is proposed to be to optimise dynamic 
efficiency, explaining the distinction between industry specific and antitrust 
regulation. Finally, attention turns to factors to consider when determining 
whether or not a market is competitive, particularly when that market is 
dynamic.  
3.1 Structure of the telephony market presented in the literature 
Much of the literature on pricing of interconnection access to a telephony 
network relies on the premise that there is a stable association between physical 
network elements and pricing of telephony services.49 The development of the 
internet illustrates that this association is not stable, and that it is the product of 
the conduct of industry participants given uncertain consumer demand and 
uncertain supply of technological innovation. Industry structure followed from 
the technological and contractual arrangements that firms employ to make 
services available. As discussed in appendix A, both the telephony network and 
the internet network employed essentially the same basic technological inputs; 
however, it is the change in the arrangement of these basic inputs that has led to 
the observed change in industry structure. 
                                                        
49 For example, see Armstrong, et al. (1996), Burnell, Evans, & Yao (1996), Armstrong 
(1998), Laffont & Tirole (1994), Laffont, Rey, & Tirole (1998a) (1998b), Carter & Wright 
(1999), Laffont & Tirole (2000, pp. 97-136), Armstrong (2002, pp. 297, 298-337), 
Vogelsang (2003), Dessein (2003), and Dewenter & Haucap (2007, p. 6). 
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Laffont & Tirole’s (2000, p. 100 Figure 3.2) illustration of one-way (OW) 
interconnection, presents the generally accepted view of industry structure:50 
Figure 2: Telephony market structure with long-distance competition 
 
Source: Laffont & Tirole (2000, p. 100 Figure 3.2) 
Using Laffont & Tirole’s (2000, p. 100) terminology, the structure shows that 
the incumbent owns the local loops51 and a long-distance (LD) toll-call network, 
and the competing entrants own a separate LD network. In order to provide a 
competing LD service, entrants require OW interconnection to the incumbent’s 
local loop to originate and terminate toll calls with consumers connected to the 
incumbent’s local loop. LD calls remain distinct and separate from calls that 
remain within the local loop. 
The industry structure implied by Figure 2 conflates the access and calling prices 
with segments of the network’s physical elements. That is, the physical elements 
that make up the local loop are associated with access prices and the physical 
elements that make up the LD network’s LD prices. The effect is that access and 
calls are treated as separate services that are determined by grouping network 
elements into specific geographic areas defined by the network architecture. The 
                                                        
50 The structure of one-way interconnection assumed by Armstrong, et al. (1996), 
Burnell, Evans, & Yao (1996), Armstrong (1998), Laffont & Tirole (1994), Laffont, Rey, & 
Tirole (1998a) (1998b), Carter & Wright (1999), Laffont & Tirole (2000, pp. 97-136), 
Armstrong (2002, pp. 297, 298-337), Vogelsang (2003), Dessein (2003), and Dewenter 
& Haucap (2007, p. 6) is consistent with Figure 2. 
51 The local loop is the fixed-line, copper-wire access to the telephony network. 
Alternative access technologies include optical fibre and wireless. 
Incumbent’s LD division 
LD entrants 
Local Loop Local Loop 
Origination Termination 
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topology of the local loop defines the local-calling areas, and the network 
elements that connect the local call areas form the LD call services. 
An implication of separating the access and LD calling services, on the pricing of 
OW interconnection, is that the structure of the pricing of OW interconnection 
follows the structure of LD prices. In New Zealand, the OW interconnection 
tariff structure is typically a uniform price per minute. However, as Burnell, et 
al. (1996) explain, the efficiency of two-part tariffs is superior to a uniform price 
per-unit time OW interconnection contract, emphasising that the incumbent has 
the incentive to negotiate a two-part tariff contract that is consistent with a 
decreasing average cost structure of the network, if there is competitive partial 
bypass of the local loop and subject to competition law.52 
This association between the telephony tariff and the physical network elements 
continues through to two-way (TW) interconnection.53 TW interconnection 
differs from OW interconnection in that OW interconnection is where entrants 
need to purchase interconnection from the incumbent and the incumbent does 
not need to purchase interconnection from entrants, whereas TW 
interconnection is where all firms need to purchase interconnection from each 
other.54 TW is illustrated by Figure 3. 
The industry structure for TW interconnection continues the OW model by 
associating the local loop with consumers’ access to a telephony service and the 
LD network with the toll call. It follows that OW and TW interconnection 
contracts are distinct.55 Similar to OW interconnection, separating the access 
and LD calling services has resulted in the structure of TW interconnection 
prices following the structure of local-call prices. 56 
                                                        
52 See section 3.6 for further discussion of Burnell, et al. (1996).  
53 See Laffont, et al. (1998a), Laffont & Tirole (2000, pp. 118-119, 179-215) , and 
Armstrong (1998, 2002, pp. 358-359). 
54 Armstrong (2002, p. 297). 
55 This point is made by Laffont & Tirole (1994, pp. 1690-1692, 2000, pp. 118-119), and 
Armstrong (2002, pp. 316-321). 
56 In New Zealand this has resulted in a transition to significantly different TW 
interconnection prices over time with the development of the internet, which is 
expanded on in section 5.2. 
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Figure 3: Telephony market structure with LD and local-loop competition 
 
3.2 Telecommunications industry structure with the internet 
Figure 4, below, illustrates the industry organisation associated with the 
internet, which replaced the telephony market structure, shown in Figure 3.   
Comparing Figure 4 with Figure 3 indicates the differences between the 
structure of the telephony market and the internet market. 
Figure 4: Internet market structure 
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In contrast to the telephony market structure, the structure of the internet does 
not associate specific physical network elements with access or internet services. 
In the internet market, access to services may extend beyond the local loop and 
may or may not include those physical network elements that had previously 
been considered part of the LD service. The analogue to local loop point of 
interconnection of the telephony market is the peering point of the internet. The 
development of peering and transit contracts, which interconnect the 
transmission networks around the internet, has relaxed the association between 
services and physical network elements.57 These contracts are negotiated 
between firms, who agree on either a peering or transit contract, and the 
location of the point of interconnection. Furthermore, the wholesale service is 
not determined by any of the retail services carried out over the internet. This 
has allowed services provided over the internet, including calling, to be 
generally, technically and contractually independent of the telecommunications 
network that their customers are connected to.58 This has also facilitated a 
significant increase in the range of services carried over the telecommunications 
network, compared with just one voice calling service available on a telephony 
network, as well as allowed the availability of the internet services to be 
international.59 
3.3 Conduct and market structure 
A proposition that generally underpins an analysis of one-way and two-way 
interconnection is that the conduct of an incumbent and rivals proceeds from a 
stable industry structure.60 The same proposition, that industry structure is 
stable, underpins the conjectural-variations framework discussed in section 2.3. 
The conjectural-variations framework defines an index  equation (1) of market 
power along a continuum between the extremes of perfect competition and 
                                                        
57 See appendix A.10 for a discussion on the structure of the internet peering and transit 
contracts. 
58 See appendix A.9 for a discussion on the provision of services over the internet. 
59 See appendix A.3 for a discussion on the growth of the internet. 
60 See sections 3.1 and 3.2 for examples of literature on one-way and two-way 
interconnection. 
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monopoly.61 The analysis of optimal interconnection prices is essentially the 
same as determining the value of  that optimises efficiency. However, when 
dynamic factors are present – such as network effects, technological change, and 
dynamic competition – the validity of inferences drawn from the conjectural-
variations framework, and by implication interconnection pricing that relies on 
static models, must be considered with caution.  
Sutton (2007) explains that in a market with stable demand and supply 
conditions, the firms’ competitive conduct is a key determinant of industry 
structure. He proposes that an increase in the intensity of competition leads to a 
decrease in the number of firms in a market. That is, the conduct of rivals 
determines market structure. The alternative is the model of the market 
structure that associates a monopoly with a single firm, and perfect competition 
that is price based with the presence of many firms in a market. Sutton draws 
support for his proposition from the observation that the introduction of 
antitrust regulation (ATR) prohibiting cartels has led to industry consolidation, 
and countries that are lenient on cartels have less market concentration than 
those that are not. Sutton does not attempt to distinguish between the 
competitive strategies; however, the central observation relevant here is that 
even within a static model, market structure is dependent on the conduct of 
rivals. 
Sutton (2007) focuses on the effect of firms’ competitive conduct on the number 
of firms participating in a market, particularly market concentration. In 
contrast, this thesis focuses on the effect of contractual and technical 
associations on industry structure in a market with unpredictable demand and 
supply conditions. Not withstanding this difference, Sutton’s analysis is useful as 
it isolates how the competitive conduct of firms, given stable basic conditions, 
can determine market structure. It lends weight to the proposition that the 
transformation of the structure of the telecommunications industry, defined by 
the association of technological and contractual elements, is uncertain as it 
depends on the conduct of market participants. However, Sutton limits 
uncertainty to the competitive conduct of firms. The fact that uncertainty in 
telecommunications markets extends beyond the conduct of firms to encompass 
                                                        
61 See discussion in section 2.3 regarding equation (1). 
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uncertainty in demand and supply conditions would seem to add further weight 
to Sutton’s proposition that structure follows from the conduct of rivals. This is 
because the conduct of firms, and particularly their investment decisions, is also 
influenced by the general scope of uncertainty in the telecommunications 
market in supply and demand conditions. 
3.4 Implications of separating access and calling 
Consumers have the option to subscribe or not to subscribe to a mobile service, 
as well as the option to subscribe or not to subscribe to a fixed-line telephony 
service, resulting in four outcomes are: (i) consumers do not subscribe to either 
service; (ii) they subscribe to only the fixed-line service; (iii) they subscribe to 
only the mobile service; or (iv) they subscribe to both the fixed-line and mobile 
services.  
Mao, Tsai, & Chen (2008) observe two forms of fixed-to-mobile substitution. 
First, Mao, et al. observe that in G7 and new industry economies (NIE) 
countries62, where there is a high penetration of fixed-line access, consumers 
mostly substitute their call traffic between their fixed-line and mobile services.  
Second, they observe that in countries without a high historical penetration of 
fixed-line access to a telephone network and where there is less than one fixed-
line phone per household, the pattern of fixed-to-mobile substitution is mostly 
substitution between fixed-line and mobile access. Mao, et al. conclude that for 
the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Brasil, Russia, India 
and China (BRIC),63 the pattern of fixed-to-mobile substitution mostly takes the 
form of access substitution.64 
Extrapolating Mao, et al.’s (2008) results to a New Zealand context suggests that 
most fixed-to-mobile substitution would take the form of consumers 
                                                        
62 G7 countries include France, United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, Italy, United States, 
and Japan. The NIE countries are Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea. 
63 ASEAN countries include Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, and Indonesia.  
64 In addition, Rodini, Ward, & Woroch (2003) estimate cross-price elasticities between 
a household’s demand for a second fixed line and a mobile service, using data from a 
United States household survey conducted over the period 2000-2001, and conclude 
that second fixed lines and mobile services are substitutes. The authors did not analyse 
the substitution effects between a household’s demand for a first fixed line and mobile 
services, as at that time the demand for the first line was constant.   
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substituting their calling between fixed-line access and mobile access, as nearly 
all households in New Zealand had a fixed-line phone at the time the market was 
opened to competition in 1989. Table 7 in appendix A.5 reports that from 2000 
to 2007 the penetration of mobile services in New Zealand grew at a compound 
average growth rate (CAGR) of 13%. There has been a small but noticeable 
decline in the penetration of fixed-line telephone access of 1% for New Zealand.65 
That is, the significant growth in mobile penetration in New Zealand cannot be 
correlated with a corresponding reduction in the penetration of fixed-line access.  
Mao, et al.’s (2008) results raise a question regarding the definition of ‘the 
market’. It may suggest there are separate markets for access and calling. 
Competition analysis would then consider whether or not there is competition 
within the ‘access market’ and the ‘calling market’, and thus whether 
competition between fixed-line and mobile services within these ‘markets’ is 
sufficient to constrain firms’ actions. Taking this approach, Mao, et al.’s results 
suggest that for the G7 and NIE countries, there is competition in the calling 
markets but not in the market for access, whereas in ASEAN and BRIC 
countries, there is competition in the market for access. However, drawing this 
conclusion for the G7 and NIE countries would fail to recognise that access and 
calling are not markets but are pricing elements of a two-part tariff for a single 
market. 
The theory of two-part tariffs expounded in appendix B shows that the access fee 
and call price are elements of a two-part tariff for services in a telephony market. 
In particular, the theory examines the effect of income on the optimal two-part 
tariff, separating out the effect of income on the demand for calling from an 
individual’s participation decision, showing how different assumptions 
regarding these effects leads to different tariff structures. This result would 
suggest that a reason (in addition to the historic penetration and coverage of the 
fixed network) for the observed difference in the form of substitution between 
ASEAN/BRIC countries and the G7/NIE countries is the difference in the 
income of consumers between these countries.  
                                                        
65 For comparison, from 1998 to 2005 the penetration of mobile access across OECD 
countries grew at a compound average growth rate (CAGR) of 19%, and the penetration 
of fixed-line telephone access declined at a CAGR of -2% across OECD (see Table 7, 
Appendix A.5). 
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Mao, et al. (2008) provide data which indicates that the expenditure share of 
income on telecommunications services for the ASEAN and BRIC countries is 
significantly greater than for the G7 and NIE countries, due to the lower income 
in ASEAN and BRIC countries. Chen, et al. (2008) examine in more detail the 
role that income plays in the uptake of the mobile services and the substitution 
with fixed-line access and calling. They define an income effect based on their 
observation that once, on average, expenditure share of income, represented by 
the average revenue per user on fixed and/or mobile services over GDP per 
capita, drops below 5% then mobile penetration increases considerably. This 
decrease in expenditure share is presumably due to price decreases and not 
decreases in demand. Using data spanning 1997 to 2005, Chen, Tsai, & Mao 
(2008, p. 630) highlight that G7 countries’ expenditure on the sum of fixed and 
mobile services dropped from an expenditure share of 5.8% in 1997 to 4.6% in 
1999 and 3.6% in 2004. For NIE countries this expenditure share dropped from 
8.6% in 1997 to 4.8% in 2000 and to 4.0% in 2004. There was a corresponding 
increase in the penetration of mobile services with an observed decrease in the 
penetration of fixed-line services. However, the expenditure share of the sum of 
mobile and fixed-line services did not drop below 5% for ASEAN and BRIC 
countries, although for all countries in these groups there was a significant 
decline in the expenditure share solely of mobile services, which for some 
countries dropped below 5%. For the ASEAN and BRIC countries this led to 
substitution between fixed and mobile services. 
Chen, et al. (2008) and Mao, et al. (2008) support the proposition that a 
telecommunications service is a normal good, and that income influences 
whether competition between mobile and fixed-line services manifests itself as 
either access or calling substitution. 
3.4.1 Description of consumer behaviour 
A theory of consumer behaviour and two-part tariffs is presented in appendix B 
that brings together the access fee and call price within a coherent model of 
consumer behaviour. The model of consumer behaviour is based on the 
standard assumptions of utility maximisation, with the additional assumptions 
that consumers have the option to not subscribe to a telephony service, and that 
consumers who do not subscribe will subscribe as their income increases – i.e. 
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normal participation behaviour. The model is used to analyse optimal two-part 
tariffs with endogenous participation. 
Suppose all individuals in the population have the same preferences, income 
differentiates consumers, and that consumers derive utility from making 
telephone calls  on a mobile network and consuming a composite non-mobile 
good  that includes telephone calls on a fixed-line network: 
  (7) 
Utility is twice continuously differentiable everywhere, strictly increasing, and is 
strictly concave for all individuals. 
Individuals consume the composite non-mobile good that includes the fixed-line 
telephony service, and individuals have the option to not make telephone calls as 
there are other modes of communication, which implies: 
  (8) 
If a unit of the non-mobile composite good has a unit price, and an individual 
with total income  does not make any mobile calls, then the utility derived is: 
  (9) 
A necessary condition for individuals to subscribe to the mobile service and 
make mobile calls is that their utility from subscribing and calling is greater than 
or equal to their utility from not subscribing: 
  (10) 
The arguments of the utility functions on either side of the inequality are not the 
same, resulting in a discontinuity in demand due to the participation decision. 
The term on the left-hand side of the greater-than-or-equal-to sign is the utility 
derived from subscribing and making mobile calls, whereas the term on the 
right-hand side is the utility derived from not subscribing and making mobile 
calls. If the term on the left is strictly greater than the term on the right then the 
individual is an infra-marginal mobile subscriber. If the equality holds, then the 
individual is a marginal mobile subscriber. In this case, the individual is 
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assumed to subscribe even though they are indifferent to subscribing and not 
subscribing. If the condition does not hold then the individual will not subscribe. 
In the following discussion, an infra-marginal mobile subscriber and marginal 
mobile subscriber will be referred to as an infra-marginal subscriber, marginal 
subscriber, or just a subscriber. It is assumed that irrespective of whether or not 
consumers subscribe to the mobile service, they will continue to subscribe to the 
fixed-line services. This is consistent with the observations made in the 
literature, and in the case of New Zealand.66 
Subscribers’ outlay on a mobile service is determined by a uniform two-part 
tariff that includes a fixed-monthly fee for access to the mobile network and a 
price  per call for calls made by the subscriber. A subscriber’s total outlay on 
non-mobile goods and the telephony service must satisfy the budget constraint: 
  (11) 
where  is an individual’s income. Individuals base their consumption decision 
on the trade off between making mobile calls and consuming non-mobile goods 
including fixed-line telephony calls. If they subscribe they will pay the access fee, 
resulting in a reduction in the available funds to outlay on calls and non-mobile 
goods. 
Following from the concavity of utility and the budget constraint, a subscriber’s 
optimal demand for mobile calls and non-mobile goods are,  and 
. Substituting these demand functions into equation (10) gives an 
alternative representation of the subscription decision in terms of the indirect 
utility: 
  (12) 
This is an individual’s participation constraint. Furthermore, it is assumed there 
is an income  that will satisfy the equality: 
  (13) 
                                                        
66 See discussion in appendix A.5. 
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This states that the income of marginal subscribers is .  
In addition, two general conditions – equations (35) and (36) – sufficient to 
ensure that participation in the mobile network is a normal-good are presented 
in appendix B.2. These conditions have influenced the choice of utility function 
used for the numerical example. They ensure that for a given two-part tariff, 
continuing to increase the income of consumers that initially do not subscribe as 
their initial income will eventually lead to them subscribing to the mobile 
service when .  
3.4.2 Numerical example illustrating the effect of competition 
The theory of two-part tariffs described in appendix B has influenced the choice 
of the Stone-Geary function:  
  (14) 
where  is utility, which is a function of mobile calls  and non-mobile 
goods . An individual’s objective is to choose  and that maximise utility 
subject to the budget constraint equation (11). The parameters are , the price 
per call, , the access fee, and , an individual’s income. Faced with this 
optimisation problem, an individual’s demand functions are: 
  (15) 
  (16) 
This allows the determination of the indirect utility function, and with equation 
(13), yields the income  of the marginal subscriber: 
  (17) 
It is assumed that individuals are uniformly distributed over the income 
interval , and that the total population size is 1000. This allows the total 
number of subscribers to be determined by: 
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  (18) 
Also, the aggregate of individual subscribers’ demand for calling is determined 
by: 
  (19) 
The firm’s profit function is: 
  (20) 
Network costs are separated into mobile network elements with properties that 
are representative of networks in the real world. The marginal cost of providing 
a consumer with access to the network is represented by the parameter . In 
addition, to access network elements there are core network elements, which in 
the case of a mobile network includes switching and transmission equipment. 
The cost of the core network element is represented by the cost function , 
which is the minimum cost to supply the total demand for calling. It is assumed 
that the marginal cost of a call is positive, , and is concave in calling. 
A key aspect of this assumption is that the core network is a common cost. All of 
these costs are static. For the numerical example, suppose that the marginal cost 
per call is  and . The fixed cost of the network, which 
is common to calling and access, is , and the cost per mobile 
network participant is .  
Table 1 presents the performance of the optimal two-part tariff under four 
scenarios. The column headed “  max.” gives the values of  and  that 
maximises profit, equation (20), subject to the participation constraint, equation 
(13).67 The next column gives the value of the profit maximising two-part tariff, 
subject to the constraint that . Under this scenario, the firm’s choice of 
the access fee is not subject to competition as it has a monopoly for mobile 
                                                        
67 See appendix B.5 for a description of general conditions of profit maximising two-part 
tariffs. 
 47 
service; however, there is Bertrand competition between fixed-line and mobile 
calls which leads to the price of mobile calls being set equal to the marginal cost 
of a call. Allowing for fixed-to-mobile call substitution is consistent with Chen, 
Tsai, & Mao’s (Chen, et al., 2008) observations. The column titled 
 includes the potential for the entry of a competing mobile 
service. The potential for entry results in the firm setting prices so that it breaks 
even subject to . An implication of  is that the common cost 
 is recovered by a mark-up included in the access fee. The last 
column presents the two-part tariff that maximises total consumer welfare 
subject to the breakeven constraint on the firm’s profits.68 
Table 1: Numerical example of performance of optional tariff 
 max. max.
  
Welfare 
Max. 
Call Price  0.022 0.01 0.01 0.012 
Access Fee  248 313 105 85 
Marg. Customer  499 541 213 185 
Total Calls 2,216,049 4,172,282 7,848,959 6,828,940 
Profit 71,889 63,972 0 0 
Agg. Cons. Welfare 416,848 424,788 620,914 623,116 
Total Welfare 488,737 488,760 620,914 623,116 
 
The table shows that the profit-maximising choice of  increases and  
decreases to , compared with the scenario where the firm can choose 
both  and . The introduction of the constraint reduces the firm’s 
profits and the number of subscribers (as indicated by the increase in ), 
increases the aggregate consumer welfare, and results in a relatively small 
increase in total welfare. Even though the number of subscribers decreases, 
                                                        
68 See appendix B.6 for a description of general conditions for constrained, consumer 
surplus maximising two-part tariffs.  
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there is a substantial increase in total calls due to the reduction in . The 
presence of the substantial profit may be sufficient to induce or raise the 
potential for competitive entry. This would result in an additional constraint on 
the firm’s profit  which reduces . This in turn increases the number of 
subscribers (as indicated by the decrease in ), total calls, and aggregate 
consumer surplus and total welfare. The two-part tariffs under the scenarios 
headed and under the consumer welfare maximising scenario 
are similar.  
Table 1 also illustrates that the objective function not only determines the level 
but also the structure of the optimal two-part tariff, as implied by Ramsey-
Boiteux pricing (Boiteux, 1971). It is optimal for a firm that produces many 
products with a profit constraint to price each product such that the ratio of the 
mark up, which is the difference between a product’s price and marginal cost, 
over the marginal revenue with respect to the quantity of the product demanded, 
is constant across all products.  The value of the constant will depend on the 
value of the profit constraint. Comparing and under profit maximising and 
welfare  maximising headings illustrates that this condition may not hold in the 
case of two-part tariffs. To illustrate this point, if the access and calling conforms 
to a constant elasticity demand function, then Ramsey-Boiteux pricing implies 
that the following equality will hold: 
  (21) 
where and are the profit maximising access fee and call price, and 
and are the constrained consumer-surplus maximising access fee 
and call price. Substitution of the appropriate values from Table 1 into this 
equation shows that the equality does not hold: 
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  (22) 
This illustrates that the objective function not only determines the level but also 
a structure of the optimal two-part tariff that differs from a structure implied by 
Ramsey-Boiteux pricing (Boiteux, 1971). The reason it is desirable that two-part 
tariffs must jointly consider access and usage is that consumer utility is not 
separable into these elements and vary with characteristics such as income.  
The results presented in Table 1 do not provide a definitive conclusion regarding 
the efficiency or even the relative efficiency of particular two-part tariffs. The 
reason for this is that these models are static and do not take into account 
uncertainty in demand and supply conditions, nor uncertainty in competitive 
conduct. For example, mobile and fixed-line networks have invested in 
broadband internet access technologies, which suggests a process of dynamic 
competition.69 As the discussion on the conjectural-variations framework 
shows,70 drawing inferences about dynamic processes from static models 
requires a stable steady-state equilibrium.71 
                                                        
69 Quigley & Sanderson (2005) emphasise that competition between mobile operators in 
Canada and the United States is dynamic, where the operators seek to gain a competitive 
advantage by investing in new services. They also highlight that the mobile markets had 
progressed to the point where mobile telephony and fixed-line telephony should be 
considered in the same market as competitive substitutes. The implication for industry 
specific regulation is that if fixed-line telephony and mobile telephony are in the same 
workably competitive market then a regulator should exercise forbearance or otherwise 
risk decreasing dynamic efficiency.  
70 See section 2.3 for further discussion on conjectural variations. 
71 The assumption that there is only one uniform two-part tariff is also a limitation, 
whereas a schedule of two-part tariffs or nonlinear tariffs may lead to a superior 
outcome. Willig (1978), noting that even though a single two-part tariff can enhance 
aggregate consumer welfare compared with a single uniform price per-unit, 
demonstrates that a single two-part tariff may enrich consumers with high incomes at 
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When analysing the performance of observed prices, the two-part tariff results 
illustrate that the access and pricing elements of a two-part tariff cannot be 
analysed in isolation of each other. This is illustrated with the profit maximising 
prices. Furthermore, the relationship between the access fee and call price 
differs from the Ramsey-Boiteux pricing. The implication of separating the 
calling and access into separate markets is that Ramsey-Boiteux pricing may not 
be optimal. If access and calling were in separate markets, then the optimal 
access fee and call price would equal the marginal cost of calling plus a mark-up 
that is proportional to the inverse price elasticity of calling. 
3.5 Dynamic efficiency of regulating access to natural monopoly 
Now consider the regulation of an incumbent that vertically integrates an asset 
with natural monopoly characteristics, which is a necessary input to a 
downstream competitive market. An example is an incumbent that vertically 
integrates a local-loop monopoly and long-distance calling market, as illustrated 
by Figure 2. In this case, the access contract of interest is interconnection. 
Another example involves, again, the local-loop monopoly, but this time where 
the downstream market is broadband internet access, as illustrated by Figure 4. 
The form of the access contract of interest here is the unbundled local-loop 
service.72 
It is assumed in this section that the sunk costs of the local loop are sufficiently 
large relative to the size of the market to make it uneconomic for competitive 
entry, thus resulting in the natural monopoly.73 Furthermore, it is assumed that 
the natural monopoly allows the firm not only to determine the price of access to 
                                                                                                                                                     
the expense of consumers with low incomes. Therefore, Willig concludes, it is Pareto-
superior to offer consumers both uniform and two-part tariffs.  
 
72 The unbundled local-loop service consists of leasing a firm’s access to the individual 
copper wires between the incumbent’s exchange and a consumer’s premises. The firm 
then installs its own equipment in the incumbent’s exchange and connects it to the end 
of the copper wires in order to provide consumers with a broadband internet service.    
73 Sunk costs include the direct cost sunk and opportunity cost of the real options sunk 
when making the investment and building the asset. Regarding the opportunity cost of 
real options, Pindyck (2005b, p. 2) points out that “uncertainty over future market 
conditions ‘amplifies’ the direct sunk cost of entering a market, and can thereby reduce 
the extent of entry and raise prices.” 
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the monopoly asset, but also the timing of irreversible investments in the 
monopoly. The timing of this investment is assumed to have significant value, 
due to the significant scale of the irreversible investment and uncertainty in the 
basic market conditions.  
3.5.1 Dynamic efficiency of regulation 
It is proposed that the objective of regulation is to maximise dynamic 
efficiency.74 In order to clarify the key relationships between dynamic efficiency 
and the setting of regulatory policy, dynamic efficiency is defined by75: 
 
  (23) 
where dynamic efficiency  is taken at . The dynamic efficiency is the 
expected, present value of current and future total market surplus  within 
period , conditional on the timing of the incumbent making an irreversible 
investment that costs  at , where . That is, for  the total 
market surplus is not subject to the investment. This is represented by the 
notation , whereas after  the total market surplus is subject to the 
investment. This is represented by the notation . Dynamic efficiency is 
also conditional on the variance in the supply and demand conditions , the 
change in the value of the investment  over time, and the social discount rate 
.  
                                                        
74 Even though this might be the intended outcome of regulation, Stigler (1971) notes 
that regulatory outcomes are also influenced by stakeholders lobbying for outcomes that 
maximise their individual utility.  
75 This expression is based on Evans & Hahn (2010), with the addition of the parameters 
representing the timing of the firm’s investment decision , and the expected change in 
the consumer’s value of the investment . The parameters in equation 23 are the same 
as those in equation (5), section 2.4, except that in equation 23 they are over discrete 
time intervals, whereas in equation (5) time is continuous. 
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The aim of regulation is to maximise dynamic efficiency by choosing a suitable 
policy  at , recognising that prices  and the timing of the firm’s 
investment decision 
 
may depend on this policy.  
The parameter  represents the change in the value of the investment  over 
time due to technology. In the case of telecommunications, the example 
presented in section 2.4 to illustrate how the value of  might change, follows 
from Moore’s Law, which suggests that the performance of electronic 
technologies within a network doubles approximately every two years. Holding 
all else constant, speculation might suggest that this rate of increase in 
technological performance corresponds to a doubling every two years in value to 
consumers of the investment . The variance parameter   captures the 
uncertainty in the value of the investment . This includes the uncertainty in 
demand for new services due to uncertainty in consumer preferences and 
network effects, as well as uncertainty in the supply of new technologies and in 
the industry’s efficacy to realise the value of the technological progress by 
developing new software.76 
The incumbent’s objective is to maximise the value of an irreversible investment 
opportunity, with a direct sunk cost of  at time , represented by: 
  (24) 
where is the value at  of the investment opportunity. The value of the 
investment is the expected value of the sum of the present value of the firm’s 
current and future profits  within period , conditional on the investment 
 made at . That is, for , profits are not subject to the investment 
, whereas for , profits are subject to the investment . The 
value of the investment is also conditional on variance in the supply and demand 
conditions , the change in the value of the investment  over time, the  
                                                        
76  See discussion in appendix A.8.1 on the internet and a telephony network, and the 
efficacy with which the networks translate the technological developments of basic 
electronic input’s improved performance. 
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discount rate , and the regulatory policy . For completeness, if  then 
the investment would be made immediately, whereas if  investment is not 
expected at any time in the future. Equation (24) shows that the incumbent 
selects  and  to maximise . However, this is subject to the regulatory 
policy and competitive conditions. The choice of  and  are variable only to 
the extent that the regulatory policy and the process of competition allow. 
3.5.2 Description of industry specific regulation 
Two general forms of regulation of interest are industry specific regulation (ISR) 
and ATR. A key difference between ISR and ATR is that, under ISR, a regulatory 
body determines the price and non-price terms under which firms (known as 
access seekers) can access the incumbent’s monopoly assets, whereas under ATR 
the access seeker and incumbent commercially negotiate the price and non-price 
terms subject to court interpretation of competition law. In New Zealand, 
competition law requires that the incumbent cannot use its market power – in 
this case due to the natural monopoly – to limit competition in the downstream, 
retail market. An implication of this difference is that ISR explicitly considers 
the conduct of the market participants looking forward, or ex-ante, in effect 
attempting to explicitly estimate equation (23). Conversely, ATR explicitly 
considers the conduct or a specific act of the participants in relation to an 
existing commercially negotiated contract, and thus does not attempt an explicit 
calculation of .77  
Another substantive difference between ISR and ATR is that there is a 
significant possibility that under ISR the regulator may revisit its estimation of 
 and revise regulatory policy going forward, whereas under ATR this 
possibility is much less likely. The risk that ISR may revisit past decisions has 
led to a regulatory ‘commitment problem’. Armstrong & Sappington (2007, pp. 
                                                        
77 Note that the definition of ATR is limited to the question of whether or not a firm has 
used its market power in order to limit competition. It might be argued that competition 
law is forward looking where there is a merger or acquisition. In this case the courts 
would assess whether or not a merger between two firms or the acquisition of one by 
another would lessen competition and, if it did, whether there were efficiency gains due 
to, say, gains in economies of scale or scope which could justify the action. Therefore, 
regulation of mergers and acquisitions has features that are similar to ISR.    
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1631-1632) underscore that this is a fundamental problem in the presence of 
sunk costs, as a regulator with limited commitment to a regulatory policy may 
choose not to compensate the firm for past investments in order to maximise 
.78 Armstrong & Sappington note that the expropriation may take the form  
of low regulated prices or permitting entry. If the incumbent anticipates 
expropriation of some form they will typically undertake too little investment.   
As already noted in section 2.4, Dixit & Pindyck (1994, pp. 136-140) emphasise 
that it is not optimal for a firm to make an irreversible investment unless the 
current value of the investment is greater than the direct sunk cost plus a margin 
that is at least equal to the opportunity cost to invest at a future time, which 
implies:79 
   (25) 
Dixit & Pindyck (1994, pp. 140-147) define the optimal timing of the investment 
decision in terms of a threshold value for the investment. If  then the 
optimal time to invest is at , whereas if  will not and the optimal 
time to invest will be . The investment will be made if its current value is 
greater than or equal to the sum of the sunk cost of the irreversible investment 
and the opportunity cost of waiting. When the investment is irreversible and 
market conditions are uncertain there is value in waiting to gain additional 
information as the market conditions develop. Dixit & Pindyck show, in general, 
both growth due to technological developments  (as discussed in chapter 
2), and uncertainty  can create value in waiting and affects investment 
timing.80 
                                                        
78 Evans & Quigley (2000) examine this issue in relation to the enforcement of contracts 
under competition law. 
79 This follows from equation (6), section 2.4, with the inclusion of uncertainty. 
80 The present discussion focuses on the option value of waiting before making an 
investment; however, Alleman & Rappoport (2002, p. 394) explain that real options can 
take a variety of forms including the option to abandon an asset, shutdown and restart 
an asset, delay or default on a project, expand the scale of an investment, amongst 
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Pindyck (2004, 2005a, 2007) argues that under ISR the access prices to 
unbundled local loop in the United States are inefficiently low as they do not 
take into account the option for the incumbent to defer the investment. 
Hausman, Pakes, & Rosston (1997), Hausman (1998), and Hausman & Sidak 
(2005, p. 188) support Pindyck’s assessment of regulatory pricing in the United 
States.81 As will be discussed in chapter 5, regulatory practice in New Zealand 
also excludes the value of real options. This policy can be represented by setting 
the access price  such that: 
   (26) 
However, due to the irreversibility of the investment decision and the 
uncertainty in the basic market conditions, the investment threshold i , 
which implies: 
   (27) 
Therefore, it is optional for the incumbent to wait and not invest immediately. 
As long as this condition holds then there will not be investment. Furthermore, 
notwithstanding the assumption that the incumbent owns the monopoly asset, 
low regulated price and non-price terms create a free option for firms seeking 
access. This also adversely affects dynamic efficiency as it reduces the incentives 
to bypass if bypass were efficient.82 Again, due to the uncertainty in basic market 
conditions, an access seeker’s option to bypass the incumbent’s local loop may 
have significant value. However, the access seeker is less likely to exercise an 
option to invest in bypass assets if the access price to the incumbent’s local loop 
is low. Alleman & Rappoport (2002), Hausman (1998), Pindyck (2004, 2005a, 
2007), Hausman, Pakes, & Rosston (1997), Hausman (1998), Hausman & Sidak 
                                                                                                                                                     
others. All these options have value where costs are sunk and there is uncertainty, and 
highlight the value in maintaining flexibility.  
 
82 Hausman (2000). 
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(2005, p. 188), and Hori & Mizuno (2004, 2006) stress that the failure to allow 
for the value of deferring an investment lessens the incentive to invest. 
Reducing the incentive to invest can have significant implications for consumer 
welfare. Hausman, et al. (1997) observe the delay in the investment in mobile 
phone services in the United States had a significantly detrimental effect on 
consumer welfare, due to the absence of mobile telephony services.83 Evans, 
Quigley, & Zhang (2003) model the trade-off between dynamic and static 
efficiency as access prices move closer to marginal cost, and show that there is 
second-best price above marginal cost and below monopoly at which consumer 
welfare is maximised. They conclude that setting prices too low undermines the 
incentives for investment in innovation and may have a substantial negative 
impact on consumer welfare. 
It might be argued that excluding the opportunity cost of waiting enhances the 
incentive to invest. This may be the case if the opportunity cost of waiting is 
solely due to factors which are endogenous to the regulatory process. That is, 
say, a regulator reduces the incentive for rivals to invest and therefore compete, 
or reduces the commitment to a consistent regulatory pricing policy which 
provides certainty. However, in telecommunications uncertainty is not solely 
attributable to the regulatory process. There is also significant uncertainty in 
demand and supply conditions that are outside the control of any regulatory 
process, therefore there is significant value in deferring an investment. 
As noted, a monopoly has not only the power to determine prices but also the 
timing of investments. Grenadair (2002) and Novy-Marx (2007) show that in a 
market with uncertain basic conditions, increasing the number of competing 
firms enhances efficiency.84 As Grenadair and Novy-Marx do not model market 
                                                        
83  Hausman, et al. (1997) show that new telecommunications services can create large 
gains in consumer welfare. They estimate that consumer welfare gains in the United 
States at that time for voice messaging services of $1.27 billion a year and for cellular 
telephone services of $50 billion a year. Brynjolfsson, et al. (2003) estimate that the 
increased product variety of online bookstores enhanced consumer welfare by $731 
million to $1.03 billion in the year 2000. 
84 Grenadair (2002) and Novy-Marx (2007) both argue that increasing the number of 
rivals enhances efficiency; however, they differ in the extent to which they believe 
efficiency is enhanced. Grenadair argues that as the number of rivals becomes large, the 
value of a firm’s option to defer investment becomes negligible. In contrast, Novy-Marx 
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entry, the implication of this result for regulation is not that more firms in a 
market enhance efficiency. Sutton (2007) stresses that it is conduct, not the 
number of firms, that affects efficiency. The implication for regulation in a 
dynamic market is that it is required to consider jointly the effect of a policy on 
pricing decisions and timing of investment. However, there is not a one-to-one 
relationship between price and timing.  
In a static market where market conditions are constant and competition is 
limited, the idea of market power, where a reduction in competitive intensity 
allows a firm to set prices greater than marginal cost, suggests that it is optimal 
to set an upper-bound limit on price in markets. In effect, this policy attempts to 
emulate or mimic a competitive outcome. Prices above the competitive 
emulation suggest that a monopoly is exercising market power, whereas prices 
below this level suggest that the monopoly is not. Real options theory shows 
that, in a dynamic market, this upper-bound limit must also take into account 
investment incentives. However, Novy-Marx (2007) also shows that there is not 
an analogous concept to the upper-bound limit on price for the timing of an 
investment. He shows that where there is rivalry, sunk costs and uncertainty, 
firms minimise direct competition with their rivals by avoiding to invest at the 
same time and on the same scale as their rivals. That is, there is not a unique 
optimal time for firms to invest, and real option values appear in prices. 
Therefore, it is not clear how to define an optimal industry specific regulatory 
policy which attempts to mimic or emulate particular intensity in dynamic 
competition.  
3.5.3 Description of antitrust regulation 
Under ATR, an access seeker and incumbent negotiate the price and non-price 
terms of a contract that is subject to competition law. Competition law requires 
that the incumbent not exploit its market power and thus limit the process of 
competition. ATR considers the conduct of the incumbent in relation to a 
specific contract. The economic question is whether or not the incumbent would 
have negotiated the same contract had it not possessed market power due to the 
natural monopoly.  
                                                                                                                                                     
argues that as the number of rivals becomes large the value of the option to defer 
investment is significant if irreversible investments are made in one-off increments. 
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With reference to the conjectural-variations equation (1), section 2.3, this is 
analogous to determining whether or not the contract would change if  were 
reduced from a value signifying market power to a value signifying competition. 
If the view is that the contract would differ, then this indicates that the 
incumbent used its market power, whereas if the contract would remain the 
same, then it did not. One implication is that a determination of a misuse of 
market power does not depend on whether or not the incumbent earns excessive 
returns. The fact that an incumbent might earn excessive returns is simply a 
reflection of the fact that it has market power. If the incumbent did not have 
market power, it is given that it would not have earned excess returns. However,  
what is relevant is whether or not the incumbent would have negotiated the 
same contract. 
The economic question also implies that it is not generally necessary to calculate 
 nor determine specific terms and conditions of an optimal contract looking 
forward (unlike with ISR). However, legal precedent has the potential to 
influence future contracts. An important example is the New Zealand courts’ 
decision that the use of the efficient component pricing rule (ECPR) for 
determining interconnection prices is not anti-competitive. In a survey of access 
pricing, Vogelsang (2003, p. 834) notes the ‘simple version’ of ECPR states that 
the access price is sufficient to meet the incumbent’s operational cost and the 
opportunity cost of the asset invested in to provide the access service, where the 
opportunity cost includes the profits that the incumbent would forgo from the 
loss of market share to the access seeker due to competition in the retail market. 
The efficient component price can be calculated by deducting the incremental 
cost the incumbent avoids by not supplying the retail service off the incumbent’s 
retail price. However, even though ECPR may not be anti-competitive, it may 
not necessarily optimise (23) as it may allow the incumbent to earn monopoly 
returns.  
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Vogelsang (2003, p. 835) sets out the conditions identified in the literature for 
ECPR to be welfare-optimal that include: 
• The downstream services of the incumbent and entrant(s) are perfect 
substitutes. 
• The entrants have no market power (Bertrand competition 
downstream). 
• The downstream industry process at constant returns to scale. 
• There is no bypass in the upstream market. 
 
Using static models, Laffont & Tirole (1994), and Laffont, et al. (1998a, 1998b) 
propose a variety of amendments to the ‘simple’ ECPR model to take into 
account a variety of situations where these conditions do not hold. In addition, 
Alleman & Rappoport (2006) and Clark & Easaw (2007) use real-options theory 
to extend the analysis to include uncertainty in demand, drawing the conclusion 
that opportunity cost includes the option for the incumbent to defer investment. 
If this opportunity cost is not considered in the investment decision then there 
would be suboptimal level of investment.  
3.6 Regulatory intervention and dynamic competition 
If the objective of regulation is to maximise , then regulation cannot expect 
to define a policy that results in an outcome that is superior to a dynamically 
competitive market. As discussed in chapter 2, dynamic competition85 is 
characterised by rivalry in terms of price, as well as altered, improved or new 
products or production techniques; brand awareness and reputation; and the 
provision of information to consumers.86 Society benefits from this process of 
dynamic competition as it induces companies to be internally efficient, allocates 
                                                        
85 Dynamic competition is consistent with the legal standard of workable competition 
where “Workable competition means a market framework in which the pressures of 
other participants (or the existence of potential new entrants) is sufficient to ensure that 
each participant is constrained to act efficiently and in its planning to take account of 
those other participants as are known quantities. To that end, there must be an 
opportunity for each participant to achieve an equal footing with the efficient participant 
in the market by having equivalent access to the means of entry, sources of supply, 
outlets for product, information, expertise and finance”(Donald & Heydon, 1978). 
86 See Quigley (2004) for a discussion on the effect of regulation on the dynamic 
efficiency of the Canadian telecommunications market. 
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resources to uses that consumers value, and makes investment decisions in 
order to gain a competitive advantage.87 
Therefore, determining whether or not a market is dynamically competitive is 
necessary for determining whether or not to intervene with regulation. The 
process of dynamic competition indicates that it is necessary to extend the 
definition of market power beyond one that implies the conduct of setting price 
above marginal cost, as described by  in equation (6), chapter 2. The exercise 
of market power needs to take into account the dynamic features of the market, 
particularly where there are irreversible investments and uncertainty in basic 
market conditions and the conduct of rivals. 
One implication of a dynamic market, as Pindyck (2005b) points out, is that 
“uncertainty over future market conditions ‘amplifies’ the direct sunk cost of 
entering a market, and can thereby reduce the extent of entry and raise prices” 
(Pindyck, 2005b, p. 2). That is, with reference to the conjectural-variations 
framework discussed in chapter 2, uncertain market conditions mean the 
indicator in equation (1) may significantly overstate market power as much of 
the competition occurs before entry, taking the form of dynamic competition, 
rather than price competition post entry (Pindyck, 2005b, p. 23). Hence, a static 
indicator of market power focused on price may suggest that firms are exercising 
market power when the observed conduct is consistent with an efficient outcome 
of a dynamic market. 
Furthermore, as discussed in section 3.3, the presence of irreversible investment 
and uncertainty may result in market structures that are profoundly different 
from those on which static models are predicated. Sutton (2007) argues that 
significant market concentration in one firm may be an indicator of vigorous, 
Bertrand competition rather than a source of market power.  
The process of transformation from the telephony market structure (Figure 3) to 
the internet market structure (Figure 4) illustrates a process of technological 
                                                        
87 Schumpeter (1942) describes how dynamic competition leads to technological 
progress by the process of "creative destruction". The economic value of technological 
progress to society is highlighted by Solow’s (1957) conclusion that 87% of the economic 
growth in the United States in the first half of the twentieth century is explained by 
technological progress rather than by increases in capital and labour. 
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bypass. The calling service offered over the local loop was replaced with internet 
services and this process is still developing. This raises the question regarding 
whether this process of replacement is due to the incumbent exerting market 
power or, alternatively, whether it is the outcome of a process of dynamic 
competition. This distinction is important for determining whether a regulatory 
intervention is required, particularly with respect to those contracts that are 
specific to the telephony market, such as one-way and two-way interconnection.  
Suppose that the local loop is a natural monopoly, and by virtue of some 
technological integration between the local loop and the telephony technology, 
the incumbent is able to extend the local loop monopoly to telephony service. 
This suggests that the incumbent has the means to prevent the development of 
broadband internet access. One reason for the observed transformation in 
industry structure could be that it was the incumbent’s profit-maximising 
strategy. The incumbent invested in broadband technologies as it expected to 
earn greater profits than it expected to earn from the existing telephony 
technologies. That is, the incumbent’s optimised equation (24), where  was the 
investment in broadband technologies, by choosing . The scale of the 
growth of internet-based services suggests that consumers valued these services, 
therefore the incumbent may have been attracted to the prospect of increasing 
profits from the growing telecommunications market. However, even 
though  may be the optimal solution for equation (24), it does not imply 
that it is the optimal solution for , equation (23).  
Again suppose that the local loop is a natural monopoly. Now also suppose that 
the incumbent does not have the technological or institutional means for 
extending its market power to the telephony services. Internet services could 
technically bypass the telephony services. The fact that dialup-internet access 
was available is consistent with this proposition. It seems reasonable to expect 
that the incumbent would respond to the growth in competition from internet 
services, particularly if it was unanticipated, by modifying the price and non-
price terms of the contracts for telephony services, and investing in new 
technologies where they provide a competitive advantage. Therefore, even 
though the incumbent is assumed to have market power due to the local loop, 
the extent to which this is transferred to telephony services is tempered by the 
emergence of internet services.  
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An additional plausible reason for the observed transformation in industry 
structure is that the incumbent did not have market power in the local loop, and 
the investment in broadband technology was a competitive response to rival 
firms. Plausible technologies that rivals may have invested in includes mobile 
technologies.  
Laffont & Tirole (1994, pp. 1690-1692, 2000, pp. 118-119), Armstrong (2002, pp. 
316-321), and Armstrong, Doyle, & Vickers (1996) consider the issue of partial 
bypass of the access network by an entrant; however, they focus on the optimal 
access price for telephony services determined by a regulator rather than the 
effect on bypass of the incumbent’s local loop on negotiated access prices. 
Burnell, et al.(1996) provide an exception to this general approach by modeling 
negotiated one-way interconnection contracts with partial competitive bypass of 
the incumbent’s local loops and all parties offered the same interconnection 
contract. 
With respect to OW interconnection, Burnell, et al. (1996) analyse the negotiated 
OW interconnection contract as potential (and actual) bypass by entrants of the 
incumbent’s local loop increases. That is, they associate particular network 
elements with particular services but relax the assumption that the local loop is 
necessarily a natural monopoly. They find the OW interconnection contracts 
converge on the cost of the local loop as the scope of the rivalry increases. The 
effect of the increased scope of the rivalry is illustrated by the graph in Figure 5 
below. 
Burnell, et al. (1996) assume that the total network cost is a function of network 
output, which can be read either as call minutes or calls. The incumbent is a 
conglomerate that owns the local-loop business unit and a retail business unit, 
where the retail business unit purchases OW interconnection from the local-loop 
business unit. There are also entrant retail businesses that may choose to bypass 
(part of) the incumbent’s upstream network, where it is assumed that there is 
(potential) imperfect or monopolistic competition. The incumbent is required to 
offer its own retail business unit and the entrant business units the same 
interconnection contract. Thus the upstream local-loop business unit provides 
OW interconnection on the same terms to all toll bypass operators. 
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Figure 5: Network total cost function of contracts under (potential) partial 
bypass 
Source: Burnell, et al. (1996, p. 29 Figure 1) 
The vertically integrated conglomerate network business unit chooses the OW 
interconnection contract that maximises the conglomerate’s profit based on the 
extent of potential bypass of the local loop by the entrant, the joint profit of the 
conglomerate’s retail and local-loop business units, and subject to the imperfect 
competition in the market for toll-call services. The two-division conglomerate 
keeps the upstream local-loop business and the retail business as separate 
divisions where the retail unit separately maximises its own profit subject to the 
OW interconnection contract. In the two-division conglomerate, the local-loop 
business takes into consideration the effect of the interconnection contract on 
retail profit as well as its profit, although the retail division acts independently. 
Figure 5 illustrates the outcome of these organisational structures against the 
cost of the network. Increased retail-competitive entry in this model results in 
the network contract approaching more closely the network cost structure. 
Thereby, competition is endogenous to market structure as technological change 
permits bypass. 
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3.7 Summary 
Dynamic demand and supply conditions in the telecommunications market have 
a significant effect on the conduct of market participants. If the objective of 
regulation is to maximise dynamic efficiency, then regulatory policy needs to 
take into account the uncertainty, particularly where a large irreversible 
investment has the potential to enhance efficiency. A highly concentrated 
market within static conditions suggests a firm with a significant degree of 
market power. Yet a highly concentrated market within dynamic conditions 
indicates a level of entry that may be optimal due to the ‘amplification’ of direct 
sunk costs which would result in intensive competition. Even if local loop is an 
enduring natural monopoly, the regulated access price still needs to allow for the 
dynamic market conditions. In this case, assuming that conditions are static will 
lead to under investment that is detrimental to dynamic efficiency. 
A numerical example, based on the theory of two-part tariffs set out in appendix 
B, is used to illustrate the effect of a firm’s and consumers’ incentives on the 
structure of a two-part tariff and market performance. The central observation is 
that market structure is not separable into an optimal access fee or an optimal 
call price that can be determined independently. The optimal access fee and call 
price are not independent of each other, and the structure of the optimal two-
part tariff differs depending on whether the objective is to maximise a firm’s 
profits or to maximise consumer surplus, subject to a constraint on the firm’s 
profits. 
The implication for regulatory policy is that determining whether or not there is 
a competition problem becomes increasingly context specific. If the process of 
regulation is to maximise dynamic efficiency, then regulation cannot expect to 
define policy that results in outcomes superior to a dynamic competitive market. 
However, less can be inferred from the conduct and performance of dynamic 
competition, based on static models of natural monopoly and perfect 
competition, when supply and demand conditions are uncertain. This implies 
that the analysis of perceived competition problems become increasingly context 
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 specific. Furthermore, determining an optimal structure for the market 
becomes more problematic. The imposition of a particular structure on the 
market is increasingly likely to be detrimental to dynamic efficiency because it is 
likely to limit the opportunities available to firms for the recovery of irreversible 
investments. 
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4  International experience 
The international experience of industry specific regulation (ISR) in the 
telecommunications market is varied. Countries opened their markets to 
competitive entry at different times and, unlike New Zealand, when they did 
they instituted some form on ISR of access to the incumbent’s network. 
Contemporaneous with these regulatory changes, mobile and internet 
technologies developed leading to the expansion of and demand for new 
services. This chapter compares the effect of these changes on market 
performance between countries. 
This chapter starts by summarising the key international regulatory 
developments, highlighting the regulatory features that were unique to New 
Zealand. This is followed by closer examination of the performance of the 
regulatory developments, first by direct comparison of prices and the date new 
services began in New Zealand and other OECD countries, and then by a review 
of the literature that used market data from different regulatory regimes88 to 
study the effect of regulatory policy on market performance.  
4.1 International comparison of regulatory developments 
By 2001, the telecommunications markets of most countries within the OECD 
had undergone regulatory reforms that involved opening markets to 
competition, and in some cases either total or partial privatisation of state-
owned telecommunications operators.89 The market in New Zealand followed 
the international trend in regulatory reforms that involved opening markets to 
competition between profit maximising firms that were formerly closed to state-
owned or controlled monopolies. However, a distinguishing and unique feature 
of the implementation of the regulatory reforms in New Zealand was the absence 
of ISR of access to wholesale services provided by the incumbent operator, 
                                                        
88 Regulatory regimes are either countries or the states of the United States. 
89 See Boylaud & Nicoletti (2001, p. 106 Table 1) for the dates when those countries in 
the OECD liberalised trunk, international calling, and mobile markets prior to 1998. 
Boylaud & Nicoletti (2001, p. 110 Table 3) also give the ownership and privatisation 
dates of the incumbent telecommunications operators. See Laffont & Tirole (2000, pp. 
16-35 Section 1.3) for a general history of the regulatory reforms. 
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particularly the absence of specific regulation of access to interconnection.90 The 
price and non-price terms of interconnection with the incumbent network was 
governed solely by antitrust regulation (ATR).  
Table 2: Telecommunications regulation, 1999 
   Interconnection Regulations 
Country Regulatory 
institutions 
Approval 
of merger 
Authorisation 
of charges of 
operators with 
significant 
market power 
Dispute 
resolution 
Pricing Service 
quality 
Independent regulator     X Australia 
Competition authority X X X X  
Independent regulator X X X X X Canada 
Competition authority X     
Independent regulator  X X  X Finland 
Competition authority X   X  
Independent regulator  X X  X Ireland 
Competition authority X     
Ministry91    X X 
Competition authority X     
New Zealand 
Other  No 
authorisation 
X   
Independent regulator X X X X X United 
Kingdom 
Competition authority X     
Independent regulator X X X X X 
Competition authority X     
United States 
Other  X X   
 
Source: OECD Secretariat, cited in the New Zealand Government Ministerial Inquiry 
into Telecommunication (2000, p. 16) final report.92 
                                                        
90 There was the regulation of a universal service obligation called the Kiwi Share 
Obligation as noted in section 1.2. 
91 The pricing and service quality regulation reported here are in relation to the 
monitoring of the quality of telecommunications services for residential customers, and 
a universal service obligation cap on the rental price for the standard residential 
telephone service. See in section 1.2 a description of the obligation. 
92 The New Zealand Government Ministerial Inquiry into Telecommunications, (2000, 
p. 16) final report is a summary of Table A.2 in an OECD Economics Department 
Working Paper by Boylaud & Nicoletti, (2000, pp. 50-52). The interpretation of this 
table in the present work is based on the Boylaud & Nicoletti working paper. The 
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The above comparison of regulatory regimes in place in 1999 highlights the fact 
that interconnection charges in New Zealand did not require authorisation by a 
regulatory institution, with any disputes addressed by the courts under antitrust 
laws. 93 In addition to New Zealand being unique with respect to the absence of 
regulation of access to the incumbent network, Boylaud & Nicoletti (2000, 2001) 
highlight that the implementation of the regulatory reforms also differed 
between countries in the OECD. Differences included the dates that markets 
were opened to competition, the extent of competitive entry, the number of 
foreign entrants, the date of privatisation, and the extent of state control in the 
market.94 
A noteworthy difference has developed between the United States’ and the 
European Union’s approaches to access regulation, particularly the unbundled 
access to the local loop. Renda (2010) notes that ex ante regulation of access to 
network elements, such as access to the unbundled local loop, was introduced in 
the United States with the 1996 Telecommunications Act, and in the European 
Union with the 1998 European Commission Access Notice95. Furthermore, this 
access regulation was based on essential facilities doctrine.96 However, in a 
                                                                                                                                                     
working paper without table A.2 was subsequently published as a journal article 
(Boylaud & Nicoletti, 2001). 
93 The New Zealand Government Ministerial Inquiry into Telecommunications (2000, 
p. 2) states that “As other countries have moved to privatise and deregulate, none have 
followed New Zealand’s approach of almost exclusive reliance on general competition 
law (the Commerce Act). Without exception, they have opted for industry specific 
regulation.” 
A study by Boylaud & Nicoletti (2000, pp. 50-52 Table A.2), which the Ministerial 
Inquiry relied on, shows that in 1999, with New Zealand, the Czech Republic, Iceland, 
Norway, Switzerland and Turkey did not require regulatory authorisation of 
interconnection contracts. In Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey the incumbent 
was 100 % owned by the government, and in the Czech Republic it was 51% owned by 
the government (Boylaud & Nicoletti, 2000, p. 30 Table 3), which may have enabled the 
government to regulate the interconnection prices. 
94 See Boylaud & Nicoletti (2001, pp. 106-112) for a summary as at and prior to 1998 by 
country of the regulation of entry and foreign investment, the market structure, and 
ownership and privatisation of incumbent operators.  
95 See European Commission (1998). This was followed in 2000 by the regulation of 
unbundled access to the local loop (European Commission, 2000). 
96 Renda (2010, p. 24) quotes a 7th Circuit Court decision which explains “a monopolist’s 
refusal to deal […] is governed by the so-called essential facilities doctrine. Such a refusal 
may be unlawful because a monopolist’s control of an essential facility (sometimes call a 
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series of decisions from 2002 to 2005 the United States industry specific 
regulator, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), decided to forbear 
from imposing mandatory unbundling and price regulation on new and 
emerging cable access, fibre access, and wholesale broadband technologies and 
services, while maintaining the regulated access to legacy local-loop network. 
Renda comments that these decisions to deregulate access to networks that use 
new technologies “reportedly provided a tremendous stimulus to investment in 
the US”(2010, p. 25). The European Union has not followed a similar 
deregulatory trend. Renda argues the regulatory framework adopted by the 
European Union mandates rivals access not only to enduring bottlenecks but 
also access to network elements that “could not be conceived as essential 
facility” (2010, p. 29). Contemporaneously with the divergent approaches to 
access regulation between the United States and the European Union, New 
Zealand began to regulate access to wholesale broadband services in 2003 and 
unbundled access to the local loop in 2006.       
4.2 Development of internet and mobile services 
The development of the internet and mobile services has had a significant 
influence on industry structure and regulation. Both developments experienced 
significant technological and demand uncertainty, which has a direct bearing on 
the effect of regulation on dynamic efficiency. 
The description of the technological and institutional evolution resulting in the 
emergent internet, which is presented in appendix A, notes that the evolution 
and development of the internet was not regulated by a government authority.  
There was no ISR of price and terms at which network operators and service 
providers accessed and interconnected with each other’s network. The nascent 
internet developed as a non-commercial network for interconnecting university 
networks, which after 1991 was subsumed into the commercial, interconnecting 
networks that grew into the internet. During both the non-commercial and 
commercial phases of the development of the internet, academic institutions, 
                                                                                                                                                     
‘bottleneck’) can extend the monopoly power from one stage of production to another, 
and from one market to another.” 
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and then commercial network and service providers, negotiated access and 
interconnection contracts without the oversight of statutory ISR.97 
In the unregulated environment, participants had the flexibility to make 
investment decisions and agree contracts. This flexibility was of value in a 
market with significant technological and demand uncertainty resulting in the 
arrival over time of new information about demand, and consumers’ willingness 
to pay for new services.98 Examples of how this flexibility was exercised 
presented in appendix A, include the IP protocol that early developers of the 
internet chose given the other options available. One might speculate that an 
alternative protocol may have been in some sense superior; however, this does 
not lessen the observed benefit of the growth and range of services based on the 
IP protocol.99 Another example is the development of the peering and transit 
contracts which define the commercial terms under which network operators 
exchange user traffic between their networks.100 The choice of peering or transit 
contracts is made by mutual agreement between two network operators without 
any regulatory oversight. The fact that the internet enables a seamless 
communication between two consumers in different countries on separate 
networks, and the significant growth in demand for new, innovative services, 
demonstrates the efficacy of these contractual agreements.101 
The other major development has been that of mobile services. Hausman, Pakes 
& Rosston (1997) provide an indication of the benefits arising from the 
development of mobile telephony services. Noting that mobile services in the 
United States began in 1983, they estimate that the gain in consumer welfare in 
the United States from mobile telephony in 1994 was $50 billion a year.102  
                                                        
97 See appendix A.10 for further discussion. 
98 See sections 2.4 and 3.5.1 for further discussion. 
99 See appendix A.7 
100 The timing of the introduction of mobile broadband services across the OECD 
countries is examined in more detail in the next section. For a description of mobile 
broadband technologies and the pricing of mobile broadband services see OECD 
(2009a).  
101 See appendix A for discussion on these features of the internet. 
102 Hausman, et al. (1997) also claim that mobile telephony technology was available in 
the early 1970s; however, mobile services did not begin until 1983 due to regulatory 
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Mobile telephony services have since evolved further so that they can now 
provide high-speed internet access (thus benefiting from the growth in the 
internet services), which is expected to result in further substantial gains in 
consumer welfare.103 
4.3 International comparison of industry performance 
The variation in the implementation of the regulatory reforms across OECD 
countries that opened state controlled markets to competition enabled Boylaud 
& Nicoletti (2001) to estimate that the general effect of these reforms on the 
performance of the telecommunications markets. They conclude that allowing 
competitive entry to previously state-controlled markets led to productivity and 
quality improvements as well as price reductions in national calling, 
international calling, and mobile services. They also conclude that there was no 
clear evidence indicating that the ownership of the incumbent had an effect on 
performance (Boylaud & Nicoletti, 2001, p. 134). Data limitations prevented the 
authors from analysing the efficacy of particular forms of regulation. 
With respect to New Zealand, Boylaud & Nicoletti’s study suggests that the 
regulatory reforms and market structure resulted in prices that were 34% less 
than the OECD average across long-distance and mobile services (Boylaud & 
Nicoletti, 2000 Table 11, page 41); productivity104 was 1% greater than the OECD 
average (Boylaud & Nicoletti, 2000 Table 11, page 40); and quality was 366% 
greater than the OECD average (Boylaud & Nicoletti, 2000 Table 11, page 42). 
By comparison, for the United Kingdom, which had an industry specific 
regulator, Boylaud & Nicoletti found that the regulatory reforms and market 
structure had resulted in prices that were 35% less than the OECD average 
across long-distance and mobile services (Boylaud & Nicoletti, 2000, p. 41 Table 
11); productivity was 3% greater than the OECD average (Boylaud & Nicoletti, 
2000, p. 40 Table 11); and quality was 471% greater than the OECD average 
                                                                                                                                                     
indecision and the subsequent licensing procedure used by the FCC. Their conclusion is 
that this lengthy regulatory delay caused very large losses in consumer welfare.   
103 See the OECD (2009a) study of the developments of mobile broadband for a 
description of mobile broadband, the mobile broadband technology options and data 
comparing the OECD countries. See appendix C for the dates when mobile broadband 
services were adopted by each country in the OECD. 
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(Boylaud & Nicoletti, 2000, p. 42 Table 11). For Australia, Boylaud & Nicoletti 
found that the regulatory reforms and market structure had resulted in prices 
that were 46% less than the OECD average across long-distance and mobile 
services (Boylaud & Nicoletti, 2000, p. 41 Table 11); productivity was 39% 
greater than the OECD average (Boylaud & Nicoletti, 2000, p. 40 Table 11); and 
quality was 335% greater than the OECD average (Boylaud & Nicoletti, 2000, p. 
42 Table 11). 
These results are generally consistent with De Boer & Evans’ (1996) finding that 
the opening of the New Zealand telecommunications market to competition in 
1989 resulted in substantial gains in consumer surplus between 1987 and 1993, 
mainly due to reductions in price. In addition, De Boer & Evans estimate that 
productivity improvements reduced cost at an annual compound average of 
5.6%.   
These gains in industry performance are due to the process of regulatory reform 
where markets that were once closed were opened to competition. Both Boylaud 
& Nicoletti (2001) and De Boer & Evans (1996) conclude that these reforms led 
to a substantial reduction in prices, thus increasing consumer surplus. The 
change in utility that a consumer derives from a change in prices is due to the 
combined effect of changes in the access fee and call price on utility. This was 
particularly relevant when assessing the affect of the regulatory reforms on the 
New Zealand market where there was rebalancing of access and calling prices, 
where the access price was increased and call prices fell in preparation for 
opening the market to competition. Evans (1996) examines the effect of this 
rebalancing on consumer surplus and shows that the detriment, due to an 
increase in access fees, was less than the benefits of reduced calling prices for 
residential customers after the New Zealand telecommunications market was 
opened up to competition. 
Instead of comparing the utility that consumers derive when presented with a 
particular tariff, a method for comparing price differences between countries or  
price changes over time, which is applied in practice, is to calculate an average 
or a representative consumer’s total outlay on telecommunications services 
based on a usage basket. De Boer & Evans (1996) compare the effect of the price 
changes between 1987 and 1993 using consumers’ usage as at 1987. Boylaud & 
Nicoletti’s (2001) analysis of price differences between OECD countries is based 
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on usage baskets defined and reported frequently by the OECD for making cross 
country comparisons.105 Policy makers and regulators extend this approach to 
reporting price differences between countries in the form of ranking New 
Zealand’s tariffs.106 
Table 3 ranks the prices for telecommunications services available in New 
Zealand and Australia by sector of the telecommunications market.  
Table 3: Performance of New Zealand telecommunications prices based on 
OECD ranking 
August 2008108 
Ranking out of 30 countries 
 
Telecommunications Sector Usage Basket 
 
Nov 1998107 
Ranking Low 
usage109 
Medium 
usage110 
High 
usage 
New Zealand Residential Telephone Services 14th out of 29  20th 20th 18th 
New Zealand Business Telephone Services 15th  out of 29  20th 17th  
New Zealand Mobile Services 9th  out of 24  10th 9th 14th 
     
Australia Residential Telephone Services 17th out of 29  17th 15th 14th 
Australia Business Telephone Services 19th  out of 29  26th 26th  
Australia Mobile Services 5th  out of 24  11th 17th 9th 
 
OECD countries are ordered and ranked according to the consumers’ outlay 
based on the tariffs available in the country with the assumption that consumers’ 
usage within the sector is the same as the OECD usage basket. The above table 
                                                        
105 The OECD reports its usage baskets every two years in the OECD Communications 
Outlook reports. For example, see OECD (2009b, p. 269). 
106 For examples, see the Commerce Commission (2008, 2009), Ministry of Economic 
Development (2004, 2005) and Ministry of Commerce (1998, 1999, 2000) reports on 
the performance of the New Zealand telecommunications market. 
107 Cited in Ministry of Commerce (1998, pp. 14,15). 
108 OECD (2009b, pp. 270-277). 
109 For the Business Telephone Service line, the Low usage column reports the OECD 
(2009b, p. 274, Figure 7.7) ranking for the small office and home office business 
category.   
110 For the Business Telephone Service line, the Medium usage column reports the OECD 
(2009b, p. 274, Figure 7.8) ranking for the small and medium-sized enterprises business 
category. 
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gives New Zealand’s ranking for the residential fixed-line baskets, business 
fixed-line baskets, and mobile baskets in 1998 and 2008. 
The country with the tariff resulting in the lowest outlay is ranked 1st. This table 
gives the ranking of New Zealand tariffs out of the OECD countries included in 
the benchmark. One problem with comparing New Zealand’s ranking between 
1998 and 2008 is that the OECD introduced new baskets and countries were 
added between these two dates. If an interpretation is to be made, the table 
suggests New Zealand’s ranking for residential and business telephone services 
declined slightly and the ranking for mobile services stayed approximately 
constant between 1998 and 2008. The same rankings have been provided for 
Australia because Australia is frequently used as a reference point when 
comparing New Zealand’s economic performance generally. This indicates that 
Australia’s ranking was generally constant for residential telephone services, 
although perhaps declined for business telephone services and mobile services. 
Comparing New Zealand with Australia in 2008, the ranking for residential 
telephone services is lower in New Zealand than Australia; the ranking for 
business telephone services is higher; and the ranking of mobile services is 
broadly comparable. 
However, Boylaud & Nicoletti (2000, 2001) caution when interpreting the 
OECD pricing benchmark. These benchmarks are based on usage baskets for a 
particular representative usage basket that does not take into account 
differences in income between countries, different consumer preferences, and 
the substitutes available within countries. Furthermore, inter-temporal 
comparison of rankings is hindered by the fact that consumer preferences and 
usage changes with time.111 
Two-part tariffs and non-linear tariffs determine consumers’ outlay on 
telecommunications services. The implication is that comparing the price of, say, 
calling in one country with the price of calling in another country, or the outlay 
on a given usage basket in one country with outlay on the usage in another may 
                                                        
111 The OECD (2009b, pp. 268-269) notes “… that in certain countries the prices may 
appear more competitive in one basket than in another. This is commonly the result of 
offers tailored to specific national calling patterns that may mimic the composition of 
certain basket more closely than others.” 
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not provide a valid comparison of the efficiency of tariffs between countries. 
Such a comparison requires knowledge of input costs, consumer preferences, 
consumer income, and substitute services and prices to be the same. Assuming 
that input costs and consumer preferences do not differ across countries, or that 
the effect of any difference on price can be explained and accounted for, then 
differences in income and the availability of substitutes still have a significant 
effect on consumer demand and the optimal tariff for an individual service. Mao, 
et al.’s (2008) and Chen, et al.’s (2008) analyses, discussed above, illustrate this 
point in relation to fixed-to-mobile access substitution and call substitution. 
They show that the availability of fixed-line services and the average income per 
capita significantly influences the average demand for mobile services. The 
theory of two-part tariffs put forward in appendix B explains that the optimal 
two-part tariff depends on the effect of income on consumers’ participation and 
consumption decisions, and income distribution across a population. If the 
intention is to compare the performance of tariffs between countries, rather than 
comparing outlay based on a common set of usage baskets, then the structure of 
the tariffs, in addition to the level of tariffs, needs to be taken into consideration.   
Taken on its own, the rankings presented in Table 3 suggest a corresponding 
ranking of the relative allocative efficiency between countries. Those countries 
with a higher ranking – i.e. lower prices and therefore lower outlay for the usage 
basket – imply consumers benefit from lower prices, thereby resulting in a 
greater allocative efficiency. However, these rankings do not take into 
consideration differences in the input costs between countries. Using an 
engineering model of a telephony network, Alger & Leung’s (1999) comparison 
of the average cost of supply indicates that there are substantial differences in 
average unit costs between five countries due to differences in customer density. 
They estimate that average unit costs for Australia, New Zealand, and Sweden, 
respectively, are about 10-14%, 15-20%, and 23-27% greater, and the United 
Kingdom 19-22% lower, than the United States average. Boylaud & Nicoletti 
(2000, pp. 17, 35) take this and other exogenous factors into account that 
represent income levels, population density, input costs, price structures, 
quality, and intensity of capital by including the percentage of digital lines, the 
ratio of fixed investment over total employment, the ratio of fixed investment 
over mainlines, as well as other indicators. 
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Firms in the telecommunications market attempt to gain and maintain a 
competitive advantage by investing in new technologies that either give a cost 
advantage or enable the supply of an innovative service. The benefits that society 
derives from new services can be very large. Comparing the efficiency gains from 
these investments in innovative services is not captured in prices or even a more 
comprehensive measure of allocative efficiency between countries. Comparing 
the price of services between countries does not provide an indication of the 
performance of a country’s market and the associated regulations. Additional 
information about the timing of the introduction of innovative services gives an 
indication of the dynamic efficiency of the market. This is because the dynamic 
efficiency of a market determines the timing of investments, particularly 
irreversible investments in innovations where there is demand and technological 
uncertainty.112 
This is illustrated by the timing of the investment in broadband access. Grimes, 
Ren, & Stevens’ (2009) analysis of the effect of broadband on the productivity of 
firms in New Zealand concludes that productivity increased with the availability 
of broadband, and that there was no observable increase with the speed of the 
broadband. Therefore, any delay in access to broadband had a detrimental effect 
on the economic benefits due to improvements in firm productivity. 
Figure 6, below, presents the timing of the investment in the fixed-line digital 
subscriber line (DSL) family of technologies and the family of mobile 
technologies across OECD countries. 
                                                        
112 Section 3.5.1. 
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Figure 6: Launch of fixed-line and mobile broadband services113 
                                                        
113 The dates in the table are provided in appendix C. See OECD (2009b, p. 136 Table 
4.15) for the dates that commercial fixed-line broadband services based on digital 
subscriber line (DSL) fixed-line broadband began, and OECD (2009a, pp. 23-25 Table 1) 
for the dates that mobile broadband services began. The OECD (2009b, p. 136 Table 
4.15) gives the year but not the month that commercial DSL broadband began in 
Canada, Luxembourg, Poland, Slovak Republic, Spain, and the United States. For these 
countries, Figure 2 shows the month of July of the year reported by the OECD as the 
start date, with the label '* fixed-line' to indicate this point. Showing the month of July 
does not affect the conclusions drawn from this diagram. Any month in year that DSL 
broadband was launched in these countries could be used and the same conclusions 
would be drawn. The OECD (2009b, p. 136 Table 4.15) gives the month and year that 
commercial DSL broadband began for all the other OECD countries, and OECD (2009a, 
pp. 23-25 Table 1) gives the month and year that mobile broadband services began in all 
OECD countries except for Turkey. The OECD (2009b, p. 136 Table 4.15) reports that 
Turkey began commercial DSL broadband in February 2001, and OECD (2009a, pp. 11, 
42, endnote 23) indicates that Turkey did not have a commercial mobile broadband 
service.  
 78 
The graph shows that the launch of fixed- and mobile-broadband technologies 
spans approximately 10 years. Starting at the left-hand end of the dark-grey bar, 
the ‘fixed-line’ label indicates the arrival of commercial DSL fixed-line 
broadband in the country. At the right-hand end of the dark-grey bar, the 
‘mobile’ label indicates the arrival of commercial mobile broadband services. 
The dark-grey bar is the period over which fixed-line broadband was the only 
mode of broadband available in the country. Both fixed-line and mobile modes 
of broadband were available starting from the right-hand end of the dark-grey 
bar, continuing through to the light-grey bar, and onwards. 
If it is assumed the productivity gains that Grimes, et al. (2009) identified for 
New Zealand firms are applicable to all OECD countries, then this implies that 
those countries, including New Zealand, that launched broadband access 
technologies earlier benefited from significant productivity gains earlier and 
subsequently than those countries that introduced broadband later. 
The graph also shows that fixed-line broadband arrived in all OECD countries 
before mobile broadband. This may have been a function of the timing of the 
availability of particular versions of a technology; however, the graph indicates 
that mobile broadband was launched in some countries before fixed-line 
broadband was launched in others. That is, it seems that there was no 
technological reason that mobile broadband could not have been launched 
before fixed-line DSL broadband.  
An alternative explanation for the fact that mobile broadband followed DSL 
broadband as indicated by Figure 2 was that the ordering was determined by the 
inter-modal, dynamic competition between fixed and mobile services. That is, 
owners of fixed-line networks invested in broadband services in order to gain a 
competitive advantage over mobile networks, and that mobile network owners 
invested in mobile technologies in order to regain the competitive advantage 
that seems to have developed for the traditional telephony calling services. As 
discussed, Chen, et al. (2008) observe that fixed-to-mobile access and call 
substitution is a function of a country’s average per capita income.114 Quigley & 
Sanderson (2005) argue that the fixed-to-mobile call substitution is increasing 
                                                        
114 Section 3.4. 
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in Canada, though constrained by regulated low fixed-line telephony prices. 
Rodini, et al. (2003) show that in the United States over 2000 and 2001, mobile 
service was a moderate substitute of fixed-line service, and that their expectation 
at that time, based on evolving calling patterns, was that fixed-line and mobile 
services would become greater substitutes over time.  
As well as a process of dynamic competition, assuming that the same 
technologies were available to all countries included in Figure 2 at the same 
time, then it seems reasonable to suppose that the timing of the investment in 
broadband services between countries was due to country specific factors. New 
Zealand was unique, as ISR of access to the incumbent’s network did not arrive 
until 2001. With the arrival of DSL broadband in June 1999, Figure 2 suggests 
that New Zealand was one of the earliest countries in the OECD to have a 
commercial fixed-line broadband service.115 It also suggests that the lack of ISR 
at that time did not delay the arrival of fixed-line broadband services. With the 
arrival of mobile broadband in July 2002, New Zealand was also one of the 
earliest countries in the OECD to have a commercial mobile broadband 
service.116 Even though this was after the advent of ISR in 2001, at that time ISR 
did not include the regulation of access to mobile networks.117 
4.4 International experience of the effect of regulation on efficiency 
The literature has examined the international experience of access regulation, 
particularly the effect of local-loop unbundling, on the investment, price and 
demand for telecommunication services. This literature is grouped here into 
those who consider the effect of access regulation on the allocative efficiency 
represented by uptake of services or the price, and those who consider the effect 
of access regulation on investment, where investment is an indicator of dynamic 
efficiency.  
                                                        
115 Canada, United States and Korea launched commercial DSL broadband services 
before New Zealand.  
116 Korea, Japan, United States and Canada launched commercial mobile broadband 
services before New Zealand. 
117 Interconnection with mobile networks was regulated in August 2010 (Minister of 
Communications, 2010). 
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With respect to the effect of regulated access on allocative efficiency, 
Economides, Seim, & Viard (2008) evaluate the effect on consumer welfare of 
competitive entry over the period 1999 to 2003, due to unbundled local loops in 
New York State. The authors conclude that consumers gained 6.2% on their 
monthly account from this competition. Another example is the Berkman 
Center’s (2009, p. 12) pricing study of 59 OECD operators’ broadband services 
in 2008, which concludes that the lowest broadband access prices and highest 
access speeds are almost all offered by firms in markets where, in addition to an 
incumbent telephone company and a cable company, there are market entrants 
who use regulated unbundled local loop or bitstream services. Furthermore, the 
Berkman Center claims that firms in the United States and Canada offer 
broadband services with the lowest speeds and highest prices, where the market 
is structured around inter-platform competition between one incumbent owning 
the telephone service and one incumbent owning a cable TV system. They also 
conclude that unbundling the local loop provides a positive contribution to the 
uptake of broadband services.  
Further support for the proposition that unbundling is more significant than 
platform competition in explaining broadband penetration is provided by the 
OECD (2007a). However, in response, Boyle, Howell, & Zhang (2008), 
correcting errors in the specification of the OECD model, conclude that the 
contribution of unbundling to the level of national broadband uptake is 
statistically insignificant. Distaso, Lupi, & Manenti’s (2006) econometric 
analysis, using quarterly data between 2000 and 2004 from 14 European 
countries, is equivocal on whether or not local-loop unbundling contributes to 
broadband uptake.118 They find that inter-platform competition seems to be one 
of the main drivers of broadband uptake, whereas competition based on 
unbundled local loop does not seem to play a similar roll.119 However, they also 
                                                        
118 Wallsten’s (2006) econometric analysis of broadband uptake across 30 OECD 
countries from 1999 to 2003 also finds that local-loop unbundling has no robustly 
significant impact on broadband penetration.  
119 Cava-Ferreruela & Alabau-Munoz’s (2006) econometric analysis, pooling data from 
2000 to 2002 across 30 OECD countries, also concludes that inter-platform competition 
accelerates the deployment of broadband noting, however, that there are geographic 
areas that are unlikely to be served by broadband services.  
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note that the econometric analysis supports the proposition that lower 
unbundled prices are associated with broadband uptake.  
This conclusion highlights a tension between lower access prices and the 
development of inter-platform competition. Crandall, Ingraham, & Singer 
(2004), using United States data at the state level from 2001 to 2002, show 
competing facilities-based line growth relative to growth in unbundled local-
loop lines was higher in states where the cost of unbundled local loop was 
greater than the cost of facilities-based investment.120 An econometric study of 
more than 70 fixed-line operators in 20 countries over 10 years by Grajek & 
Roller (2009), observes that even though an increase in the intensity of access 
regulation increases the investment by entrants on technologies that rely on 
regulated access to the unbundled local loop, it is not greater than the loss due to 
reduction in the incumbents’ investment.121 Therefore, the effect of an increase 
in access-regulation intensity is to reduce total investment in the market. In 
addition, by treating the level of regulation as endogenous, Grajek & Roller 
observe that higher levels of investment by the incumbent encourages the 
provision of regulated access.122 
Grajek & Roller (2009) analyse the effect of regulation on investment and the 
effect of the incumbents’ investment on the intensity of access regulation. 
However, they expressly do not draw any conclusions regarding the effect of 
regulatory decisions on welfare and price. Their results support the proposition 
developed in the theoretical literature123 that increasing the intensity of 
                                                        
120 This result is supported by Wallsten & Hausladen (2009), using data from 27 
European countries from 2002 through to 2007. They find the number of local-loop 
lines unbundled by entrants is negatively correlated with the number of broadband 
connections over fibre, cable and wireless local loop. 
121 Ingraham & Sidak (2003) find evidence to support the proposition that mandatory 
unbundling of the local loop reduced the incentives of the incumbent local exchange 
operators in the United States to invest in their own network.  
122 De Boer, Enright, & Evans (2000), comparing the performance of internet service 
providers (ISP) between Australia and New Zealand in 1999, find that relative ISP costs 
of the two countries were in accord with the argument that telecommunications 
infrastructure competition in Australia was weaker than in New Zealand. They attribute 
the weaker competition to different regulatory regimes. At that time in Australia, the 
terms of access were governed by ISR, whereas in New Zealand, there was no ISR.  
123 See chapter 3 for a discussion of theoretical literature on the effect of regulation on 
investment.  
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regulation either by lowering access prices or regulatory opportunism is 
detrimental to dynamic efficiency, particularly in a dynamic market such as 
telecommunications. 
Lowering access prices will enhance consumer welfare in the short term if it 
leads to lower retail prices. Höffler (2007) finds that inter-platform competition 
between DSL and cable TV networks had a significant positive effect on 
broadband penetration in western Europe. However, Höffler calculates that the 
“welfare gains from the increase of penetration due to infrastructure 
competition seem not to be sufficiently large to over compensate for the very 
high investments into the basically redundant alternative cable infrastructure” 
(2007, p. 411). That is, infrastructure-based competition is not welfare 
enhancing. 
Höffler’s (2007) analysis does not consider whether or not inter-platform 
competition enhances dynamic efficiency in the context of timing and 
innovation. He only considers the cost and benefits of inter-platform 
competition with respect to static, allocative efficiency. In a static market, where 
firms invest large sunk costs leading to monopolistic competition, the standard 
result is an over investment in competing assets that is not welfare enhancing 
(Salop, 1979). The present value of the expected total surplus into the future is 
an important determinant of dynamic efficiency; however, it is not the only 
determinant. As discussed in section 3.5, an additional determinant of dynamic 
efficiency is the present value of the flexibility to make decisions in response to 
new information. Höffler does not consider the economic value of flexibility that 
inter-platform competition provides. The other papers considered in this section 
do not take into account the economic value of the flexibility to respond to new 
information in the future. The implicit assumption seems to be that the 
penetration or the price of broadband is the main determinant of dynamic 
efficiency, as it is positively correlated with future gains in consumer welfare. 
Therefore, accelerating this uptake enhances consumer welfare. 
4.5 Summary 
The lack of ISR did not lessen competition or reduce performance in the 
telecommunications market in New Zealand. The performance of the New 
Zealand telecommunications market after it was opened to competitive entry in 
1989, and before the advent of ISR in 2001, was not significantly different from 
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other countries that had ISR when their markets were opened to competitive 
entry. Between opening the market to competitive entry in 1989 and the arrival 
of ISR in 2001, Boylaud & Nicoletti (2001) find that long-distance and mobile 
prices, productivity, and quality were generally consistent with comparable 
OECD countries that had ISR. 
New Zealand was amongst the first group of countries in the OECD to launch 
DSL broadband internet access. Figure 6 indicates that only Canada, the United 
States, and Korea launched before it. The literature indicates that there was 
substantial welfare gains for New Zealand from having broadband access 
available, and that the incremental gains become less substantial with 
improvements in the quality of broadband access. The introduction of 
broadband internet access also led to the transformation of industry structure 
illustrated by Figure 4. 
The timing and the size of investment is an indicator of dynamic efficiency, as 
firms value present and future options when making investment decisions. The 
flexibility to make decisions in the future is valuable in the telecommunications 
markets where there is significant uncertainty. As discussed in chapter 2 , this 
uncertainty is due to technological progress leading to growth in the range and 
capability of new technologies – particularly the growth in the internet – and 
demand. With the emergence of commercial arrangements in an unregulated 
environment, these new technologies and contracts that differ significantly from 
those employed by the traditional telephony service, have led to an increase in 
the range of services and in demand. In such a changing commerical 
environment, the flexibility to choose between investing or not, and the form of 
the commercial arrangements, is significant and has significant value.   
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5  New Zealand experience 
Dynamic and uncertain demand and supply conditions have a significant effect 
on the conduct of firms, particularly where decisions involve irreversible 
investments in innovative services. Regulatory policy also has an effect on these 
investment decisions. If the regulated price of access to a natural monopoly asset 
does not allow for the value of deferring the investment, then the monopoly’s 
expected revenue may not be sufficient to compensate for the opportunity cost of 
deferring the investment, resulting in no investment. Also, if the regulator lacks 
commitment to incorporating the value of real options over the life of the 
monopoly asset, then this will have a detrimental effect on investment. The 
regulator may acknowledge the opportunity cost of the investment before it is 
made, but there is a possibility that it will not commit to recover this cost once 
the investment is sunk. 
Dynamic and uncertain demand and supply conditions also mean the conduct of 
rivals in a competitive market is unpredictable and market structure is 
uncertain. In a dynamic market, firms not only compete on price and product 
but also on the timing of investment. They seek to make and time investments 
when competition is minimal. With respect to market structure, a highly 
concentrated, static market suggests that firms exist with a significant degree of 
market power, whereas a highly concentrated, dynamic market can be 
consonant with intensive competition. 
The implication of uncertainty for regulatory policy is that determining whether 
or not there is a competition problem becomes increasingly context specific and 
cannot be inferred from static models. Also, determining the optimal market 
structure looking forward becomes increasingly problematic. The imposition of a 
particular structure on the market is increasingly likely to be detrimental to 
dynamic efficiency, as it is likely to limit the opportunities available to firms for 
the recovery of irreversible investments. 
The New Zealand experience is of interest because from the deregulation of the 
market in 1989 through to the arrival of industry specific regulation (ISR) in 
2001, access to the incumbent’s wholesale services was governed solely by 
antitrust regulation (ATR). This chapter traces the development of regulation by 
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examining the conduct of regulation before, in the lead up to, and after the 
advent of ISR. Of particular interest is constancy of the decisions under ATR and 
ISR over a period of significant change, and how they assessed competition. A 
striking difference between ATR and ISR is that ATR defined competitive 
conduct and assessed past conduct, whereas ISR had a view of market structure 
that was expected to promote competition. Even though the courts had 
determined certain contracts were not anticompetitive, the government’s 
concept of a competitive market structure influenced contracts prior to the 
arrival of ISR. Then partly in reaction to contracts that developed in a dynamic 
market, this arguably led to the establishment of an ISR institution, and 
subsequently the government’s view of a competitive market structure led to the 
introduction of further regulations. This chapter examines each of these phases 
of the development of ISR. This is followed by an analysis of the effect of ISR on 
entry and the process of dynamic competition over the period of 1989 to 2008.  
5.1 Defining competition under ATR 
In a landmark decision in 1994, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
(Privy Council) established case law defining anti-competitive conduct under the 
Commerce Act 1986, s 36.124 A dispute between Clear and Telecom had emerged 
during the negotiation of an interconnection contract.125 Clear claimed that 
                                                        
124 The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was New Zealand’s highest court of 
appeal. It ended hearing appeals in relation to all decisions of New Zealand courts made 
after 31 December 2003, when it was replaced by the Supreme Court of New Zealand.  
125 In October 1990, Clear Communications Ltd (Clear) registered as a network operator 
pursuant to the Telecommunications Act 1987. It signed toll-by pass and local access 
interconnection agreements with Telecom on March 1991 ("Telecom Corporation of New 
Zealand Ltd v Clear Communications Ltd," 1994, p. 392), and commenced commercial 
operation on April 1991 (Ministry of Commerce, 1997, Section 7.1).  
Clear required interconnection to Telecom’s network in order to provide calling with 
ubiquitous coverage. Local access interconnection allowed consumers on Clear’s access 
network to call consumers on Telecom’s access network. Furthermore, in the case of toll 
by-pass, interconnection allowed consumers on Telecom’s access network to place toll 
calls over Clear’s toll-call networks. Therefore, Telecom had two roles: one as the 
provider on an essential input to Clear’s downstream services, and another as Clear’s 
competitor.  
During the process of negotiating the interconnection contract, a dispute emerged that 
led to litigation in 1991. ("Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Clear 
Communications Ltd," 1994, pp. 392-395). Clear claimed that Telecom’s terms were in 
breach of s 36 of the Commerce Act 1986. Clear argued that the terms of the contract 
were an exploitation of Telecom’s dominance. The Court of Appeal accepted Clear’s 
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Telecom exploited its market power in the local-access telephony market and set 
interconnection prices that were anticompetitive in the downstream market for 
long-distance toll-calls.126 
The Privy Council defined anti-competitive conduct as conduct that could not be 
profitable for a hypothetical firm that was the same in all respects as the 
incumbent, except that it does not have market power.127 This test is referred to 
as the counterfactual test, as it relies on defining a hypothetical firm that is the 
same as the firm with market power in all respects except that it does not have 
market power.128 The Privy Council also decided that wholesale access prices 
based on the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) was not an anti-
competitive use of market power.129 
The counterfactual test defines market power and (anti) competitive conduct in 
static terms. Drawing on the conjectural-variations framework in section 2.3, 
equation (1) measures market power as an index  along a continuum from a 
firm without market power in perfectly competitive  to a firm with market 
power that is a monopoly . The test states that conduct is not 
anticompetitive if it is profitable irrespective of the value of . However, if the 
                                                                                                                                                     
argument. In response, Telecom appealed to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council  
("Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Clear Communications Ltd," 1994). 
126 For discussion on telephony interconnection see section 3.1. 
127 The Privy Council’s view was “it cannot be said that a person in a dominant market 
position ‘uses’ that position for the purposes of s 36 unless he acts in a way which a 
person not in a dominant position but otherwise in the same circumstances would have 
acted” ("Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Clear Communications Ltd," 1994, 
p. 403). 
128 The New Zealand Supreme Court decision on Commerce Commission v Telecom New 
Zealand reaffirmed this definition of anticompetitive conduct. The New Zealand 
Supreme Court replaced the Privy Council as New Zealand’s highest court in 2004 
(Courts of New Zealand, 2010). 
129 Noting that the Privy Council decision refers to the Efficient Component Pricing Rule 
as the Baumol-Willig Rule (after the names of the authors of each rule), the Privy 
Council found that “… the Baumol-Willig Rule did not breach s 36 since it did not 
involve the use by Telecom of its dominant position” ("Telecom Corporation of New 
Zealand Ltd v Clear Communications Ltd," 1994, p. 408). 
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conduct is not profitable for a low value of , then it is considered to be an 
anticompetitive use of market power.  
The test does not state that the absolute level of interconnection prices changes 
in the . By definition the absence of market power will lower the value of  
which will lower the interconnection price. Lower interconnection prices would 
lead to lower retail prices for long-distance toll calls, if Telecom notionally treats 
the price charged to Clear as the price it charges itself for terminating calls on its 
own network.130 Therefore, it is the margin between the retail and 
interconnection price that is relevant. 
Telecom argued that its interconnection price was the retail price less the 
incremental cost that Telecom saved by not carrying the toll call, and that this 
price was not anticompetitive. This price is the standard definition of the 
ECPR.131 The Privy Council’s articulation of the ECPR is “in a fully contestable 
market, someone selling to a competitor the facilities necessary to provide a 
service that the seller could otherwise provide that would demand a price equal 
to the revenues that would have been obtained if the seller had provided the 
service – in short the price equals the opportunity cost.”132 
The Privy Council considered whether or not the continued inclusion of rents 
within the opportunity cost contradicted the proposition under the 
counterfactual test. The Privy Council’s view was that it was not apparent, based 
on the available evidence, whether or not Telecom was earning economic rents 
from its local-access network. However, even if Telecom did earn rents, it was 
largely an irrelevant consideration. It would only be relevant if the 
                                                        
130 This is referred to as the principle of comparative parity ("Telecom Corporation of 
New Zealand Ltd v Clear Communications Ltd," 1994, p. 396). 
131 See section 3.5.3 for further discussion regarding the ECPR. 
132 ("Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Clear Communications Ltd," 1994, p. 
386). Also, the Privy Council decision refers to the ECPR as the Baumol-Willig Rule, 
which are names of the authors ("Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Clear 
Communications Ltd," 1994, pp. 386,395-397). 
 88 
interconnection price were so high as to foreclose entry, and Clear did not make 
this claim.133 
The Privy Council’s reasoning was that the ECPR ensured that both operators 
would compete on equal terms in the market for calls. The ECPR provided Clear 
with a signal regarding the incremental cost to Telecom for those service 
elements that Clear would compete on. If Clear was (not) more efficient, then it 
could (not) compete. In a static sense, this would lead to an allocatively efficient 
outcome.  
Furthermore, if the price of interconnection included rents, the Privy Council 
identified either one of two solutions, which depended on whether or not the 
rents were economic rents. If the rents were not economic rents, and reflected 
option value of investment timing, then the presence of rents would attract 
competition in the retail market for access to the PSTN, which the Privy Council 
identified as taking place.134 If the rents were enduring economic rents or, as the 
Privy Council described, if competition in the local access market was limited or 
                                                        
133 ("Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Clear Communications Ltd," 1994, p. 
407). 
134 ATR relies on commercial negotiation to settle interconnection contracts. Burnell, et 
al. (1996) use a static model to show that commercially negotiated interconnection 
contracts converge on network costs to the extent of competitive bypass of the access 
network. 
Burnell, et al. (1996) assume that the entrant’s cost to build at the margin not only 
influences the incumbent’s pricing of retail access fee but also influences the 
incumbent’s optimal interconnection pricing strategy. An attempt to exploit a dominant 
position by increasing interconnection prices increases the incentive on the entrant to 
bypass the incumbent’s network. It would do this to compete for retail customers at the 
margin, in order to bypass the interconnection contract and thereby reduce the average 
marginal cost to itself of terminating calls. Another effect of access bypass is that it 
allows the entrant to earn interconnection revenue.  
Further, Burnell, et al. (1996) compare two tariff structures for interconnection: a two-
part tariff and a uniform price per unit time. As the two-part tariff more closely matches 
the decreasing average cost structure of a network than a uniform price, the two-part 
tariff reduces the incumbent’s risk to unexpected variations in demand and provides the 
entrant with the efficient cost signal for it to decide whether to by-pass the network or 
interconnect. Traditionally however, commercially negotiated interconnection prices are 
uniform prices per unit time. 
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likely to be lessened, then the Commerce Commission had the power under Part 
IV of the Commerce Act 1986 to regulate price.135 
Certainty of legal process and the establishment of case law would maintain 
dynamic efficiency. By not increasing uncertainty, the Privy Council decision 
would not change the option value of deferring investment and thus would 
maintain dynamic efficiency. If the Privy Council decision increased uncertainty, 
then it would adversely affect dynamic efficiency. 
In response to the Privy Council’s decision, the government stated that it 
opposed the use of the ECPR “because it had the potential to lessen 
competition.”136 The rationale for this divergence with the Privy Council’s view 
can be found in a report prepared by the Ministry of Commerce & The Treasury, 
(1995, paras. 110,111 & 124-126). The report proposed that there might be 
“dynamic benefits of competition”137 from pricing interconnection below the 
ECPR. It is argued that pricing below the ECPR price would encourage entry, 
including potentially productively inefficient operators, who would compete 
resulting in an efficient outcome. Decreasing the price for interconnection may 
result in increased entry and thus a reduction in retail prices.  
Rather than focus on the competitive conduct considered by the Privy Council, 
the government posed a policy intended to influence entry into the downstream 
toll-call market. It presented a view of industry structure and its effect on 
efficiency that influenced the finally agreed prices. The Ministry of Economic 
Development notes: “The terms finally agreed between the companies [Telecom 
and Clear] set access prices at levels below those implied by the Baumol-Willig 
Rule.”138 Even though there was no instituted ISR of access, there was tacit ISR 
of access, with the government taking views of policy that were diverging from 
ATR.  
                                                        
135 ("Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Clear Communications Ltd," 1994, p. 
407). 
136 Ministry of Economic Development (2001, p. 6). 
137 Ministry of Commerce & The Treasury (1995, paras. 9, 110 and 124). 
138 Ibid. 
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5.2 Adaptation of contracts in a dynamic market under ATR 
Telecom and Clear entered into an interconnection agreement in 1996 that was 
to expire in 2000.139 Significant unexpected changes in supply and demand 
conditions followed, which led to changes to interconnection contracts in 1999. 
These contractual changes, which included the introduction of new 
interconnection services, are collectively known as the ‘0867 package’ for 
reasons discussed below. The 0867 package was tested in the courts to 
determine whether or not Telecom had exercised an anti-competitive use of 
market power under s 36 of the Commerce Act 1986. The Commerce 
Commission claimed that Telecom contravened s 36 by making an unlawful use 
of a dominant position in a market when it introduced the 0867 package in 
1999.140 At the end of the legal process in 2010, the New Zealand Supreme Court 
decided that Telecom had not made anti-competitive use of market power in 
implementing the 0867 package. The Supreme Court decision also reaffirmed 
the 1994 Privy Council decision that the counterfactual test was appropriate for 
identifying anti-competitive conduct under s 36 of the Commerce Act 1986.141 
A feature of the 0867 package is that it was a contemporaneous response to 
rapid and unexpected changes in market conditions. Another feature of the 0867 
initiative is that it arguably precipitated the advent of ISR of access to the 
incumbent’s network.142 Even though the courts ultimately decided the conduct 
was not anticompetitive, by introducing ISR, the government’s actions indicate 
that it believed different policy settings would enhance market efficiency.  
The local access interconnection agreement that Clear and Telecom entered into 
in 1996 enabled them to hand over local calls that originated on their networks 
                                                        
139 Ministry of Commerce (1998, p. 20). 
140 ("The Commerce Commission v Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd," 2009, 
para.1). 
141 The 0867 case was the first time the recently established Supreme Court had 
considered competitive conduct under the Commerce Act s 36. 
142 The New Zealand Government Ministerial Inquiry into Telecommunications (2000, 
p. 97, sect. 10.1) noted that market participants generally expressed dissatisfaction with 
Telecom’s actions in relation to the introduction of the 0867 package. It also noted that a 
contributing factor in the 0867 dispute at that time had been the terms of the Telecom-
Clear interconnection agreement. The Inquiry recommended the regulation of 
interconnection. 
 91 
and terminated on the other carrier’s local access network, as Figure 3 
illustrates. Telecom paid 2 cents per minute to Clear for Clear to terminate a call 
on its network.143 Clear paid Telecom more for Telecom to terminate a call on its 
network. Telecom claimed the difference included a contribution to the cost of 
providing the Kiwi Share Obligation (KSO).144 
This interconnection agreement did not anticipate the subsequent growth in 
dial-up internet traffic.145 The contract was based on the calling characteristics 
traditionally associated with consumers making voice calls, particularly the 
characteristic that on average the calls that consumers made and received would 
be in balance. This expectation combined with the difference between Telecom’s 
and Clear’s termination rate implied that Clear was expected to make net-
payments to Telecom for local-access interconnection.146 
Before the introduction of commercial broadband services in 1999, consumers 
accessed the internet by subscribing to a dial-up internet access service offered 
by internet service providers (ISP). ISPs rented access lines to the PSTN from 
Telecom or Clear. ISPs connected these access lines to a bank of modems that 
were in turn connected to the internet backbone by a data network with 
elements either leased or owned by the ISPs. As well as providing dial-up access 
to the internet, ISPs supplied homepage and email services, which are now not 
necessarily bundled in with internet access and are available from service 
providers on the internet.  
The growth in demand for dial-up internet access was rapid and unforeseen 
when Telecom and Clear entered into the agreement in 1996.147 In 1992, the 
number of internet host addresses was negligible; by 1995 the number had 
                                                        
143 Evans (2007 para. 9). 
144 ("The Commerce Commission v Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd," 2008 
para. 20). 
145 ("The Commerce Commission v Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd," 2009 
para. 11 & 26). 
146 ("The Commerce Commission v Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd," 2009 
para. 10). 
147 ("The Commerce Commission v Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd," 2009 
para. 11 & 26). 
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increased to approximately 15,000, in 1996 to 53,000, in 1997 to 84,000, and in 
1998 it increased to 169,000.148 Between March 1998 and 1999 the proportion of 
total traffic volume on the local call network that was internet traffic almost 
doubled to 31%.149 
This rapid growth in demand was also accompanied by a change in the 
characteristics of calls. In 1999, the duration of a voice call within a local call 
area was on average three minutes, whereas the duration of an internet dial-up 
call was on average 22 minutes.150 Another change was the shift in the time of 
the call volume peak. The call volume for voice calls peaked at approximately 
7.00pm on weekdays, whereas for dial-up internet calls peaked at approximately 
9.00pm. A further difference was related to the balance between calls made and 
received. On average, residential consumers made and received the same 
number of voice calls, thus the volume of voice calls to and from a residential 
consumer was in balance. In contrast, dial-up internet call volume was out of 
balance as residential consumers always called their ISP. 
The significant increase in demand for dial-up internet access and the fact that 
dial-up internet calls were out of balance resulted in Clear receiving net 
payments from Telecom. By July 1999, Telecom’s interconnection termination 
payments had reached $700,000 per week, and the liability was expected to 
increase to $70 million per year.151 As 99% of residential customers were 
connected to Telecom’s telephone network, nearly all the calls to the internet 
originated on Telecom’s network. Telecom’s termination payments to Clear 
increased with the number of consumers using ISPs connected to Clear’s 
network. There was no similar balancing growth in calls from Clear’s network 
back to Telecom’s network, as Clear had virtually no residential customers.  
                                                        
148 An internet host address is the internet address of a service provider or more 
specifically a computer connected to the internet. See appendix A.7 for a discussion on 
internet hosts.  
149 ("The Commerce Commission v Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd," 2008 
para. 60 & 61). 
150 ("The Commerce Commission v Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd," 2008 
para. 57 & 59). 
151 Evans (2007, para.14).  
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Prior to the introduction of the 0867 package, Clear had a strong incentive to 
exploit the arbitrage opportunity provided by the unexpected growth in internet 
calls and the 1996 interconnection agreement. It did this by growing the volume 
of dial-up internet calls terminating on its network. The 2 cent per minute 
payment that Clear received was greater than Clear’s marginal cost for 
terminating a call on its network. Clear used the margin between 2 cents per 
minute and marginal cost to fund further growth in termination traffic by 
subsidising ISPs connected to its network. This subsidy enabled ISPs on Clear’s 
network to offer free dial-up internet access to consumers.152 In 2000, several 
free ISPs emerged in the market although most ceased their free service within a 
year.153 Revenue received by some free ISPs via this source is reported to have 
been as much as approximately $500,000 per month.154 In addition to the losses 
incurred due to increasing termination payments, Telecom anticipated that 
under the status quo an additional $205 million investment would be required 
to PSTN over the following three years in order to meet forecast growth in dial-
up internet traffic.155 
Telecom did not recover the increased capital and termination costs from 
residential consumers due to the free local calls provided by the KSO. Telecom 
did not charge residential consumers for these growing costs as it treated 
residential customers’ dial-up internet calls to a local phone number the same as 
a voice call to a local phone number. 
In response to the growth in termination payments and the potential growth in 
capital expenditure, Telecom implemented the 0867 package in 1999.156 Telecom 
also introduced a service called Internet Dial-up Access (IDA) to manage 
internet dial-up calls. Consumers dialled their ISPs via a specific number range, 
                                                        
152 Karel (2003, p. 23). 
153 Karel (2003, pp. 18-20). 
154 Karel (2003, p. 65) cites pers. comm. 
155 ("The Commerce Commission v Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd," 2008 
para. 71).  
156 In addition to the 0867 package, Telecom paid the ISP Ihug up to $16 million for it to 
connect exclusively to Telecom’s network, allowing Telecom to avoid termination 
payments to Clear for Ihug traffic (L. Evans, 2007 para.13). 
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starting with the four digits 0867, which identified calls as dial-up internet calls, 
enabling Telecom to separate these calls from voice calls on its network.157 
Telecom considered that 0867 calls fell outside the interconnection agreement 
agreed in 1996.158 Telecom proposed that there be no charge for terminating this 
traffic on another network.   
Telecom also considered that dial-up internet calls fell outside the KSO. A retail 
charge was introduced to complement IDA. Telecom did not charge consumers 
for internet dial-up calls made either to ISPs using the 0867 service or Xtra (a 
business unit of Telecom). Telecom charged consumers for calls to ISPs using 
local telephone numbers, either on Telecom’s or another network provider’s 
network. This was called the Internet Dial-up Charge (IDC). Consumers making 
internet calls to a local number (not a 0867 number) were charged 2 cents per 
minute after the first 10 hours of internet calls in a month. The combination of 
IDC and IDA is the 0867 package.159 
The 0867 package aligned the retail price for internet calls with the 
interconnection termination rate, thereby eliminating the arbitrage. Residential 
consumers were not charged for internet calls to 0867 numbers, and there was 
no charge for terminating this traffic on another network. Residential consumers 
making internet calls to a local telephone number were charged 2 cents per 
minute after the first 10 hours of calling in a month, and Telecom was charged 2 
cents per minute for calls terminating at local access number on Clear’s network.  
                                                        
157 Calls made to the 0867 number range were directed to modems located in the local 
exchange nearest to the consumer making the call. The IDA service separated internet 
and voice call traffic on the network close to the retail customer. This enabled internet 
traffic to be managed separately from voice traffic. Technically, this meant that internet 
traffic could be diverted on an IP network and thus carried more efficiently than over the 
public switched telephone network. It also meant that the 0876 traffic would fall outside 
the interconnection agreements.  
158 ("The Commerce Commission v Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd," 2008, 
para 71). 
159 ("The Commerce Commission v Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd," 2008, 
para 71). 
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In 1999, Telecom sought the approval of the government to introduce the 0867 
package. The government agreed to the introduction subject to conditions 
designed to protect the interests of residential consumers:160 
• Calls to 0867 numbers must be free to residential customers. 
• Telecom must ensure residential calls to 0867 numbers are of no worse 
quality than ordinary residential calls to the internet. 
• Telecom must monitor standards to ensure quality is maintained. 
• Telecom must not implement the IDC before 1 November 1999. 
• 0867 calls to commercial organisations using 0867 numbers to a carrier 
network interface are to be free. 
Following a change of government in November 1999, Telecom agreed to 
temporarily suspend IDC, pending the completion of a government inquiry into 
the telecommunications industry. The government inquiry into the 
telecommunications industry led to the arrival of ISR in 2001.161 IDC was not 
reinstated. 
In addition to the advent of ISR, the Commerce Commission pursued litigation, 
claiming that Telecom contravened s 36 of the Commerce Act 1986 by making 
an unlawful use of a dominant position in a market when it introduced the 0867 
package.162 The High Court of New Zealand concluded in 2008 that the 
introduction of the 0867 package did not contravene s 36 of the Act.163 The 
Commerce Commission appealed this decision, which the Court of Appeal of 
                                                        
160 ("The Commerce Commission v Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd," 2008, 
para. 72). 
161 ("The Commerce Commission v Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd," 2008, 
para.73). 
162 ("The Commerce Commission v Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd," 2009, 
para.1). 
163 ("The Commerce Commission v Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd," 2008, 
para. 114). 
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New Zealand dismissed in 2009.164 In 2010, the Supreme Court of New Zealand 
dismissed a further appeal by the Commerce Commission.165 
The High Court of New Zealand (High Court) did not accept that the 0867 
package was not injurious to competition.166 It found that the termination 
payments, and the resultant subsidies to ISPs, leading to low, even zero, prices 
to consumers were not the result of competition, but were the result of the KSO 
and the operation of the 1996 interconnection agreement in an era of escalating 
internet use. The High Court found that the introduction of the 0867 package 
could have led to increased dynamic efficiency, due to the removal of the 
incentive to grow inefficient dial-up internet traffic.167 In response to the claim 
that the 0867 package had sent a signal to the market that Telecom would use its 
dominance to unilaterally rewrite contracts, the High Court indicated that 
Telecom’s response could not reasonably be regarded as an indicator of the way 
that it would act in the future.168 
Having dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the Commerce Commission 
failed to show that Telecom’s conduct could not be rational in a competitive 
market,169 the Court of Appeal raised a concern with the counterfactual test: 
The reality of the case is that it is about terminating charges which are 
markedly above cost and the willingness of Telecom, under threat of 
regulation, to share its monopoly rents with Clear. Any realistic 
counterfactual must take monopoly rents as a given. It is difficult to see 
                                                        
164 ("The Commerce Commission v Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd," 2009, 
para.99). 
165 ("The Commerce Commission v Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd," 2010, 
para 50). 
166 ("The Commerce Commission v Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd," 2008, 
para. 108). 
167 ("The Commerce Commission v Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd," 2008, 
para. 112). 
168 ("The Commerce Commission v Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd," 2008, 
para. 111). 
169 ("The Commerce Commission v Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd," 2009, 
para. 98). 
 97 
how there can be any plausible counterfactual about the distribution of 
monopoly rents where non-dominance has to be assumed: in the absence 
of dominance there can be no monopoly rents.170 
The conjectural-variations framework discussed in section 2.3 indicates that 
market power cannot be separated from economic rents, as this statement 
suggests. The counterfactual test assesses whether or not a monopoly with 
market power could rationally engage in the disputed conduct. Economic rents 
are dependent on market power, therefore the hypothetical absence of market 
power under the counterfactual test must imply that economic rents are 
absent.171 It follows that the counterfactual test determines whether the conduct 
could have been rational if the firm did not have economic rents. If it is shown 
that the monopoly’s conduct was not rational without economic rents present 
then market power was a factor in the conduct, otherwise economic rents are an 
irrelevant consideration.   
The Supreme Court also dismissed the Commerce Commission’s final appeal on 
the grounds that the Commission failed to show that a firm like Telecom but 
without market power could not have rationally introduced the 0867 
packages.172 In addition, the Supreme Court decision reaffirmed the 
counterfactual test as appropriate for determining whether or not a firm with 
market power has acted anti competitively.173 
In contrast to the constancy of ATR, the institution of ISR has shown a greater 
willingness to change and adapt to changing market conditions. That is, there 
has been a persistent view regarding the structure that the competitive market 
should take. Following the Privy Council decision on Telecom v Clear, the 
government presented a view that interconnection prices should be less than the 
                                                        
170 ("The Commerce Commission v Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd," 2009, 
para. 100). 
171 The reverse is not necessarily true. That is, a firm with market power either does or 
does not earn economic rents.  
172 ("The Commerce Commission v Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd," 2010, 
para. 49). 
173 ("The Commerce Commission v Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd," 2010, 
paras. 31-36). 
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ECPR. The 0867 package was a catalyst to the introduction of the industry 
specific regulator. In contrast, the courts determined that both the Telecom-
Clear interconnection agreement and the 0867 package were not 
anticompetitive. 
The New Zealand Government instituted the industry specific regulator within 
the Commerce Commission in 2001. The role of the regulator is to determine the 
terms of access to regulated services such as interconnection between network 
operators and the resale of the incumbent’s (Telecom’s) retail services. The 
regulator also investigates whether to regulate access to new services. 
5.3 Adaptation of contracts to a dynamic market under ISR 
In 2003, New Zealand’s telecommunications industry regulator investigated 
whether or not to regulate access to unbundled local loop (ULL), unbundled 
bitstream access (UBA), and unbundled partial circuits (UPC).174 Access to ULL 
allows entrants to offer consumers broadband internet access service in 
competition with the incumbent by installing electronic equipment in the 
incumbent’s exchanges and connecting it to the copper wires that lead to 
consumers’ premises. Access to UBS allows entrants to offer consumers 
broadband internet access services, without installing their electronic equipment 
in the incumbent’s local exchanges, by providing access to unbundled elements 
of the incumbent’s broadband service. Access to UPC allows entrants to offer 
business data services by using unbundled elements of the incumbent’s point-to-
point data services. 
The regulator was required to recommend to the government whether or not to 
regulate access to ULL and UBS based on whether or not regulation would 
promote competition in telecommunications markets for the long-term benefit 
of end users.175 The regulator assessed the state of competition in wholesale 
markets in which ULL, UBS and UPC could be supplied. Where the market was 
found to be competitive, the regulator’s view was that regulation could not 
improve efficiency.176 Where competition was limited, the analysis considered 
                                                        
174 Commerce Commission (2003). 
175 Telecommunications Act 2001 (s 18). 
176 Commerce Commission (2003, para. 305). 
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whether or not the benefits of regulation exceeded the costs.177 Static, partial 
equilibrium models were used to quantify the benefits and costs of regulation. 
The main benefit of regulation was the reduction in the retail price for 
broadband access. 
The regulator recommended the government regulate UBS, and not regulate 
UPC and ULL, subject to Telecom agreeing to certain conditions. Regarding 
UPC, the regulator stated that “cost-based pricing of at least those components 
of the service reliant on legacy assets is the efficient form of pricing that should 
be applied.”178 Telecom complied with this condition and the government did 
not regulate UPC.179 
Regarding ULL, when accepting the regulator’s recommendations, the Minister 
of Communications (2004) indicated that he: 
… will watch developments very closely and will be taking particular note 
at how quickly and successfully Telecom moves to promptly facilitate the 
delivery of higher-speed, more competitive broadband for New Zealand. 
On the same day,180 Telecom (2004b) announced it had set a target of 
connecting 250,000 residential broadband customers by the end of 2005 and 
that “… about a third of the 2005 target would be delivered by competitors …”.  
By December 2005 Telecom had 279,123 residential broadband connections, of 
which 22.7% were wholesale connections. Telecom met the target for residential 
broadband connections (250,000 connections), but it had failed to meet the 
target for the proportion of connections (33%) that would be with its wholesale 
customers.181 
                                                        
177 Commerce Commission (2003, pp. 77,78). 
178 Commerce Commission (2004). 
179 Minister of Communications (2004). 
180 19 May 2004. 
181 Commerce Commission (2006). 
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In May 2006, the government announced a plan to introduce new regulations.182 
Although not specifically expressed in these terms, an interpretation of the 
intended purpose of the new regulations was to enhance dynamic efficiency. The 
government compared the performance of the New Zealand telecommunications 
sector and regulatory policies with those of other OECD countries and came to 
the view that New Zealand’s performance would be enhanced by following the 
regulatory policy adopted by other OECD countries. The government stated that 
the policies were to ensure that the telecommunications sector becomes more 
competitive, with particular emphasis that the availability and quality of 
broadband services was a key enabler of economic growth.183 
The new regulations included the unbundling of Telecom’s local loop and 
enhancing the quality of the regulated UBS. In addition, the May 2006 
announcement questioned whether “additional measures are warranted … such 
as the structural separation of Telecom’s retail and lines operations.”184 The 
government did not introduce structural separation, but introduced operational 
separation of Telecom’s retail and local-loop operations.185 These new 
regulations were instituted in December 2006 by an amendment to the 
Telecommunications Act 2001.186 
The new regulations were intended to facilitate competition by improving access 
to the local loop. The government’s view was that there was a lack of effective 
competition.187 The natural monopoly of the local loop was enduring and 
restricted the development of competition.188 There was the view that 
                                                        
182 Minister of Communications (2006a). 
183 Minister of Communications (2006b, paras. 1-8). 
184 Minister of Communications (2006a). 
185 Structural separation includes separating the ownership of retail and local-loop 
operations’ assets. Under operational separation, Telecom maintains ownership of these 
assets, the local-loop operation is not to discriminate between Telecom’s retail 
operations and external wholesale customers, and Telecom’s retail and local-loop 
operations’ commercial decisions are generally expected to be made in their own 
interest. 
186 New Zealand Parliament (2006). 
187 Minister of Communications (2006b, para. 34). 
188 Minister of Communications (2006b, para. 35). 
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“[v]ertically integrated incumbents have the incentives and ability to place 
access-seekers at a competitive disadvantage by supplying wholesale services on 
less favourable terms and conditions than those made available to their own 
retail arm.”189 This view was supported by comments made by stakeholders 
regarding the conduct of Telecom.190 This view was also supported by Telecom’s 
conduct following the decision in 2003 to not regulate ULL. 
When accepting the regulator’s recommendation not to regulate ULL, the 
government had expected the decision “would lead to a co-operative 
development of an effective wholesale market, and provide incentives for 
Telecom to quickly deploy its Next Generation Network (NGN).”191 The 
investment in residential NGN infrastructure had not developed as quickly as 
the government expected.192 In addition, while recognising that Telecom’s ability 
to deliver the wholesale target depended on competitors delivering effectively, 
the government’s view was that the failure to meet the target was due to 
Telecom’s failure to promptly resolve UBS supply agreements.193 
In sum, the government had an expectation that the competitive conduct would 
follow from the implementation of a particular market structure. However, as 
discussed in chapters 2 and 3, the structure of a dynamic market follows from 
the competitive conduct of the firms, and that structure can evolve and change 
unpredictably with the conduct of the firms.  
5.4 Entry and exit as an indicator of market performance 
The deregulation of the telecommunications market in 1989 opened the market 
to competitive entry. This section traces the subsequent process of entry, 
mergers and acquisitions. The regulator’s annual process for determining the 
funding of the TSO conveniently supplies the list of network operators over the 
                                                        
189 Minister of Communications (2006b, para. 36). 
190 Minister of Communications (2006b, para. 37). 
191 Minister of Communications (2006b, para. 40). The Next Generation Network is a 
communications network based on the internet protocol that enables firms to offer 
services such as voice, video conferencing, and video streaming at a quality better than 
available from best-efforts grade of internet service.  
192 Minister of Communications (2006b, para. 40).  
193 Minister of Communications (2006b, para. 41). 
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period from 2007 to 2008 that have an interconnection agreement with Telecom 
in order to provide telephony services.194 Table 4 lists the telecommunications 
service providers in operation over 2007 and 2008, ranked by their share of 
industry revenue, with the date when the network operator or their predecessor 
first entered into the New Zealand market. 
Of the 10 entrants or their predecessors, nine entered the market before the start 
of ISR in 2001, when competition was governed solely by ATR. The table also 
indicates that there has been a significant number of mergers and acquisitions 
following entry. This entry and merger activity indicates that the operation of 
the market before 2001 was sufficiently efficient for these transactions to take 
place, allowing firms to take advantage of expected gains. Table 4 also indicates 
that the number of new entrants after 2001 (two firms) was significantly less 
than before 2001 (11 firms). 
                                                        
194 Commerce Commission (2008a, p. 29). 
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Table 4: Market entry of firms with telephony service and interconnection agreement during 2007 and 2008 
Telecommunications 
Service Providers 
Share of 
TSO Liable 
Industry 
Revenue195 
Predecessors 
and Former 
Names 
Market 
Entry 
Brief Description and History 
Telecom New Zealand 67.368% New Zealand Post 
Office 
March 1987 Formed by separating from New Zealand Post Office. 
26.074% BellSouth New 
Zealand 
July 1993 BellSouth launched a mobile phone service in Auckland and then built a 
national network (Ministry of Commerce, 1997, s. 7.3). Vodafone 
acquired BellSouth in November 1998 (Vodafone, 2009). 
Vodafone 
New Zealand 
 Ihug  August 1994 Launched as an internet service provider (Twose, 2008). Vodafone 
acquired Ihug in 2006 (Vodafone, 2009). 
5.791% Clear 
Communications 
April 1991 Clear commenced by offering domestic and international toll-call 
services (Ministry of Commerce, 1997, s. 7.1). 
TelstraSaturn and Clear merged in December 2001 (TelstraClear, 2001).  
 Telstra New 
Zealand 
1996 Telstra relaunched its New Zealand operation providing virtual private 
networks, national and international calls, ISDN services and local 
access (Ministry of Commerce, 1997, Section 7.3). Telstra New Zealand 
and Saturn announced a merger in February 2000 to form TelstraSaturn 
(Ministry of Economic Development, 2001, s. 2). 
TelstraClear 
 Saturn 
Communications 
May 1998 Saturn Communications launched the first residential local wire network 
in competition with the incumbent Telecom. The network was launched 
in the Hutt Valley, then subsequently expanded to all of  (cont.) 
                                                        
195 Commerce Commission (2008a, p. 29). 
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Telecommunications 
Service Providers 
Share of 
TSO Liable 
Industry 
Revenue195 
Predecessors 
and Former 
Names 
Market 
Entry 
Brief Description and History 
 Wellington, the Kapiti Coast and Christchurch (Ministry of Commerce, 
1998, p. 9). Telstra New Zealand and Saturn announced a merger in 
February 2000 to form TelstraSaturn (Ministry of Economic 
Development, 2001, s. 2). 
WorldxChange 0.287%  1995 Commenced business as an international and national toll provider 
(WorldxChange Ltd, 2000). 
CallPlus 0.172%  1997 Commenced business as a national service provider offering national and 
international toll bypass (Free Internet Access Ltd, CallPlus Ltd, & Attica 
Communications Ltd, 2000). 
Compass 0.138%  1995 Compass began by providing fax broadcast services to business 
customers (Compass, 2009). 
Orcon 0.110%  1997 Entered into the ISP market in 1997. Prior to this date it provided 
computer support (Kordia Media Release, 2007). 
Woosh 0.050% Walker Wireless 1999 Launched in 1999 offering fixed wireless broadband services (Woosh, 
2009). 
TeamTalk 0.007%  1995 Launched early in 1995 offering a trunked mobile radio-based service, in 
competition with Telecom’s established Fleetlink mobile radio service 
(Ministry of Commerce, 1997, Section 7.4). 
Airnet 0.002%  2002 Launched in 2002 offering fixed wireless broadband services to 
businesses in the Hawke’s Bay region.  
2degrees  0.001% NZ 
Communications, 
and Econet 
August 
2009 
2degrees launched its mobile service in August 2009 (2degrees mobile, 
2009a). The development of 2degrees’ network started in February 2001 
(2degrees mobile, 2009b). 
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This does not provide a complete picture of the market entry and exit, 
particularly amongst ISPs. Karel (2003, pp. 16,17) observes that at the start of 
1996 there were 30 ISPs in New Zealand, most of which served regional markets. 
With the increase in price-based competition, some of the operators exited the 
market or were acquired to form larger ISPs that could take advantage of the 
economies of scale. ISPs continue to provide internet services in the retail 
market by leasing access to infrastructure in the wholesale market, with some 
bundling telephony services that utilise the incumbent’s regulated retail 
telephony services under ISR.   
Table 5: Market entry date of wholesale operators in operation in 2009 
Wholesale 
Network 
Operator 
Market 
Entry 
Comments 
CityLink 1995 Citylink (2009) privately owns and 
operates a regional fibre network in 
Christchurch, Wellington and Auckland. 
Enable Networks 2007 Owned by the Christchurch City Council, it 
operates a regional fibre network in 
Christchurch (Enable Networks, 2009). 
FX Network 2005 FX Network (2008) is a subsidiary of a 
firm that operates network in various 
countries. It operates a national fibre 
transmission network. 
Kordia 2003 Until 2003, it was the transmission arm of 
Television New Zealand, until being 
established as a State Owned Enterprise 
with an independent board. It operates 
wireless access and backhaul networks 
throughout New Zealand (Kordia, 2009). 
Vector 
Communications 
2001 Vector (2004) is a publicly listed company 
with a consumer trust as the majority 
shareholder. It operates a regional fibre 
network in Auckland. 
 
In addition, regional and national communications network providers entered 
into the market, investing in transmission and distribution infrastructure, 
offering wholesale network services to retail service providers. These firms are 
listed in Table 5, with a market entry date where it could be found. There are an 
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additional eight regional fibre network operators and one wireless regional 
network operator, which are not included in Table 5, as entry dates could not be 
found.196 These firms, offering only wholesale services, do not appear in Table 4 
as they do not have an interconnection agreement with Telecom, thus they are 
not required to contribute to funding the TSO. They make services available to 
firms providing retail services, including those listed in Table 4, as well as to 
firms that only offer internet access and data services. 
Tables 4 and 5 suggest that there was an ongoing process of entry by competitors 
since the market was opened to competition through to the 2009. Comparing 
Tables 4 and 5 also indicates a change in the pattern of entry. Before 2001, entry 
was dominated by firms offering telephony services. After 2001, entry was 
dominated by firms specialising in the wholesale or retail market, and internet 
services.  
The introduction of ISR in 2001 was contemporaneous with the introduction of 
broadband internet access. The pattern of entry described above suggests that 
either the advent of ISR acted as a disincentive for firms to invest in technologies 
required to provide telephony services and interconnect with Telecom’s network, 
and/or the arrival of broadband and the internet made new investment in 
telephony services redundant for most entrants.  
It seems reasonable to expect that the growth in wholesale transmission capacity 
was due to the growth in demand for internet services. As observed in appendix 
A.3 the volume-weighted mean annual growth rate of internet traffic between 
2002 and 2008 was 68% on average. Entrants supplied network capacity in 
response to this growth in demand. Such a significant growth in demand might 
also have been expected to result in an increase in the number of firms offering 
telephony services. The fact that there were 11 entrants before 2001 and two 
after 2000 suggests that there is no inherent barrier for firms to offer telephony 
                                                        
196 Amuri.net operates wireless access networks in the North Canterbury region; 
Counties Power operates a fibre network in the Counties-Manukau region; Digital 
Nation operates a fibre network in the Manawatu-Wanganui region; InverNET in 
conjunction with Venture Southland operate a fibre optic network in Invercargill; 
Northernpower operates a fibre network in Whangarei; SmartLinx3 operates fibre and 
wireless access networks in Upper Hutt, Lower Hutt and Porirua; thelink operates fibre 
access and backhaul networks in the Nelson and Marlborough regions; Velocity Network 
operates fibre access networks in Hamilton; and WIC operates wireless access networks 
in Dunedin (The National Broadband Map, 2009). 
 
 107 
services. This might suggest that it is generally more profitable to offer network 
services in the wholesale market than to offer retail telephony services and have 
an interconnection agreement with the incumbent. 
In addition, the introduction of regulation of access to the incumbent’s retail 
telephony services, under ISR, would have meant that entrants could avoid 
investing in telephony equipment. As well as regulating interconnection, ISR 
also required the incumbent to make its retail access to the telephone network 
available to competitors at the retail price less a discount. The discount is equal 
to the cost the incumbent avoids by supplying the service in the wholesale 
instead of the retail markets.  
The significant increase in demand for internet services, combined with the fact 
that telephony services are available over the internet or the incumbent’s 
telephony service can be resold, are plausible reasons for new entrants not 
investing in telephony equipment. If the reason for the reduction in investment 
in telephony equipment was due to the option to resell the incumbent's services 
then this may have lessened the extent of dynamic competition, and thus 
dynamic efficiency, as the extent of innovation in these service would have been 
limited to the incumbent's retail services. If the reason for the reduction in 
investment in telephony infrastructure was due the growth in demand for 
internet services, then it would suggest that the advent of ISR of interconnection 
with the incumbent’s network was made redundant by technological progress.  
5.5 Non-price competition in the access market 
Firms engage in competitive rivalry based on service differentiation resulting 
from investing in successive waves of new technology. This enables them to offer 
an ever-increasing range of better-quality services. Consumers benefit from this 
rivalry as firms seek out a competitive advantage. 
The process of dynamic competition in mobile broadband that was initiated 
prior to the arrival of ISR has continued unabated. However, the government’s 
comments in 2006 regarding the quality of fixed-line broadband suggest that 
this was not sufficient to spur the investment necessary to meet the 
government’s expectation regarding the desired quality of broadband access. 
Figure 6, section 4.3, shows that DSL broadband was launched in New Zealand 
in June 1999, before the arrival of ISR in 2001. It shows that mobile broadband 
was launched in New Zealand in June 2002. It also shows that fixed-line and 
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mobile broadband were launched in New Zealand before most other countries in 
the OECD. 
Figure 6 illustrates the dynamic relationship between fixed-line and mobile 
broadband internet access. Fixed-line broadband was launched in all OECD 
countries before mobile broadband. This may have been a function of the timing 
of the availability of technology; however, the graph indicates that mobile 
broadband was launched in some countries before fixed-line broadband was 
launched in others. It seems that there was no technological reason that mobile 
broadband could not have been launched in some countries before fixed-line 
DSL broadband. An alternative explanation for the fact that mobile broadband  
followed DSL broadband is that the ordering was determined by dynamic 
competition between fixed and mobile services.197 The observed ordering 
suggests that mobile operators did not see the need to invest in mobile 
broadband services until fixed-line operators invested in broadband services, 
perhaps due to having a competitive advantage such as mobility. The launch of 
DSL broadband bettered this advantage thus inducing a response from mobile 
operators. 
The absence of ISR in 1999 did not seem to have a detrimental effect on the 
decision to invest in fixed-line broadband internet access. Assuming that the 
technologies were universally available at the same time, it seems reasonable to 
suppose that the timing of the investment in broadband services between 
countries was due to country specific factors.   
Rivalry in the New Zealand mobile market commenced the year that Telecom 
was formed in 1987, with the launch of the first mobile telephony services in 
New Zealand.198 Telecom had the monopoly for mobile telephony until 1993 
when BellSouth entered into the mobile market using a digital technology.199 
Entering into the market with a later, more modern technology allowed 
BellSouth to offer a broader range of services, particularly the short message 
                                                        
197 Quigley & Sanderson (2005) discuss the implications of regulating wireline telephone 
services on dynamic efficiency, particularly on the adoption of new mobile technologies 
by consumers in Canada. Comparing Canada with other countries, they found that fixed-
line and mobile services were in the same market, and that the low regulated wireline 
prices were slowing take up of new mobile services.  
198 Telecom (2004a para. 87). 
199 Telecom (2004a para. 88). 
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service (SMS), which Telecom could not offer. Telecom differentiated its service 
with greater geographic coverage.200 
In 1998, Vodafone purchased BellSouth’s mobile network.201 Vodafone invested 
in network and increased its geographic coverage thereby eroding Telecom’s 
advantage. Telecom followed by investing in a new mobile network technology 
called CDMA in 2001. As well as enabling Telecom to match Vodafone’s SMS, 
CDMA provided a basic form of wireless internet access and other services that 
Vodafone could not offer.202 Vodafone in turn responded by investing in new 
services, and Telecom again replied. The following diagram illustrates this 
competitive interaction between the two firms. Each firm invested in newer 
technology, enabling it to offer an ever-greater range of services of increasing 
quality in order to gain a competitive advantage.  
Technological rivalry between the firms extended to the fixed-line network, as 
the list of wholesale access providers in Table 2 indicates, as well as between 
fixed and mobile networks. The growth in demand for internet services provided 
firms with an opportunity to offer better-quality internet access. Before 1999, 
residential consumers gained access to the internet by a dial-up connection. 
Consumers connected their computer to a modem that was connected to the 
telephone network, programming their modems to dial their internet service 
provider’s telephone number, which in turn connected them to the internet. 
                                                        
200 Telecom (2004a para. 88). 
201 Telecom (2004a para. 92). 
202 Telecom (2004a para. 93). 
 110 
 
Figure 7: Technology rivalry between mobile operators 
Source: Telecom (2009 para. 27) 
Telecom launched its broadband internet access service in June 1999, which 
provided a better-quality service than dial-up internet access. Saturn 
Communication followed closely by launching a competing broadband service in 
Wellington in August 1999, and then a year later a broadband service in 
Christchurch.203 In addition, starting in 2001, Telecom and then Vodafone 
offered mobile broadband services that connect laptop computers and other 
devices to the internet. The quality of a mobile broadband connection is not as 
good as a fixed-line connection; however, mobility itself provides it with a 
significantly different and competitive feature. 
5.6 General price trends 
Overall, prices for telecommunications services have been decreasing in real 
terms. This is illustrated by the following graph, which compares price indices 
for access and calling with the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The bold vertical 
line indicates a structural break in the series due to a change in the composition 
of the baskets used to calculate the indices.  
                                                        
203 Ministry of Economic Development (2001, p. 11). 
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Figure 8: Comparison of telecommunications and CPI indices204 
Source: Statistics New Zealand 
These price changes represent the change in the average price of a call and the 
access fee; however, they do not represent the changes in the structure of access 
and calling. A feature of the pricing of telecommunications services is that 
consumers have a menu of non-linear tariffs to choose from. The analysis of 
two-part tariffs presented in appendix B, and illustrated by way of example in 
section 3.4, highlights that the structure as well as the level of prices determines 
the optimal tariff. Even though the above graph indicates that prices in general 
have been decreasing due to competition, it does not fully represent the benefits 
that competition brings to the structure of retail prices. The graph only presents 
the change in the average access fee and call price; however, it does not 
represent the change in the marginal price due to competition, which generally 
involves caps on the price of a national toll-call or calling packages that allow 
consumers to make an unlimited number of national calls for a fixed-monthly 
                                                        
204 The Telephone Call Charge series and Telephone Rental and Connection series 
represent price changes faced by households for both fixed-line telephony and cellphone 
services for the dates set out here. Cellphone call charges, which include the monthly 
access fee, were introduced at the June 1999 quarter. Prior to this date, telephone call 
charges were charges for national and international calling, and from the June 1999 
quarter onwards, this series represents changes in cellphone call charges, and national 
and international calling rates. Internet charges represent both monthly (dial-up) access 
and usage fees. 
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fee. The change in the marginal price also extends the growth of free calling 
services available on the internet, which are not captured in this graph. 
5.7 Summary 
There was substantial market entry before and after the advent of ISR 
supporting the conclusion, made in chapter 4 on the international experience, 
that the absence of ISR did not have an adverse effect on competition. A change 
did occur in the pattern of entry that coincided with the arrival of ISR and 
broadband internet access. Table 4 indicates that of those firms with 
interconnection agreements with the incumbent during 2007 and 2008, 11 
entered the market before the advent of ISR in 2001, whereas two entered the 
market after. This suggests that there has been a significant reduction in 
network-based service providers investing in technologies that support 
telephony services. In contrast, Table 5 indicates that from 2001 there have been 
four entrants providing telecommunications infrastructure in the wholesale 
market, with the possibility of many more entrants. It is proposed that this 
growth in network capacity was in response to the growth in demand for 
internet services. 
The growth in demand for internet services has also had a significant effect on 
investment in new mobile technologies. Figure 7 shows that the two competing 
mobile operators invested in successive mobile technologies, providing 
consumers with new, better-quality services for accessing the internet. This 
pattern of investment is consistent with the process of dynamic competition 
developed in chapter 2. One noticeable feature of the pattern of investment is 
that the timing of the new investments does not coincide. This is consistent with 
Novy-Marx’s (2007) conclusion, discussed in section 2.4, that rivals will avoid 
investing at the same time under dynamic market conditions.  
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6  Conclusion 
The history of the telecommunications market in New Zealand presents a 
natural experiment on the conduct of regulation in a dynamically evolving 
market and its effect on market performance. The regulatory feature that made 
the telecommunications market in New Zealand unique compared with other 
countries is that there was no industry specific regulation (ISR) of access to the 
incumbent’s network for a substantial period of time following the opening of 
the market to competitive entry. The telecommunications market was opened to 
competitive entry in 1989, and ISR of access to the incumbent’s network was 
introduced in 2001. During the period without ISR, the commercial agreement 
of price and non-price terms of wholesale access to the incumbent’s network was 
governed by antitrust regulation (ATR), under general competition law and 
enforced by the courts. Contemporaneous with these regulatory changes was 
significant technological change and growth in demand for arguably unforeseen, 
innovative internet and mobile services. These changes led to a substantial 
change in industry structure. 
The lack of ISR did not lessen competition or performance in the 
telecommunications market in New Zealand. The performance of the New 
Zealand telecommunications market after it was opened to competitive entry in 
1989, and before the advent of ISR in 2001, was not significantly different from 
other countries that had ISR when their markets were opened to competitive 
entry. Between opening the market to competitive entry in 1989 and the arrival 
of ISR in 2001, long-distance and mobile prices, productivity, and quality were 
generally consistent with comparable OECD countries that had ISR. New 
Zealand was amongst the first group of countries in the OECD to launch digital 
subscriber line (DSL) broadband internet access. Only Canada, the United 
States, and Korea launched before it. There were substantial welfare gains for 
New Zealand due to the availability of broadband. The introduction of 
broadband internet access also led to the transformation of industry structure. 
Moreover, there was substantial market entry before and after the advent of ISR, 
indicating that the absence of ISR did not have an adverse effect on the process 
of dynamic competition. A change did occur in the pattern of entry, which 
coincided with the arrival of ISR and broadband internet access. Of those firms 
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with interconnection agreements with the incumbent during 2007 and 2008, 11 
entered the market before the advent of ISR in 2001, whereas two entered the 
market after. From 2001 there have been four entrants providing 
telecommunications infrastructure in the wholesale market, with the possibility 
of many more entrants. This suggests that there has been a significant reduction 
in network-based service providers investing in technologies that support 
telephony services. 
In addition, the introduction of the regulation of access to the incumbent’s retail 
telephony services, under ISR, would have meant that entrants could avoid 
investing in telephony equipment. As well as regulating interconnection, ISR 
required the incumbent to make its retail access to the telephone network 
available to competitors at the retail price less a discount. The discount is equal 
to the cost the incumbent avoids by supplying the service in the wholesale rather 
than the retail markets. 
It seems reasonable to expect that the growth in wholesale transmission capacity 
was due to the growth in demand for internet services. As observed in appendix 
A.3, the volume-weighted mean annual growth rate of internet traffic between 
2002 and 2008 was 68% on average. Entrants supplied network capacity in 
response to this growth in demand. Such significant growth in demand might 
also have been expected to result in an increase in the number of firms offering 
telephony services. The fact that there were 11 entrants before 2001 and two 
from 2001 suggests that there were no inherent barriers for firms to offer 
telephony services. This might indicate that it is generally more profitable to 
offer network services in the wholesale market than to offer retail telephony 
services and have an interconnection agreement with the incumbent. 
The significant increase in demand for internet services, combined with the fact 
that telephony services are available over the internet, or the incumbent’s 
telephony service can be resold, are plausible reasons for new entrants not 
investing in telephony equipment. If the reason for the reduction in investment 
in telephony equipment was due to the option to resell the incumbent’s services, 
then this may have lessened the extent of dynamic competition. This would 
reduced dynamic efficiency, as the extent of innovation in these services would 
have been limited to the incumbent’s retail services. If the reason for the 
reduction in investment in telephony infrastructure was due the growth in 
demand for internet services, then it would suggest that the advent of ISR of 
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interconnection with the incumbent’s network was made redundant by 
technological progress. 
Uptake of fixed-line and mobile broadband and telephony services  in New 
Zealand was comparable to the demand in other OECD countries prior to the 
introduction of ISR. Prior to the advent of ISR the demand for internet dial-up 
and broadband access was comparable to the average across the OECD.  
Following the introduction of ISR, the total dial-up and broadband internet 
access penetration was greater than the OECD average, although the penetration 
of broadband internet access was marginally less than the OECD average. More 
recently there was acceleration in the uptake of broadband internet access, 
reducing the difference with the OECD average penetration. It is also shown that 
the penetration of fixed-line and mobile telephony was comparable to the OECD 
average before and after the advent of ISR.  
Demand and supply conditions in the telecommunications market are 
dynamic. Economic theory shows that the dynamic supply and demand 
conditions mean competitive conduct cannot be reduced to static models of 
natural monopoly and perfect competition. As regulation is predicated on the 
concepts of natural monopoly and perfect competition, this implies that 
understanding the limits of these concepts is important. A justification for 
regulating access to elements of a telecommunications network is that certain 
elements exhibit characteristics of a natural monopoly. It is usual to start an 
analysis for determining an optimal access price to an access network by 
proposing that it is a natural monopoly. In the case of telecommunications, it is 
common to claim the local access network is a natural monopoly. It follows that 
if the incumbent vertically integrates the local access network with services it 
supplies to the downstream retail market, and competitors in the retail market 
require access to the local-access network, then regulation to access is seen as a 
means to promote welfare. 
To logically reduce the performance of oligopolistic competition to a point 
within a range between the extremes of natural monopoly and perfect 
competition requires a stable market equilibrium. If supply and demand 
conditions are static, where supply and demand are linear in quantity, and 
supply and demand parameter values are not uncertain, there is no irreversible 
investment, and in a market where quantity is uncertain, then inferences can 
logically be drawn from the static models of natural monopoly and perfect 
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competition. If these conditions do not hold, then inferences regarding market 
performance cannot logically be drawn from the static models of perfect 
competition and natural monopoly. 
Under static supply and demand conditions, the process of oligopolistic 
competition reduces to rivals simply competing on price or quantity, as 
described by Bertrand or Cournot competition. Under dynamic supply and 
demand conditions, the timing of irreversible investments becomes a valuable 
option for competing rivals. Dynamic supply and demand conditions lead rivals 
to change their actions as time progresses, resulting in unanticipated and 
unforeseen competitive conduct, particularly if firms invest in order to avoid 
competition. This unforeseen competitive conduct is not due to random 
variations around an expected market equilibrium, as there is no stable 
equilibrium. Dynamic conditions lead to a process of disequilibrium, resulting in 
the development of new services. 
Real options theory stresses that the timing of an investment has value when 
investments are significant and irreversible, there is uncertainty, or if there is an 
expected significant expansion in demand. It also shows that dynamic processes 
have a significant effect on the conduct of competition between rivals, in 
particular that rivals will avoid making competing investments at the same time 
in order to avoid direct competition. The result is that rivals will endeavour to 
invest either before or after each other. The evidence presented in this thesis 
regarding the timing of DSL and mobile broadband technologies is consistent 
with this conclusion. This implies that the effect of these investments on welfare 
cannot be reduced to price, nor can the performance of the market be assessed 
in terms of natural monopoly and perfect competition.  
Determining an optimal structure for the market is also problematic. The 
imposition of a particular structure on the market is increasingly likely to be 
detrimental to dynamic efficiency because it is likely to limit the opportunities 
available to firms to recover the cost of irreversible investments. A highly 
concentrated market within static conditions suggests a firm with a significant 
degree of market power, yet a highly concentrated market within dynamic 
conditions indicates a level of entry that may be optimal due to the opportunity 
cost of investment timing. 
The implication for regulatory policy is that determining whether or not there is 
a competition problem becomes increasingly context specific. If the process of 
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regulation is to maximise dynamic efficiency, then regulation cannot expect to 
define policy that results in outcomes superior to a dynamic competitive market. 
However, less can be inferred about the conduct and performance of dynamic 
competition, based on static models of natural monopoly and perfect 
competition, when supply and demand conditions are uncertain. It follows that 
the analysis of perceived competition problems becomes increasingly context 
specific.  
Demand and supply conditions in the telecommunications market are dynamic. 
This is illustrated by the transformation from the telephony industry structure to 
the internet industry structure. The transformation from traditional telephony 
services to the internet resulted in increased demand for a wider range of new 
services. Another feature of the transition to the internet that indicates that it 
was part of a broader dynamic process was that it was generally unanticipated. 
Commercial interconnection agreements signed in 1995 did not anticipate the 
significant growth of internet access, resulting in the subsequent introduction of 
new agreements to address arbitrage opportunities. The advent of broadband 
internet access made the regulation of interconnection redundant.    
The features of the telecommunications market, identified in this thesis, that 
induce dynamic supply and demand conditions are: (i) network effects; (ii) rapid 
development in hardware; (iii) significant sunk cost required to develop 
software; and (iv) large, sunk costs to build the capability or capacity to supply 
services and, once built, low marginal cost to supply services.  
Network effects are inherently dynamic, resulting in positive-feedback effects, 
the absence of equilibrium, or the presence of multiple equilibria. Much of the 
economic and social value associated with the internet is due to network effects. 
Consumers’ and service providers’ valuation of a physical or virtual network 
depends on the size of the consumer and service provider population connected 
to the network. Direct network effects result when users directly benefit from the 
presence of others on a communications network. Indirect network effects occur 
when a user’s valuation of a good depends on the availability and number of 
complementary services which in turn depends on the number of users.  
Supply conditions are neither static nor linear due to ongoing technological 
progress in the quality and performance of hardware, the significant irreversible 
investment needed to develop the software required for new services, and 
significant irreversible investment in capacity to provide consumers with access 
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to the telecommunications service. Moore’s Law, which captures the ongoing 
technological development of the integrated circuit, highlights that the quality of 
a key input to telecommunications services has improved and is expected to 
continue to improve. This creates value in deferring an irreversible investment, 
which may have significant implications for the optimal timing of investment. It 
also creates the potential for the development of new services that can exploit 
the technological improvement. 
There is also progress in the software. Although there is ongoing progress in the 
quality and performance of hardware, if the hardware is commonly available 
then the competitive advantage is to be gained in the software or intellectual 
property that a firm can add. The development of software depends on making 
irreversible investment in high-cost intellectual property as firms seek a 
competitive advantage. 
A feature of these investments is that they are incremental. This not only 
includes the sunk cost of developing intellectual property but also extends to the 
irreversible investment in capacity required to meet a consumer’s decision to 
participate in telephony or broadband access service. In the case of a fixed-line 
telephony or broadband service, this investment may take the form of installing 
a cable between the consumer’s premises and an exchange with electronic 
equipment. In the case of mobile services, this includes augmenting capacity to 
accommodate growth in demand for new services. 
Unanticipated changes in the expected supply and demand conditions, which 
progress over time, are not the same as a process where there are unanticipated 
changes in the supply and demand conditions but there is no change to the 
expected supply and demand conditions. These dynamic conditions do not imply 
that actual supply and demand for services will fluctuate around an expectation 
of services offered to consumers, quantities demanded, and technologies used to 
build these services. If the dynamics resulted in random fluctuations around an 
expectation, then the literature indicates that the dynamic process could be 
reduced to the static models of natural monopoly and perfect competition. 
Markets are uncertain, and it is not surprising that commercial and regulatory 
decisions fail to anticipate unexpected changes. However, the important 
distinction is that the risks commercial and regulatory decision makers face in 
the telecommunications market are not random fluctuations in demand or 
supply around a stable equilibrium. The central feature of the 
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telecommunications industry, which is described in detail in this thesis, is that 
the demand and supply conditions are not stable and static, but are dynamic. 
There are unanticipated changes in expectations, as time progresses, due to the 
introduction of previously unforeseen services, and in particular services related 
to the development of the internet. 
The extent of the market dynamics results in uncertainty not only in terms of 
quantity demanded but also the uncertainty in the service itself. The difference 
between telecommunications services and other network industries, such as 
water or electricity reticulation, is that even though there may be uncertainty in 
the quantity demand for water of electricity, there is not the same uncertainty in 
water or electricity itself as there is in telecommunications. In 
telecommunications there have been and will continue to be unforeseen 
developments, resulting in no single ‘telecommunications service’ that is 
comparable to electricity or water. 
The optimal two-part tariff access fee and call price are not separate services. 
A model of consumer participation as a normal-good, based on the theory of 
two-part tariffs developed in the thesis, is used to explain several features of the 
telecommunications market. The novelty of this model is the explicit 
consideration of participation as a normal-good, and its implication for the 
construct of the utility function. Desirable two-part tariffs must jointly consider 
access and usage since consumer utility is not separable in these dimensions, 
and vary with characteristics such as income. In addition, participation does not 
imply consumers substitute one service for another, but also includes the 
situation where consumers adopt an additional telecommunications service. 
Consumers’ participation decisions result in a discontinuity in demand, thus 
contributing to market dynamics. Consumers’ choice to subscribe or not 
subscribe is determined by comparing their utility at two separate arguments of 
the utility function. In the particular case of calling and the access fee is greater 
than zero, if an individual is indifferent to subscribing and not, then the decision 
to subscribe results in a discontinuous increase in the demand for calls and the 
consumers’ marginal utility of income.      
The model also illustrates that the optimal two-part tariff access fee and call 
price are not separate services. The access fee and call price are not separable 
due to fact the access fee has a direct effect on the income available to consume 
services. Empirical evidence on the demand for mobile services is consistent 
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with the proposition that participation is a normal-good. If the income of 
consumers who do not participate is increased, then at some point they will 
participate in the market for mobile services. 
Also, the access fee and call price are not separable because the structure, as well 
as the level of the optimal access fee and call price, depends on whether the 
objective is to maximise profit, or to maximise profit subject to a constraint on 
profits. If access and calling are treated as if they are separate services, then 
some might argue that the Ramsey-Boiteux pricing principle is optimal, in which 
the level but not the structure of the access fee or call price would depend on 
whether the objective is to maximise profit or welfare. A numerical example, 
based on the theory of participation using the Stone-Geary utility function, 
illustrates the effect of different objectives on the optimal access fee and call 
price. It indicates that the profit maximising two-part tariff recovers a greater 
proportion of the common costs in the call price than a consumer surplus 
maximising two-part tariff. 
ISR has not enhanced dynamic efficiency. It is assumed that the objective of 
regulation is to maximise dynamic efficiency, thus a role for regulation is to 
preserve the process of competition. The stated purpose of ATR and ISR in New 
Zealand is to promote competition for the long-term benefit of consumers. 
Harm to the process of competition due to a firm exerting market power is 
anticompetitive and may reduce dynamic efficiency. An expectation of 
competitive conduct is required to determine whether observed or anticipated 
conduct is anticompetitive or limits the process of competition. In the present, a 
view of competitive conduct can be formed given the current information about 
supply and demand, and the conduct of firms. If supply and demand conditions 
are static, then the current view of competitive conduct should not change with 
the passage of time. Current expectations of competitive conduct in the future 
will be the same as the view of competitive conduct now. If supply and demand 
conditions are dynamic, then reasonable expectations can not be formed of 
competitive conduct in the future.  
Under ISR, regulatory policy is forward looking and attempts to influence 
competitive conduct. In 1989, the government threatened regulatory 
intervention if the incumbent hindered competition, notwithstanding that ATR 
was in place. In 1995, the government’s view of competition differed from the 
Privy Council’s view, resulting in an interconnection price that was less than the 
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price required by the Privy Council decision. In 2001, the government instituted 
ISR of interconnection. Following the regulation of interconnection there was a 
reduction in investment in telephony equipment. This reduction may have been 
due to the regulation of access to the incumbent’s retail services or the growth in 
internet services. If due to the former reason, then regulation may reduce 
incentives to invest in telephony technology, if the latter then technological 
process has made telephony technology redundant. In 2006, the government 
introduced regulation of access to the unbundled elements of the incumbent’s 
local loop.  
This ongoing evolution of industry regulation is due to a persistent view that the 
assets owned by the incumbent are a natural monopoly. In a static market, the 
conduct of competitors is expected to stay the same with the passage of time. In 
a dynamic market, there may be unanticipated changes in the competitive 
conduct with the passage of time, as firms launch innovative services utilising 
unforeseen technologies. Up until the advent of broadband internet access, the 
government’s view of competitive conduct centred on calling and the 
interconnection agreement. Following the introduction of broadband internet 
access, the natural monopoly was still the local loop; however, the focus of 
regulation shifted to the unbundled local-loop, which allowed competitors to 
install their own equipment on these lines and bitstream services. These changes 
in regulatory policy show that expectations regarding competitive conduct 
changed in response to the changing supply and demand conditions, particularly 
as new services developed.  
In a dynamic market, uncertainty is determined by supply and demand factors, 
and these factors are outside of the control of an industry specific regulator. A 
regulator can not expect to lessen the uncertainty inherent in these factors.  
However, a regulatory policy that adapts to changing market conditions suggests 
that an investor’s risks may be heightened due to the commitment problem. This 
would increase the opportunity cost of deferring investment, thus reducing the 
likelihood of investments being made. A regulator may reduce uncertainty for 
the regulated firm by providing entrants with a free option to access existing 
infrastructure, thereby reducing the threat of competing investment. However, 
any such reduction in the intensity of dynamic competition may also reduce  
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dynamic efficiency, as it reduces the incentives for investments in new 
technologies that may have reduced production costs or increased the range of 
services available.  
ATR is likely to enhance dynamic efficiency. A determination of anticompetitive 
conduct by the courts in a static market addresses the enduring effect that such 
conduct has on dynamic efficiency. Conversely, a determination of 
anticompetitive conduct in a dynamic market addresses the incentives for firms 
to repeat the conduct in the future as supply and demand conditions change. 
The assessment of anticompetitive conduct under ATR is consistent with the 
limits of the concepts of natural monopoly and perfect competition in a dynamic 
market. In a static market, anticompetitive conduct will have an enduring effect 
on the market, and thus any harm to dynamic efficiency is enduring. There is no 
need for the firm to repeat the conduct as the market is static.  
In a dynamic market, the potential for unanticipated change in competitive 
conduct with the progression of time means that the effect of anticompetitive 
conduct, at the present point in time, on the state of the market, at a future point 
in time, becomes less certain. This does not mean that a dynamic market 
mitigates the adverse consequences of such conduct. The risk of not prosecuting 
anticompetitive conduct as it occurs, even though the effects of the specific 
conduct might be short lived, is that the firm will repeat it in the future as supply 
and demand conditions change. Therefore, the threat of anticompetitive conduct 
by the dominant firm may deter competitive entry and investment, thus 
reducing the level of dynamic efficiency. 
The courts form a view of competitive conduct based on the counterfactual test 
and the context of the disputed conduct. An expectation of competitive conduct 
is formed given the current information about demand, supply and the conduct 
of firms. The counterfactual test does not anticipate the state of competition at 
some future point in time. In 1994, the courts, using the counterfactual test, 
concluded that there was competition with only two rivals in a telephony market 
at a time when, although supply and demand conditions were changing, the 
internet was just emerging and its effect on the industry was generally 
unanticipated. A subsequent decision in 2010 was made about conduct during a 
period when the industry was undergoing significant change, and concluded that  
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the market was competitive. This decision considered competitive conduct 
associated with the introduction of commercial interconnection contracts in 
response to significant growth in dial-up internet access and changing patterns 
of usage of the telephony network. As already observed, there has been entry 
into the telecommunications market before and after the advent of ISR. This 
suggests that ATR has provided sufficient protection to allow competitive entry 
and promote dynamic competition. 
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Appendix A:  Evolution of the internet 
The structure of the telecommunications industry changed from the telephony 
network structure to the internet services structure illustrated by Figure 1, 
section 1.1. This change in industry structure evolved with the technological and 
contractual developments, leading to significant network effects, and ultimately 
growth in the internet and new services made available by the internet. These 
new services are dependent on the availability of the internet. The growth in the 
internet is dependent on the demand for these services. The growth of the 
internet and services are endogenous with network effects and dynamic 
competition. 
This appendix starts with an account of the rapid growth of the internet and the 
value of the services available on the internet over a 10-year period. This is 
followed by a description of the technical features of the internet that has 
enabled the development of services that consumers value, and compares these 
features to the corresponding technical features of the public-switch telephone 
network. The contractual agreements for interconnecting networks carrying 
internet traffic have also had an important effect on the development of services 
and are discussed. 
A.1 Definition of service and network providers 
A network provider has a geographically distinct physical network that provides 
consumers with access to the internet. It was initially provided by a public 
switched telephone network, but over time it is being replaced by broadband 
networks. These have improved the quality of internet access. Access to the 
network is provided by a number of different technologies including the twisted 
copper pairs used by the fixed-line telephone network, wireless access (WiMax, 
WiFi), and mobile cellular technologies. The definition of the network provider 
covers fixed-line telecommunications networks, mobile telecommunications 
networks, and internet service providers (ISP) that offer an access service. 
Service providers provide internet-based services. The current range of services 
available on the internet is varied and large. To provide services, it is sufficient 
that service providers connect to the internet via a network provider’s network. 
Service providers do not generally need to have contracts with the network 
provider that serves the consumer these services. There is a range of 
internationally accepted technical standards and a set of peer-to-peer and 
transit contracts which enable the delivery of the service ubiquitously to internet 
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subscribers. A key feature of the internet is that service providers are largely 
independent of the access network that services consumers.  
Examples of firms that perform both functions include the ISP or a telephone 
network. Some ISPs provide a network connecting a consumer to the internet as 
well as a homepage with news and information. A telephone network integrates 
a communications network with a voice-calling service. 
A.2 The range and growth of service providers 
The diverse range of services available to consumers and the growth in the scale 
of the internet are related by network effects. New telecommunications services, 
or services offered over the internet, can result in very large gains in consumer 
welfare.205 This has revealed latent demand for a range of services, including 
services that were previously unknown, which has attracted new participants 
who in turn create new commercial opportunities. The extent of the growth and 
the diversity of the new services available on the internet indicate that the gain 
in social welfare due to the internet is large.  
The following description of internet activity relies on a combination of general 
international statistics, information about service providers based in the United 
States, as well as information about the New Zealand market. Two reasons for 
using international as well as New Zealand growth data are 1) that time series 
data on total international growth of the internet are available, but no 
comparable data has been found for New Zealand206, and 2) that the internet is 
international. It is estimated that in 2007 approximately 75% of internet traffic 
carried within New Zealand either originated or terminated overseas.207 
Key services based on site popularity and providing a diverse range of services 
are: Google, Trade Me, Yahoo!, Facebook, YouTube, Wikipedia, Amazon.com 
                                                        
205 Hausman, et al. (1997) show that new telecommunications services can create very 
large gains in consumer welfare. They estimate a consumer welfare gains in the United 
States at that time for voice messaging services of $1.27 billion a year and for cellular 
telephone of $50 billion a year. Brynjolfsson, et al. (2003) estimate that the increased 
product variety of online bookstores enhanced consumer welfare by $731 million to 
$1.03 billion in the year 2000.  
206 Internet NZ External Peering Group (2007, p. 14 paragraph 7.1.4) note a similar 
problem finding data about the New Zealand internet. 
207 Internet NZ External Peering Group (2007). 
 126 
and Skype.208 Google is a web search engine that allows consumers to search 
web pages; YouTube offers an internet video search service that allows people to 
watch and share videos; Trade Me is a New Zealand-based internet auction 
website; Skype offers a telephone service to consumers connected to the 
internet; Facebook is a social networking site; Yahoo! is a web-portal; Wikipedia 
is an internet-community prepared encyclopaedia; and Amazon is an online 
retailer.  
Only two of these service providers existed before 1998. Yahoo! and Amazon 
were founded in 1994. These were followed by Google in 1998, Trade Me in 
1999, Wikipedia in 2001, Skype in 2002, Facebook in 2004, and YouTube in 
2005. This is not a comprehensive list of major service providers that offer 
service in New Zealand, let alone those with a significant international presence, 
but it does provide an indication of the diversity, scale and speed of the growth 
of internet services in general. 
These service providers grew rapidly to a significant size. Google Inc. entered the 
S&P 100 in 2006, and earned revenue of US$21.7 billion in 2008. Google 
acquired YouTube in 2006 for $US1.65 billion, with consumers retrieving daily 
100 million video views and uploading 65,000 new videos by this time. In March 
2009, Trade Me reported having 2.2 million active members out of the New 
Zealand population of 4.2 million. Fairfax purchased Trade Me for NZ$700 
million in 2006. eBay acquired Skype for US$2.6 billion in 2005. Market 
research indicates that Skype carried 8% of the world’s international call 
minutes in 2008. Facebook had more than 175 million users in February 2009. 
Extrapolating a recent investment of US$200 million for a 1.96% stake in 
Facebook suggests a valuation for Facebook’s preferred stock of US$10 billion. 
Wikipedia attracted 684 million visitors in 2008. Amazon.com entered the S&P 
100 on 31 December 2008. 
                                                        
208 Refer to the annex to appendix A for supporting data and references. 
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Figure 9 illustrates the marked increase in the rate of growth of aggregate 
revenue earned by internet firms from 2003 to 2006 compared with other 
sectors of the information technology and communications (ICT) industry.  
Figure 9: Top 250 ICT firms’ revenue trends by sector, 2000-2006209 
 
Source: OECD(2008c, p. 36, Figure 1.10) 
The observed growth in new services such as social networking sites, web 
portals, internet search engines, web-based encyclopaedias, online retailing, and 
telephone calling, can be expected to have resulted in a substantial increase in 
consumer welfare. The range or the number of services per se are both of value, 
and the diversity of services means that an individual consumer is more likely to 
find a service or a group of services on the internet that they value sufficiently to 
incur the cost of gaining access to the internet.  
Service providers have an international character as they operate from anywhere 
in the world. Only two, Trade Me and Yahoo! Xtra, of the top 10 sites listed in 
the Alexa internet survey are specific to New Zealand, although Google and 
others offer variants in their services with a degree of customisation to local 
markets such as New Zealand. The internet allows service providers to operate 
independently of each other and of the consumers’ access networks. This 
significantly reduces the market entry cost for new service providers and the cost 
for existing service providers of making new services available to all the 
                                                        
209 USD current prices, index 2000=100. 
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consumers with access to the internet – hence the heralded internet start-ups 
that have offered services from a computer located in a garage or bedroom.  
Consumers have the choice from several service providers for each type of 
service. Examples are: social networking sites that include Facebook, Bebo.com 
and Myspace; search engines include Google, Windows Live and Yahoo!; Web 
portals include Msn.com and Yahoo!; and telephone calling services include 
Skype and the traditional telecommunications operations. Among this shortlist, 
there is competition from which consumers would expect to benefit through a 
process of dynamic interaction. 
A.3 Growth of the internet 
The growth in the internet in the aggregate dimensions is indicated by the 
number of hosts connected to the internet, where a host is a machine connected 
to the internet with a domain name and IP address. In practice, a single physical 
machine may appear as many machines and each of these machines corresponds 
to a host. The following graph of the internet host count sourced from the 
Internet Systems Consortium website counts each host (Internet Systems 
Consortium, 2009b).  
The Internet Systems Consortium (2009a) considers that this count is a 
reasonable estimate of the minimum size of the internet. Based on this data, the 
compound annual growth rate (CAGR) between 1998 and 2008 was 31%, 
implying that the internet was doubling in size approximately every 2.5 years. 
This internet host count measures the number of computers (or the equivalent) 
connected to the internet. The University of Minnesota Minnesota Internet 
Traffic Studies (MINTS) provides a measure of the growth in total internet 
traffic based on transmission rates in bits per second. MINTS estimates growth 
in internet traffic based on an analysis of published traffic studies. The most 
recent analysis indicates that on average the volume-weighted mean annual 
growth rate between 2002 and 2008 was 68% (Minnesota Internet Traffic 
Studies, 2009). This suggests that the volume of internet traffic is doubling 
every 1.3 years.210 
 
                                                        
210 The Global IP Traffic in 2008 is estimated to 43,518 PB per month. A PB is a Peta Bit 
which is 250 Bits. 
 129 
Figure 10: Internet host count history 
 
Source: Internet Systems Consortium (Internet Systems Consortium, 2009c) 
The fact that traffic growth is significantly greater than the growth in hosts is 
suggestive of network effects. Network effects occur when a network 
participant’s valuation of the network is a function of the number of participants 
on the network. To illustrate the general principle using a naïve example of 
simple direct network effects, if each network participant is equally likely to 
communicate with any other network participant and there is no resource 
constraint on the ability of participants to communicate, then it can be shown 
for a large number of participants that a 100% increase in the number of 
participants will result in a 200% increase in communication traffic.211 But for 
the internet, network effects are not as simple as this illustration.212 
                                                        
211 The assumption that each participant is equally likely to communicate with another 
implies that the total volume of communication traffic is a function of the number of 
combinations of pairs of participants. The elasticity of the volume of communication 
traffic with respect to the number of network participants can be calculated with this 
implication in mind. 
212  The fact the percentage growth in internet tariff is approximately double the growth 
in internet hosts does not mean that internet hosts are equally likely to communicate 
with each other. See section 2.1 for discussion on network effects. 
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A.4 Internet access demand growth 
In 1998, consumers in New Zealand, as in most other OECD countries, accessed 
the internet via dial-up modems connected to the fixed-line public switched 
telephone network. Commercial broadband internet access services based on 
DSL technology were launched in Canada in 1996 and the United States in 1997. 
New Zealand, along with nine other OECD countries, launched commercial DSL 
broadband services in 1999, with the remaining OECD countries launching 
commercial broadband services subsequently. By 2004, over 90% of the 
population of New Zealand were able to access broadband services (OECD, 
2007b, p. 121, Table 4.11). 
A number of studies using multivariate techniques have attempted to determine 
the effect of price, income, regulatory policies, and broadband availability on the 
growth of broadband access to the internet.213 None of these studies explicitly 
considers the change in or range of internet services, or the change in network 
effects as an influence on the uptake of broadband internet access, in particular.  
The following graph illustrates the growth in internet subscribers in New 
Zealand in comparison with the whole OECD. Internet subscribers are grouped 
by those with broadband access (which includes cable modems and DSL 
technologies), and more generally fixed-line access (which is the sum of those 
with broadband access and dial-up internet access). The difference between the 
broadband and fixed-line access provides an indication of the number of 
subscribers with dial-up access. 
                                                        
213 See studies by OECD (2007a), Cava-Ferreruela & Alabau-Munoz (2006), Boyle, 
Howell, & Zhang (2008), Distaso, Lupi, & Maneti (2006), and Sraer (2008). 
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Figure 11: Internet access subscribers 
Source: Based on OECD (2007b p. 156, Table 5.1) and Commerce Commission (2008b) 
The graph illustrates that in 2000 most consumers used dial-up internet access. 
Subsequently, the total growth rate of fixed-network internet access was less 
than the growth rate of broadband internet, indicating that most of the growth 
in broadband internet access is from consumers substituting from dial-up 
access. By 2008 most New Zealand consumers used broadband internet access. 
The compound average growth rate (CARG) statistics in Table 6 show that the 
overall growth in uptake of internet access is less than the growth in broadband 
access. In 2000, internet access was dominated in New Zealand by dial-up 
connections, whereas by 2008 internet access was dominated by broadband 
connections. 
Table 6: Fixed Network internet access growth rates 
 CAGR 
Fixed-line access – OECD from 2000 to 2005 10% 
Fixed-line access – New Zealand from 2000 to 2007 9% 
Broadband access – OECD from 2000 to 2008 40% 
Broadband access – New Zealand from 2000 to 2008 72% 
 
A.5 Fixed-line telephone and mobile access demand growth 
For traditional fixed-line telephone services, Figure 12 indicates that there is a 
small but noticeable reduction at a CAGR of -1% for New Zealand and -2% on 
average across the OECD. In contrast, the penetration of mobile services over 
the same period increased at a CARG of 13% in New Zealand and 19% on 
average across the OECD. As the graph illustrates, the net effect is that the 
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penetration of mobile phones is approximately double that of fixed-line 
connections. It also indicates that consumers are not forgoing their fixed 
telephone access at the rate they take up mobile services. 
Figure 12: Mobile and fixed telephone access path subscribers 
 
Source: Based on OECD Communications Outlook 2007 ( p. 156, Table 5.1) and 
(Commerce Commission, 2008b) 
Table 7: Mobile and fixed telephone network access growth rates 
 CAGR 
Mobile Subscribers – OECD from 1998 to 2005 19% 
Mobile Subscribers –New Zealand from 2000 to 2007 13% 
Fixed Telephone Access Path – OECD from 2000 to 
2008 
-2% 
Fixed Telephone Access Path – New Zealand from 2000 
to 2008 
-1% 
 
In 2008, mobile penetration was approximately double that of fixed-line 
connections because consumers generally install only one fixed telephone line in 
their homes. As a result, the number of residential dwellings has tended to 
determine the maximum number of residential telephone lines, in contrast to 
mobile phones which are not limited by this. Individuals are unlikely to share a 
mobile phone because the benefit of mobility requires that the mobile phone 
remain with the individual. Because on average there is more than one 
individual per dwelling, it follows that there is likely to be more than one mobile 
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phone per dwelling. This may suggest that fixed telephone lines and mobile 
connections are not close substitutes.214 
A.6 Telecommunications company revenue 
In contrast to the significant growth in demand for internet services, revenue 
earned by Telecom New Zealand (Telecom), the incumbent telecommunications 
operator in New Zealand, remained constant. The following graph shows that 
the revenue per connection earned by Telecom through providing access to the 
fixed-telephone network, mobile services, and broadband internet access has 
been relatively constant over the past 10 years. This observation is generally 
consistent with the average across the OECD, as illustrated by the following 
graphs. 
Figure 13: Change in Telecom’s ratio of revenue to fixed Telecom connections, 
mobile subscribers, and broadband connections 
Source: Based on data reported in Telecom New Zealand Quarterly Reports and Annual 
Reports from 1999 to 2008. 
                                                        
214 See discussion in section 4.3 on fixed-to-mobile substitution. 
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Figure 14: OECD telecommunications revenue per total communications access 
path 
Source: OECD (2007b, p. 84, Table 3.3) 
Comparing Figure 11 and Figure 13 suggests that Telecom earned increasing 
total revenue from consumers purchasing broadband services. However, 
Telecom did not earn any noticeable additional revenue per broadband 
connection since 2000, one year after the launch of its commercial broadband 
service. This suggests that the significant increase in demand for broadband 
internet access observed in Figure 11 is not due to a corresponding decrease in 
the access price, but that it is the result of consumers’ increasing valuation of the 
internet-based services increasing over time.  
A.7 Technological conditions of supply 
A key factor in the change in industry structure is the change in technology. The 
public switched telephone network integrated the communications network with 
calling services, whereas the internet enabled the separation of the calling 
service from the communications network. This change significantly altered the 
general competitive process and cost structure of providing services and the 
communications network. The technical separation of the network from services 
has had significant implications for the provision of services. This is shown in 
the growth in the range and scale of service providers from 1998 to 2008.  
The internet is a network of networks.215 It is designed to allow users who are 
connected to separate networks, but using the same application, to communicate 
                                                        
215 See the Internet Engineering Task Force – Network Working Group (1989a, p. 7). The 
Internet Engineering Task Force publishes official specifications, guidelines and 
protocols for operating the internet as well as publications discussing issues in relation 
 135 
with each other as if they are communicating with users of the application on the 
same network. The approach taken to implement this principle is that 
information about the users’ applications and data are kept and maintained by 
the users, and the communications interconnection between the networks is 
indifferent about the applications and the data being communicated. 
This is analogous to a basic postal service with a single class of mail delivery. The 
sender and receiver of a letter are concerned with the act of sending and 
receiving a letter, the contents of the letter, and any actions to be taken following 
receipt of a letter. The postal service is not concerned with any of these factors. 
The postal service is concerned with getting the letter from the sender to the 
receiver, where the sender and receiver are not concerned with how the postal 
service collects, sorts, transports and delivers the letter.  
This approach to designing the network function is referred to as the end-to-end 
principle. Originally proposed in 1984 (Saltzer, Reed, & Clark), the end-to-end 
principle has fundamentally determined the technical architecture of the 
internet and economic incentives of those connecting to the internet.  
Figure 15 illustrates a simplified topology of the internet.216 The internet is a 
network of hosts and routers that communicate with each other via links. A host 
is a computer that runs the applications and services which consumers value and 
demand. It is also a computer that consumers use to access services on other 
hosts via a communications network, which is made of routers and 
communications links. In contrast, the router does not run any applications; it 
directs communications between hosts.  
Figure 15 relates to the internet industry structure represented in Figure 4, by 
noting that the hosts in Figure 15 correspond to the computer symbols in Figure 
4, and the routers and links correspond to the internet network illustrated by the 
“cloud” in Figure 4. 
                                                                                                                                                     
to the development of the internet. These publications are referred to as Request for 
Comments (RFC). 
216 This diagram does not include multiplexers, mirror sites, switches or other network 
elements. Although these other elements are important and frequently used, their 
inclusion is not required for the present discussion and would distract from the essential 
features under consideration.  
 136 
 
Figure 15: Schematic description of the internet 
 
 
The applications and services that consumers value, which run on the hosts, 
create user data or request user data from other hosts. User data is transmitted 
from a host to its destination host by the process of encapsulation in which 
additional information is added to the data in layers. User data is encapsulated 
within four layers of information defined by the Internet Protocol Suite.217 The 
layers of the Internet Protocol Suite are: 
1. Application Layer – adds information that indicates to the destination 
host the type of data and what it is for. The Application Layer 
information indicates whether the user data is text, audio or video; 
which applications are needed to view or listen to the data; whether the 
source host requires action to be taken by the user at the destination 
host; and it can test whether the integrity of data received has been 
corrupted during transmission; 
2. Transportation Layer – converts the user data with additional 
Application Layer information into a stream of individual packets 
                                                        
217 Internet Engineering Task Force - Network Working Group (1989a, 1989b). 
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suitable for transmission across the network and then reconstruction by 
the destination host. On receipt of the packets at the destination, this 
layer unpacks the packets; it can test whether the data has been 
corrupted during transmission; and it reconstructs the user data; 
3. Internet Layer – adds the Internet Protocol (IP) address of the 
destination host and the next router en route to the destination; and 
4. Link Layer – converts the IP packet into a format suitable for 
transmission over a next communications link. 
The originating host of the user data encapsulates the user data with all four 
layers of information defined by the Internet Protocol Suite and then sends each 
pack to the first router. The first router and subsequent routers then inspect the 
packet for the destination host IP address, selects and sends the packet to the 
next router, resulting in the packet moving closer to the destination in hops. The 
final router in the chain forwards the packet to the destination host, which 
processes the packet based on the Transportation and Application Layers 
information.  
The diagram above also shows that hosts are connected to each other via links 
and routers, and that the hosts are at the 'edge' of the communications network 
of routers and links. The fact that hosts are at the edge of the network 
graphically illustrates the implementation of the end-to-end principle.  
Implementation of the end-to-end principle by the encapsulation process means 
that the routers and links do not inspect or act on the information contained in 
the user data, the Application Layer, or the Transportation Layer. All the 
information required by the routers and links to carry a packet between hosts is 
contained within the internet and Link Layers. Therefore, the communications 
network is functionally independent of the applications operating on the hosts 
and the applications are functionally independent of the IP communications 
network. 
Returning to the comparison between the structure of the telephony calling 
market and the internet services market represented in Figure 1, the gap 
between the rectangle representing the internet services and the rectangle 
representing the internet access is in part due to functional separation between 
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the services and the communications network described above.218The gap also 
represents commercial separation between the available services and the 
internet access service. That is, internet access and the available services are not 
offered to consumers as a pure bundle.  
This functional separation between the communications network and services 
has different implications for the supply of communications networks and the 
supply of the services. The rest of this appendix will focus on the basic market 
conditions in relation to the production of the communications network, starting 
with a discussion of the change in the performance and cost of the integrated 
circuit.  
A.8 Internet’s technical performance and cost 
The integrated circuit is a fundamental, ubiquitous, building block of the 
internet. The growth in the internet is due to many interacting factors, but it 
does not depend on any one single input factor as much as it depends on the 
integrated circuit. Alternative network architectures, network protocols, 
communications media, hardware configurations, applications and services exist 
or have existed but are no longer in use. However, there is no alternative to the 
computational and data processing capabilities of the integrated circuit. 
Extrapolating historic data indicating that the average cost per component 
decreased as the number of components on an integrated circuit increased, 
Moore (1965) predicted that the number of components on an integrated circuit 
would double every two years. Subsequently, a generalisation of this proposition 
emerged to the effect that the number of components on an integrated circuit 
will double approximately every 18 to 24 months, which is now commonly 
referred to as Moore’s Law.  
As Moore explained in his 1965 article, increasing the number of components on 
an integrated circuit would result in more powerful computers. The value of 
increasing the density of components is not just a decrease in average cost per 
                                                        
218 Hatfield, Mitchell, & Srinagesh (2005, p. 52) also note that the end-to-end principle 
with the Internet Protocol Suite has “far-reaching implications in terms of both the 
ability to support multimedia applications and in the control over the development of 
such applications.” However, the authors do not relate this to how this is achieved in 
terms of its influence on industry structure or the resulting dynamic competition that 
emerges, which is addressed in the present work. 
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component, but it is also an increase in the performance and capabilities of the 
integrated circuits. 
The observed doubling of component density every 18 to 24 months is not a law 
of physics, technology or economics. It is a dynamic process that is the product 
of technical innovation, institutional arrangements, and market conditions 
(including, more recently, demand for the internet and services) that has 
resulted in a reasonably stable growth rate in the quality of integrated circuits.219 
The fact that the historic trend may suggest a stable rate of change should not be 
taken to imply that it is amenable to a static approach to an analysis.  
Two aspects of Moore’s Law are of interest in relation to the internet. The first is 
whether or not there is an internet analogy of Moore’s Law. As observed in 
section A.3, the CARG for hosts connected to the internet was 31% and for traffic 
was 68%, which suggests the possibility of a Moore’s Law for the internet.220 
However, just as with Moore’s Law for the integrated circuit, this does not mean 
that the underlying processes are stable or predictable. The underlying processes 
are a complex mix of evolving consumer preferences for a range of innovative 
new services with developing institutional arrangements. 
The second aspect is the effect of increasing capabilities of integrated circuits on 
the capability of the internet. In this case, the rate at which the increasing 
performance of integrated circuits is incorporated into the internet, existing or 
new services is the outcome of demand and supply factors in the market for the 
internet and available services. As one of the input factors is integrated circuits, 
                                                        
219 This is supported by Odlyzko’s (2003, p. 4) observation that “‘Moore’s laws’ are not 
laws of nature. Furthermore, even when there are extended periods of steady growth at a 
constant rate in a technology, that growth rate can periodically shift. For 
semiconductors, the traditional ‘Moore’s Law’ has held remarkably well over more than 
three decades, but only if it was interpreted in a certain way.” Eldering, Sylia, & Eisenach 
(1999, p. 117) are more confident in predictions provided by Moore’s Law, however they 
note: “What is most remarkable about Moore’s Law is its ability to predict the outcome 
of the complex set of technological, institutional, and economic forces that determines 
what is actually bought and sold in the market.” The complex set of technological, 
institutional, and economic forces, which are changing over time would indicate a 
dynamic process. Schaller (1997, p. 55) emphasises that “The reinforcing effects of 
complementary software developments feeding back into PC hardware – and at the core, 
chip innovations – are significant”. He describes these as “dynamically increasing 
returns”. 
220 For example, Eldering, et al. (1999) ask “Is there a Moore’s Law for Bandwidth?”. 
Also, Coffman & Odlyzko (2002b, p. 40) ask “is there a Moore’s Law for data traffic?” in 
2002 using data up until 2000, and find that the internet was growing at 100% per year, 
which superficially is greater than the current aggregate growth rate of 68%. 
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this suggests the general change in the performance of the integrated circuit as 
described by Moore’s Law is a convenient reference point for measuring the 
change in this performance or cost of the internet. 
A.8.1 Implications of a relatively simple communications network 
The result of the end-to-end principle and the functional layering of the internet 
Protocol Suite is a communications network that is relatively simple compared 
with the traditional telephone network. As Blumenthal & Clark (2001, p. 71) 
note, the resulting relatively simple network is easier to upgrade and the core 
does not need to change in order to accommodate new applications. 
The traditional architecture of a switched telephone network integrates the 
applications into the core of the communications network. The economic 
consequence, as the Internet Engineering Task Force, Network Working Party 
explains, is as follows:  
In the 1970s and 1980s, the voice carriers competed by adding features 
which drove substantial increases in the complexity of the [public 
switched telephone network], especially in the Class 5 switching 
infrastructure. This complexity was typically software-based, not 
hardware driven, and therefore had cost curves worse than Moore’s Law. 
In summary, poor margins on voice products today are due to 
[operational expenditure and capital expenditure] costs not dropping as 
we might expect from simple hardware-bound implementations. (2002, 
p. 6) 
Applications such as calling, messaging, caller identification, call waiting 
indicator and others are embedded within the communications network, rather 
than at the edge of the network, in host and consumer computers and other 
access devices, as is the case of an IP communications network. This means that 
any changes to these services or any new service development is carried out by a 
telephone network operator, not by a large number of independent service 
providers as is the case with the internet. The result is that the cost of 
introducing new services to a traditional switched telephone network is less 
likely to decrease at the rate or more than the rate of Moore’s Law, and that the 
network is not capitalising on benefits resulting from improvements in 
technology.  
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A.8.2 Best efforts communication network 
As Figure 15 illustrates, once a host breaks the user data into a stream of packets 
and sends the packets into the core of the IP communications network, there are 
many different routes that the packets can take across the network to reach the 
destination host. The routers manage this flow of packets around the network so 
that the packets reach their destination and maintain network stability by taking 
the least congested route. One of the technical marvels of the internet is that it is 
able to do this and thus share communication resources amongst a very large 
number of hosts communicating contemporaneously with many other hosts.  
This means that the internet does not commit or dedicate capacity and resources 
for communication between two hosts. This is one of the consequences of the 
end-to-end principle. Communication capacity is provided on a best efforts basis 
using the available resources of links and routers between two hosts. In the case 
of a highly interconnected mesh of routers, packets can take a large number of 
different routes in order to avoid points of congestion. 
In contrast, the switched telephone network dedicates a circuit of committed 
communication capacity over the network to connect calling parties for the 
duration of a call. This connection between calling parties is maintained for the 
duration of the call even during periods of silence. IP networks are defined as 
being connectionless, as there is no circuit-based connection.221 
A.9 Internet access technology dynamics 
As drawn in Figure 15, the link between a host and a router represents that 
access network. A single link does not provide the host with different routing 
options; however, there are still technical options available for providing access. 
It may seem that the technical capabilities of access to the internet will severely 
limit the internet services available to consumers. This is true up to a point, as 
the end-to-end principle with Internet Protocol Suite enables the service 
providers to functionally bypass services available on the access network. In the 
case of the traditional telephone switched network, the internet bypassed the 
calling service available on the switched network. 
                                                        
221 Perhaps a better description of the internet is that all hosts are fully connected as they 
are all on the network at the same time and each host can identify the others on the 
network. 
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Figure 11 indicates that, on average, for countries in the OECD, dial-up access to 
the internet dominated broadband access up until approximately 2004. Prior to 
2004, most users accessed the internet by dialling ISPs over the telephone 
network. The telephone network had been technically optimised to carry voice 
calls, not internet traffic. Even so, the internet experienced some of its most 
significant growth rates prior to 2004. The technology that enabled this early 
growth of the internet was the dial-up modem and the hypertext browser, thus 
resulting in functional bypass of the switched telephone network and initiating 
investment in alternative broadband access technologies.  
A.9.1 Modems and internet access 
Modems for accessing computer networks over switched telephone networks 
emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s with modems that could send and 
receive data at 300 bits per second. This remained the standard data rate for the 
next decade. By late 1998, dial-up modems became available that could send 
data at 33.6 kbits per second and receive data at 56.0 kbits per second. Eldering, 
et al. (1999, p. 120) estimate that dial-up modem data rates doubled every 1.9 
years, as illustrated by the following graph up until 1998. 
Figure 16: Historical modem speeds 'Moore’s Law' prediction 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eldering, et al.(1999, p. 120 Figure 2)  
Eldering, et al. (1999, p. 118) also observe that this increase in capabilities of the 
dial-up modem occurred without regulation. The only constraints in the United 
States were technical, ensuring that modems did not interfere with the operation 
of the telephone network. 
Telecom New Zealand launched its commercial broadband service in 1999 based 
on Asynchronous Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL). This enabled data to be 
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downloaded at a transmission rate typically below 5 Mbits per second222, 
compared with 56.0 kbits per second using dial-up technology over the copper 
lines connecting consumers’ premises to the local exchange or equivalent 
network node. An additional feature of broadband access is that consumers 
remain connected to the internet, unlike dial-up access where consumers would 
normally have to initiate a connection by 'dialling up' an internet service 
provider.  
Since 1999, the capability and variety of broadband technologies have increased 
substantially. By the end of 2008, Telecom New Zealand estimated it had 
installed the ADSL2+ version on 58% of its lines, enabling theoretical maximum 
download speed of 24 Mbits per second, with users typically experiencing 
download transmission rates of between 8 and 15 Mbits per second.223 These 
developments and the growing range of available access technologies are 
illustrated in the following table with the average data transmission speeds by 
access technology. 
Table 8: OECD average advertised broadband speeds by 
technology, September 2008224 
 Average upload speed 
(kbits per second) 
Average download speed 
(kbits per second) 
Total 5,012 17,412 
Wireless 712 1,889 
DSL 699 9,623 
Cable 1,264 14,856 
FTTx 34,247 65,326 
 Source: OECD(2008a) 
                                                        
222 The IDC & Epitro Technologies (2008, pp. 8,9) report on broadband states that the 
ADSL standards allowed maximum download speeds capped at 8 Mbits per second, with 
typical rates below 5 Mbits per second.  
223 Refer to IDC & Epitiro & Technologies (2008, p. 8). 
224 The OECD (2008b) defines broadband as internet connectivity capable of download 
speeds of at least 256 kbits per second. Wireless technologies include satellite, LMDS, 
MMDS, and WiMAX (fixed). DSL covers the digital subscriber line group of technologies 
including ADSL, VDSL, and SDSL among others. Cable is internet access using cable 
modems, and FTTx is fibre-to-the-premises (e.g. house, apartment). 
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This table indicates that the OECD is monitoring four different technologies 
providing access to the internet across the OECD group of countries. 
A.9.2 Disruptive innovation and the Web browsers 
The discussion so far has considered how the underlying technologies influenced 
the industry structure of the internet. However, consumers do not value these 
technologies for themselves, but for the available information and services the 
technologies carry. One application that had a significant, disruptive, influence 
on internet access growth in making services and other applications more 
accessible is the Web browser. 
It is common to not differentiate between the World Wide Web (the Web) and 
the internet. For many, the Web and the internet are synonymous. However, the 
Web is an application based on the Web browser, which operates over the 
internet. It allows consumers to access and share a very large number of 
documents, which are interlinked and contain text, pictures, video, audio and 
other applications. It increased the value of the internet for many consumers by 
making online content more accessible. 
In 2002, Coffman & Odlyzko (2002a, p. 42); (2002b, p. 72) claimed there were 
only two applications which consumers significantly valued: one was email, the 
other was the Web browser. They observed that it apparently took 18 months 
from the launch of the first release of the Mosaic visual browser around the 
middle of 1993 for Web traffic to dominate the internet. Furthermore, they 
speculate that a 100-fold increase in internet traffic over the two-year period of 
1995 and 1996 can be attributed to more consumers being willing to use the 
internet as more graphics-rich content became available on the Web and the 
introduction of flat-rate internet access plans. This led to consumers tripling the 
time they spent online and accelerated the growth in internet access. No 
information has been found to suggest that a single application launched since 
2002 had an effect of similar proportions on the growth of the internet. 
A.10 Internet peering and transit 
As the internet is a network of networks, a key input for the supply of internet-
based services is the ability to interconnect between networks. The institutional 
arrangements governing interconnection are flexible and have been an 
important element in the dynamic development of the internet. The gap in 
Figure 1 between the rectangle representing the internet services and the 
rectangle representing the internet access is due to (i) the described functional 
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separation between the services and the communications network, and (ii) the 
commercial separation between services and the internet access.  
The vehicle that brought these factors together into a form that would eventually 
evolve into the internet was a non-commercial network 'NFSNET' developed by 
the National Science Foundation (NSF). NSFNET was a network that linked 
together universities across the United States. The first NFSNET goal was to link 
together supercomputer centres, and emerging regional and midlevel 
networks.225 The second goal was to expand the use of the network from 
scientists and researchers to a broad academic community for their general use. 
At the time, building a network for general-purpose use was novel, as networks 
had been built for a particular project or program of activity. In contrast, 
NSFNET was built to provide general-purpose connectivity.  
The development of NSFNET commenced when it engaged a partnership of 
Merit Network, IBM, and MCI. By mid 1988, the partnership had commissioned 
an operational network connecting 13 sites across the United States, 
transmitting 152 million packets per month at a speed of 1.5 Mbps. Even at this 
early state, in its first year, the usage of NSFNET grew by 500%. By late 1991 the 
network covered 16 sites, with a transmission speed of 45 Mbps.226 
During this period, pressure began to build to commercialise NSFNET as 
awareness of the benefits and potential for such a network grew, especially in the 
private sector. A constraint on the traffic that could traverse NSFNET was NSF’s 
Acceptable Use Policy, which prohibited the transmission of purely commercial 
traffic. However, regional and other networks were attracting commercial 
customers. Plus, it was apparent that commercial traffic would improve the 
efficiency of networks given the networks’ underlying economies of scale and 
scope.227 
At this time, some commercial backbone operators circumvented NSFNET by 
establishing a Commercial Internet Exchange (CIX), which consisted of a router 
located in Santa Clara, California.228 CIX interconnected the commercial 
                                                        
225 Fraser (1995, p. 16). 
226 Fraser (1995, pp. 19, 20, 27, 30). 
227 Fraser (1995, pp. 31, 32). 
228 Kende (2002, p. 48). 
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backbones, enabling them to exchange end-user traffic. In 1993, NSF ceased 
funding the NSFNET, leaving the management of the backbone to competing 
commercial networks. In order to facilitate development of competing backbone 
networks, NSF designed a system of Network Access Points (NAPs) across the 
United States, similar to the CIX, for interconnecting the commercial operators. 
These commercial networks and NAPs replaced NSFNET in 1995. 
Although the NSF designed the system of NAPs, the NSF did not establish any 
terms for interconnection, nor did the Federal Communications Commission 
regulate interconnection among the commercial internet backbone operators.229  
In 2008, the terms of interconnection among the internet network operators 
remained unregulated by the FCC.  
Over time, network operators have developed two alternative types of 
interconnection for exchanging traffic. These two types of interconnection 
contracts emerged as the commercial internet developed in the early 1990s and 
are still in use. Most internet traffic is carried and exchanged using these 
contracts. Network operators agree to either peer with each other or to transit 
traffic to another carrier’s traffic. 
Peering230 
In principle, peering involves two operators exchanging traffic that is destined 
for an end user on the other operator’s network, and they agree to neither charge 
nor receive payment for terminating this traffic. An important implication of this 
arrangement is that no information is exchanged between network operators 
regarding usage or pricing of individual services connected to their network. 
Therefore, information about service usage does not traverse the internet, and is 
not passed onto individual consumers by the network operator, although the 
service provider may charge the consumer for services. 
In the United States, peering requires the two operators to agree the geographic 
location where the two networks are to interconnect. In complex networks 
where there are multiple points of interconnection, the generally accepted 
practice is to engage in hot-potato routing. This involves each operator, with one 
of two end users (consumer or host) who are communicating, agreeing to hand 
                                                        
229 Kende (2002, p. 42). 
230 Economides (2005, p. 379) and Kende (2002, p. 47). 
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over traffic from the originating network to the terminating network at the point 
of interconnection closest to the end user originating the IP packet. This implies 
that a communication exchange between two end users, with each end user 
originating traffic on different networks, may traverse geographically separate 
handover points.  
Transit231 
The alternative to peering is transit. This involves a network operator agreeing 
to carry traffic for another network operator that originated the traffic, 
ultimately to a peering point of interconnection.232 The network operator 
originating the traffic will pay for transit, and therefore a wholesale customer of 
the network operator provides the transit service. 
There is no accepted convention for deciding when two network providers 
should peer with each other or one offers the other transit. Kende (2002) distils 
the decision down to whether each operator judges that they will equally share 
in the benefits and the costs of interconnect. If the network operators believe 
that the benefits and costs are equal then they will agree to peer with each other, 
otherwise one operator will charge the other for transit. As observed in the 
United States, network operators engage in a mix of peering and transit 
agreements with different operators.233 
Development of the internet interconnection in New Zealand 
A report by Internet NZ234(2007, p. 7) states that prior to 2004, network 
operators, including the two largest – Telecom New Zealand and TelstraClear – 
interconnected with each other at a multilateral peering exchange in Auckland 
and in Wellington, where traffic was exchanged without payment between 
network operators. Network operators funded the cost of carrying traffic to and 
                                                        
231 Economides (2005, p. 379) and Kende (2002, p. 47). 
232 Under a peering agreement, if an operator receives traffic that is not for an end user 
connected to their network then the operator can disregard this traffic. 
233 See Kende (2002, p. 52) for a discussion on the commercial practicalities of peering 
and transit negotiations in the U.S. From an antitrust perspective, Besen, et al. (2001) 
indicate that these more complex peering and transit arrangements result in 
opportunities for competitive bypass and less chance for exclusion. 
234 Internet NZ (2007, p. 5) states it is “a membership-based not-for-profit organisation 
and has the management responsibility for the administration of the .nz domain name 
registry, a critical component of the internet infrastructure in New Zealand.” 
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from these peering exchanges, including the cost of national transmission, from 
revenue earned from their customers.  
In 2004, TelstraClear withdrew from the peering exchanges, and Telecom 
followed soon after. At the time the report was prepared by InternetNZ, 
TelstraClear and Telecom interconnected with each other and provided access 
for some other network operators by private bilateral transit arrangements. 
Some network operators continued to exchange traffic at the multilateral 
peering exchanges in Wellington and Auckland. Otherwise, traffic was 
exchanged at peering exchanges offshore. The report highlights issues regarding 
the efficiency of these particular arrangements with respect to the supply of local 
content, particularly video and audio-rich content, within New Zealand. It also 
highlights the flexibility in determining particular arrangements of peering and 
transit contracts within New Zealand.235 
A.11 Summary 
The transformation in market structure described by Figure 1 and Figure 4 was 
enabled by the internet protocol suite and the structure of peering and transit 
contracts. The end-to-end principle with the layering of the internet Protocol 
Suite meant that a wide variety of services could be added and removed from the 
internet without the need for changing the communications network. The 
peering and transit contracts meant that service providers did not need to have 
contracts with the network providers that their customers happened to connect. 
These features of the internet lowered the cost of entry for new services 
compared with introducing new services to the public switched telephone 
network. 
A.12 Annex: Selection of service providers 
There is a range of methods and sources for assessing the general demand or 
value that consumers place on websites. A variety of internet research 
companies provide this information using a variety of methods. As the data is 
publicly available, the two internet research companies selected are Alexa 
Internet and comScore. The data from these research companies are reported 
here and provide a general indication of the popularity of various websites both 
                                                        
235 An illustration of this flexibility is provided by some stakeholders in New Zealand 
indicating that in addition to the definition of peering and transit described above, paid 
peering is a possible form for an interconnection contract (InternetNZ External Peering 
Group, 2007, p. 9).  
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here in New Zealand and overseas. Generally, the approach taken by these 
companies for ranking sites is to monitor a sample of consumers for the sites 
they visit and then adjust the raw data for any sample bias. The choice of these 
research companies here is not an indication of the validity of the reported data.  
Table 9: Alexa internet traffic rankings 
NZ Top 10 Sites 
2 March 2009 
Global Top 10 Sites  
2 March 2009 
1. Google New Zealand  
2. Google  
3. Trade Me  
4. Yahoo!  
5. Windows Live  
6. YouTube  
7. Facebook  
8. Bebo.com  
9. Wikipedia  
10. Blogger.com 
1. Google 
2. Yahoo! 
3. YouTube 
4. Live.com search engine from 
Microsoft 
5. Facebook 
6. Msn  
7. Wikipedia 
8. Blogger  
9. Myspace  
10. Yahoo.co.jp 
Source: (Alexa Internet. Top Sites in New Zealand, 2009) and (Alexa Internet. Global 
Top Sites, 2009) 
Table 10: comScore World Metrix Rankings 
comScore Top 10 Properties (US) 
Ranked by Unique Visitors 
January 2009 
Total U.S. – Home, Work, University 
Locations 
comScore Top Global Web 
Properties 
Ranked by Total Unique Visitors 
May 2008 
Total Worldwide, Age 15+ - Home and 
Work Locations 
1. Google Sites 
2. Yahoo! Sites 
3. Microsoft Sites 
4. AOL LLC 
5. Fox Interactive Media 
6. Ask Network 
7. eBay 
8. Amazon Sites 
9. Wikimedia Foundation Sites 
10. Facebook.com 
1. Google Sites 
2. Microsoft Sites 
3. Yahoo! Sites 
4. Wikipedia Sites 
5. AOL LLC 
6. eBay 
7. Fox Interactive Media 
8. Amazon Sites 
9. Apple Inc. 
10. CNET Networks 
Source: comScore Media Metrix (comScore Press Release, 2009) and (comScore, 2008) 
Based on these tables, and a qualitative assessment of selecting sites that offer a 
diverse range of services, the service providers selected for analysis are: Google, 
Trade Me, Yahoo!, Facebook, YouTube, Wikipedia, Amazon.com and Skype. 
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This is not a comprehensive list of major service providers that offer services in 
New Zealand, let alone those with a significant international presence. The 
service providers not included in this list but which appear in the rankings offer 
similar types of services to others in the list. For this limited selection of service 
providers, it will be shown there has been significant growth across a range of 
different services within the past 10 years. This will be followed by observations 
regarding the aggregate effect of the growth in services on the internet. 
Description and growth of each service provider 
Google 
Google is a web search engine that allows consumers to search web pages. 
Google provides consumers with numerous features and tools to assist with the 
search. Additional services offered by Google include Google News, Google 
Finance, Google Maps, Google Image Search, Google Video, Google Book 
Search, Google Blog Search, and Google Groups, amongst others.  
Google was incorporated on 4 September 1998. In 2008, Google Inc. earned 
US$21.7 billion revenue with income from operations of US$6.6 billion (Google 
Inc., 2009). Google Inc. entered the S&P 100236 on 17 December 2006 (Standard 
& Poor's, 2006). 
A general indication of the magnitude of the growth can be provided by way of 
comparison with Verizon Communications Inc and Sprint Nextel Corporation, a 
major telecommunications operator in the United States, and Apple Inc. For the 
2008 financial year Verizon (2009) posted revenue of US$97 billion and 
operating income of US$17 billion. Sprint Nextel (2009, p. 30) posted revenue of 
US$35.6 billion and an operating income loss of US$2.7 billion. Apple Inc. 
(2008, p. 36) posted revenue of US$32 billion and net income of US$5 billion.  
YouTube 
YouTube offers an internet video search service which allows people to watch 
and share videos. By the time Google Inc. announced its acquisition of YouTube, 
                                                        
236 Standard & Poor’s (2009, p. 3) state: “The S&P 100 consists of 100 companies 
selected from the S&P 500. To be included, the companies should be among the larger 
and more stable companies in the S&P 500, and must have listed options. Sector balance 
is considered in the selection of companies for the S&P 100. This index is widely used for 
derivatives, and is the index underlying the OEX options.” Furthermore “The S&P 500 
focuses on the large-cap sector of the [U.S. equities] market; however, since it includes a 
significant portion of the total value of the market, it also represents the market.”  
 151 
consumers were daily retrieving 100 million video views and uploading 65,000 
new videos (Google Inc. Press Center, 2006). 
The domain name 'www.youtube.com' was activated in February 2005 with its 
official launch in November 2005. In October 2006, Google Inc. announced that 
it had agreed to acquire YouTube for US$1.65 billion, which was completed the 
following month (Google Inc. Press Center, 2006).  
Trade Me 
Trade Me is a New Zealand-based internet auction website. On 16 March 2009, 
Trade Me reported having 2.2 million active members and 1.2 million current 
listings (Trade Me, 2009). The total population of New Zealand at the end of 
June 2008 was 4.2 million. 
Trade Me was founded in 1999 and acquired by Fairfax in April 2006 for 
NZ$700 million (John Fairfax Holdings Limited Press Release, 2006).  
An indication of the general magnitude of this growth can be gained by 
comparing this result with Telecom New Zealand’s growth over a similar period. 
In 1998, a year before Trade Me was founded, Telecom (1998, p. 25) also 
reported having 1.8 million access lines and 476 thousand mobile connections in 
New Zealand. In 2008, Telecom (2008, pp. 12, 17) reported having 1.8 million 
access lines and 2.1 million mobile connections in New Zealand.  
Skype 
Skype offers a telephone service to consumers connected to the internet. 
Consumers download and install the Skype software which allows them to make 
and receive calls. Calls between Skype consumers are free, whereas calls to a 
fixed or mobile telephone network incur a call charge.  
Skype was founded in 2002. In September 2005, eBay Inc. announced that it 
had agreed to acquire Skype for US$2.6 billion (eBay Inc. Media Center, 2005). 
For the year 2008, Skype posted revenue of US$550 million (eBay Inc. Media 
Center, 2009b). In April 2009, eBay announced that it plans to separate Skype 
from eBay by an initial public offering in 2010 (eBay Inc. Media Center, 2009a). 
By the end of 2008, Skype had more than 405 million users worldwide. eBay 
cited preliminary data released by TeleGeography Research which indicates that 
Skype accounted for 8% of the world’s international calling minutes in 2008. 
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eBay also states that 30% of Skype users use Skype for business purposes, and 
more than 25% of Skype-to-Skype calls include video. 
Facebook 
Facebook is a “social utility that helps people communicate with friends, family 
and work colleagues”. The company develops technologies that facilitate the 
sharing of information through a 'social graph', the digital mapping of people’s 
real-world social connections.  
Facebook was founded in February 2004 (Facebook Inc. Press Room, 2009a). It 
is currently privately owned and does not release financial information. 
By February 2009, Facebook had more than 175 million users. More than 50% of 
users are not at college, and more than 70% of users are outside the United 
States. The average user has 120 friends on the site (Facebook Inc. Press Room, 
2009b). Extrapolating the investment by Digital Sky Technologies in 2009 of 
US$200 million for a 1.96% stake implies a valuation for Facebook’s preferred 
stock of US$10 billion.237 
Yahoo! 
Yahoo! Inc. offers a web portal that provides consumers a homepage, internet 
search engine and email, amongst other services. Internet surveys indicate that 
Yahoo! web sites are the second most visited sites on the internet. 
Yahoo! Inc. was founded in 1994 and incorporated in 1995. Yahoo! Inc. posted 
revenue of US$7.2 billion and net income of US$424 million for 2008 (Yahoo! 
Inc., 2009). 
Yahoo! Inc. earns revenue by offering advertising space and marketing services 
on its websites. With respect to the New Zealand internet market, Yahoo!Xtra is 
a joint venture between Yahoo!7 and Telecom New Zealand. Yahoo!7 holds a 
51% stake in the joint venture company and Telecom holds 49%. Yahoo!7 is a 
joint venture between Australia’s Seven Network and Yahoo! Inc.  
Wikipedia 
Founded in 2001, Wikipedia is a multilingual, Web-based, free-content 
encyclopaedia which is written by volunteers. In 2008, it attracted 684 million 
                                                        
237 Reported by The New York Times by Miller (2009). 
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visitors. There are more than 10 million articles in more than 250 languages 
(Wikipedia contributors, 2009).  
Amazon.com 
Amazon.com is an online retailer that sells a wide variety of goods and services 
including clothes, music CDs, books, software, consumer electronics, and DVDs 
amongst other things. 
Amazon.com, Inc. was incorporated in 1994. In 1998, Amazon.com, Inc. posted 
net sales of $609 million and a loss from operations of ($112 million) 
(Amazon.com Inc., 1999). In 2008, Amazon.com, Inc. posted net sales of $19 
billion and income from operations of $842 million (Amazon.com Inc. investor 
relations, 2009). Amazon.com entered the S&P 100 on 31 December 2008 
(Standard & Poor's, 2008). 
 154 
Appendix B:  Two-part tariffs in the presence of 
heterogeneous consumers 
Income plays a key role in a consumer’s consumption of any service. It is no 
different when two-part tariff determines consumers’ outlay for a service. In the 
case of a basic telephony service, the two-part tariff generally takes the form of a 
monthly subscription fee for access to a telephony network, and a usage price for 
making a call over the telephony network. Payment of an access fee, say, for 
subscribing to a telephony service, directly reduces the income available to 
spend on calls as well as non-telephony services. Thus income determines the 
extent of the benefits from subscribing compared to not subscribing, and thus 
subscription and consumption decisions. 
This general issue for telecommunications has not been systematically treated in 
the literature. A theory of consumer behaviour and two-part tariffs is presented 
which ties together the access fee and call price within a coherent model of 
consumer behaviour. The model of consumer behaviour has standard 
assumptions of utility maximisation where there is a two-part tariff, and 
consumption and participation in that market are jointly a normal good. The 
model is used to analyse optimal two-part tariffs with endogenous participation.  
B.1 Literature on the theory of two-part tariffs 
A feature of the literature on two-part tariffs is that a wide range of simplifying 
assumptions is made when addressing a particular problem and these 
assumptions are often not consistent with each other. 
Laffont & Tirole (2000, pp. 60-66, 68, 70), and Mitchell (1978) propose that the 
socially optimal two-part tariffs should be analysed as complementary access 
and call services where the access fee and call price are determined by Ramsey-
Boiteux pricing principles. Ramsey-Boiteux pricing principles determine the 
contribution to common costs from the access fee and usage call, where the 
contribution from the access fee is proportional to the inverse of the access fee 
elasticity and the contribution from the usage price is proportional to the inverse 
of call price elasticity. That is, the mark up included in the access fee and call 
price is proportional to the inverse of the price elasticity of demand for access 
and call services.238 This treats access and calling as separate services. In 
                                                        
238 Laffont & Tirole (2000, p. 64). 
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addition, Laffont & Tirole (2000, p. 73) propose that prices may deviate from 
Ramsey-Boiteux prices if some other social objective is to be met, for example an 
obligation to make telephony services universally available to a population. This 
implies that the pricing associated with the social objective is not efficient 
whereas a tariff based on Ramsey-Boiteux pricing is efficient. Boiteux (1971) and 
Ramsey (1927) exclude wealth effects and consider only uniform price-per-unit 
demand, so have little relevance to determining optimal two-part tariffs.  
The literature makes a variety of assumptions regarding the role, or lack of, for 
income as a determinant of consumer behaviour under two-part tariffs. Coase 
(1946) and Oi (1971) assume that income does not affect demand. Schmalensee 
(1981) assumes the marginal utility of income is a constant equal to one 
irrespective of whether or not consumers subscribe to the service. Furthermore, 
Ng & Weisser (1974), Goldman, Leland, & Sibley (1984), and Wilson (1993, pp. 
165-176) implicitly assume that the marginal utility of income is continuous in 
the transition from non-subscriber to subscriber. These assumptions are 
inconsistent with the proposition that income affects subscription decisions. 
Tirole (1988, pp. 143-144) proposes a model of consumer behaviour that 
assumes different marginal utility of income between subscribing and not, which 
is in part consistent with a general proposition that an increase in income 
increases subscription. However, Tirole also assumes that utility is separable 
between calling and non-telephony services, which is inconsistent with the 
proposition that calling increases with income. 
Oi (1971), Feldstein (1972), Littlechild (1975), Auerbach & Pellechio (1978), and 
Mitchell & Vogelsang (1991, p. 80) assume that the consumer surplus, and 
therefore the willingness to pay for access, equals the area under the demand 
curve. For this assumption to be theoretically valid, the demand for calling 
cannot be a function of income. This is also generally inconsistent with the 
proposition that consumers on higher incomes subscribe whereas those on lower 
incomes do not subscribe: that is, that subscription is a normal good. 
Stole (1995) develops a Hotelling location model in an oligopoly setting where 
firms use nonlinear tariffs to discriminate.239 Stole’s model differentiates 
                                                        
239 Armstrong & Vickers (2001) also use a Hotelling location model, arguing that price 
discrimination tends to be desirable in sufficiently competitive conditions, with the 
exception where consumers are segmented into separately identifiable markets. 
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consumers’ preferences along a horizontal dimension for a firm’s brand and 
vertical dimension for quality or quantity scale. A fundamental distinction 
between the horizontal and vertical dimensions is that consumers with a high 
horizontal preference for one brand will have a low preference for another. 
Conversely, a high vertical preference for a particular quantity or quality is 
constant across all brands. Stole concludes that the optimal price schedule 
depends on the type of private information (brand or quality) that the consumer 
possesses.  
Stole’s (1995) use of term ‘participation decision’ differs from that used here.  
For Stole, consumers choose to participate in a service by subscribing to or 
purchasing one of a range of differentiated services based on their brand 
preference. In the present work, consumers choose whether or not to participate 
in a telephony service. In principle, no limit is placed on the number of 
telephony services that a consumer subscribes too. For example, the model 
presented in this appendix accommodates the situation where consumers 
subscribe to a telephony service and decide whether or not to subscribe in 
addition to a mobile service.240 
There is no doubt that consumers’ tastes and preferences vary, and income may 
influence preferences. This spatial representation of consumer preferences does 
not explicitly take into account the effect of income on a consumer’s 
participation decisions. Income’s role in consumers’ participation decisions is 
                                                                                                                                                     
Rochet & Stole (2002) consider the optimal nonlinear prices with the spatial model of 
consumer preferences and show that a duopoly outcome is similar to a monopoly 
outcome, and if the two firms have the same marginal cost and competition is 
sufficiently intense, then the result is cost-plus-fee pricing. Yin (2004) also considers 
oligopoly competition amongst firms using a Hotelling location model and finds that 
two-part tariffs result in greater welfare relative to uniform prices. Hoernig & Valletti 
(2007) use a Hotelling location model to compare the tariff structures adopted by media 
outlets, such as cable-tv firms, where firms offer various combinations of subscription 
and pay-per-view fees. They argue that consumer welfare tends to reduce as the reliance 
of subscription-based pricing increases because a subscription reduces affordability, 
mixing content from different sources. 
Blonski (2002) adapts the Hotelling location model to consider the effect of network 
externalities on optimal two-part tariffs, while making the explicit assumption that 
consumers are not differentiated by income, and noting that, for his purpose, it does not 
matter if consumer “differentiation is generated by wealth, taste, or both” (Blonski, 
2002, p. 99, footnote 3). It is proposed here that it does matter whether differentiation is 
generated by wealth or taste.  
240 See section 3.4.2 for numerical example illustrating consumer participation in mobile 
services. 
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distinct from acting as a proxy for the variation in consumer tastes.241 To assume 
that variation in income and variation in preferences are essentially the same 
implies that income does not have an effect on calling and that utility is 
separable. This leads to ambiguity regarding a theory that explains the 
participation decision. 
B.2 Influence of income on consumer behaviour 
Suppose all consumers in the population have the same preferences and that 
income differentiates consumers. Consumers derive utility from making 
telephone calls  and consuming non-telephony goods : 
  (28) 
Utility is twice continuously differentiable everywhere, strictly increasing, and is 
strictly concave for all individuals. That is, it is assumed that , 
,  and , where the 
subscript indicates the first and second order partial derivative taken with 
respect to variables, calls and non-telephony goods. This implies that at a 
consumer’s optimal consumption choice, given a budget constraint, utility is a 
concave function on income.  
Individuals consume some non-telephony goods (for example food), and they 
have the option to not make telephone calls as there are other modes of 
communication, which implies: 
  (29) 
If a unit of the non-telephony goods has a unit price, and an individual with total 
income  does not make any calls, then the utility derived is: 
  (30) 
A necessary condition for an individual to subscribe to the telephony service and 
make calls is that their utility from subscribing and calling is greater than or 
equal to their utility from not subscribing: 
                                                        
241 Tirole (1988, pp. 143-144) claims that variation in income and variation in tastes are 
equivalent. 
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  (31) 
The arguments of the utility functions on either side of the inequality are not the 
same, resulting in a discontinuity in demand due to the participation decision. 
The term on the left-hand side of the greater-than-or-equal-to sign is the utility 
derived from subscribing and calling, whereas the term on the right-hand side is 
the utility derived from not subscribing and not calling. If the term on the left is 
strictly greater than the term on the right then the individual is an infra-
marginal subscriber. If the equality holds, then the individual is a marginal 
subscriber. In this case, the individual is assumed to subscribe even though they 
are indifferent to subscribing and not subscribing. If the condition does not hold 
then the individual will not subscribe. 
Suppose that subscribers’ outlay on the telephony service is determined by a 
two-part tariff that includes a fixed monthly fee for access to the network and a 
price  per call. A subscriber’s total outlay on non-telephony goods and the 
telephony service must satisfy the budget constraint: 
  (32) 
where  is an individual’s income. Individuals base their consumption decision 
on the trade-off between calling and consuming non-telephony goods. If they 
subscribe they will pay the access fee, resulting in a reduction in the available 
funds to outlay on calls and non-telephony goods. It follows that utility is not a 
homogeneous function of telephone calls and non-telephony goods, as the ratio 
of non-telephony goods to calls is not constant along the income-consumption 
path: this is due to the access fee.242 
Following from the concavity of utility and the budget constraint, a subscriber’s 
optimal demand for calls and non-telephony goods is  and 
. Substituting these demand functions into equation (31) gives an 
alternative representation of the subscription decision in terms of the indirect 
utility: 
                                                        
242 The income-consumption path is the locus of all tangencies of the indifference curves 
to various budget constraints, holding price constant (Silberberg, 1990, p. 317). 
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  (33) 
This is an individual’s participation constraint. Furthermore, it is assumed there 
is an income  that will satisfy the equality: 
  (34) 
The novelty of this work is the explicit consideration of a normal-good 
assumption in relation to the participation decision, and its implication for the 
construct of the utility function.243 It seems reasonable to expect that infra-
marginal subscribers are those individuals with income , whereas 
individuals with income do not subscribe. Two consistent conditions are 
proposed that are sufficient to result in normal participation behaviour. 
The first condition is required for normal participation when there is no access 
fee, and that tariff is a uniform price per unit. That is, given  and a choice 
of call price  such that , then subscription increases with income 
if: 
  (35) 
Assuming that the first condition holds, the second condition is sufficient for 
normal participation behaviour when the access fee takes a positive value, and 
there is a two-part tariff. That is for  and thus , subscription 
increases with income if: 
  (36) 
Together these two conditions result in normal participation behaviour. That is, 
for a given two-part tariff and an individual who does not subscribe, continuing 
to increase the individual’s income will eventually result in the individual 
subscribing and making calls.  
                                                        
243 Oi (1971), Feldstein (1972), Littlechild (1975), Auerbach & Pellechio (1978), 
Schmalensee (1981), Tirole (1988, p. 143), and Mitchell & Vogelsang (1991, p. 80) put 
forward the general proposition that participation is determined by comparing utility or 
consumer surplus at two the separate arguments of participating and not participating. 
Where this thesis departs from this earlier work is to explicitly consider the normal good 
aspect of the participation decision. 
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To show that the first condition leads to normal participation, suppose  
and a call price  is chosen such that  for marginal subscribers with 
income . It follows that marginal subscribers are indifferent between 
subscribing and not subscribing, at the same argument,  and . 
Irrespective of whether or not the marginal subscribers subscribe, they do not 
make any calls and spend all of their income on non-telephony goods. 
Furthermore, as , and  is optimal choice with subscription, 
then the first order conditions of the marginal subscribers’ optimisation problem 
is:244 
  (37) 
Therefore, the second order condition implied by (35) is required to ensure that 
those with income  subscribe, whereas those with income  do not 
subscribe.245 If the inequality in (35) does not hold, and the increase in the 
marginal utility of income of subscribing is less than not subscribing, then 
consumers with income slightly less than would gain utility from subscribing, 
and individuals with an income greater than  would lose utility from 
subscribing. This would contradict normal participation behaviour.   
An additional consequence of the first condition is that not only does 
participation increase with income at  but also calling is a normal 
good, . This can be shown by first taking derivate of (35) with 
respect to : 
  (38) 
                                                        
244 Silberberg (1990, pp. 313-315) shows that the condition described by equation (37) 
holds at the optimal consumption choice. 
245 Schmalensee (1981) assumes that the marginal utility of income is constant. 
Although, equation (41) allows either  or , it does not 
allow both  and . Furthermore, as discussed below, there 
is a discontinuous increase in the marginal utility of income. 
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The arguments of the functions in this expression have been left out in order to 
simplify notation, and asterisks have been added as a reminder that the 
derivates are being evaluated at the argument  with . Substituting 
, which derived from the budget constraint into equation (38) and 
simplifying gives: 
  (39) 
In addition to the conduct implied by equation (35), as income increases for 
, consumption follows the income-consumption path determined by 
.246 Taking the derivative of the first order condition at the optimal 
consumption choice , substituting , and simplifying 
leads to: 
  (40) 
Comparing equations (39) and (40) indicates that: 
  (41) 
Comparing this result with (40), and recognising that the term within brackets 
of (40) is negative due to the (quasi-)concavity of the utility function, implies 
.247 That is, if , normal participation behaviour requires that an 
increase in income will increase the demand for calls. 
For , the second condition, (36), with the first condition, (35), implies: 
  (42) 
That is, a positive access fee results in a discontinuous increase in the marginal 
utility of income as the marginal subscriber is indifferent between not 
subscribing and subscribing. Whereas, with no access fee there is no 
                                                        
246 The income-consumption path is the locus of all tangencies of the indifference curves 
to various budget constraints, holding prices constant (Silberberg, 1990, p. 317). 
247 Quasi-concavity is sufficient for  (Silberberg, 1990, p. 307). 
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discontinuous change in marginal utility, as (37) indicates. The effect of this 
discontinuity is that consumers with income  do not subscribe, whereas 
those with income  do subscribe.  
In order to show that (42) follows from the first and second conditions, consider 
a sufficient, though not necessary, condition that is consistent with equation 
(42). Suppose for  that the full derivative subject to 
, and that  is smooth. This is the same as the marginal 
utility of income increasing with traversing a marginal subscriber’s indifference 
curve as  increases.248 Expanding the full derivative with respect to  gives: 
  (43) 
This expression, but evaluated at  and , is the same as (41). This 
suggests that (42) holds for values of  close to zero, as  is smooth. It 
also suggests that equation (42) will hold for  if the full derivative 
, subject to . In other words, taking an extreme 
scenario, equation (42) will hold for  if  for  because 
of the first condition imposed on the utility by (35). Therefore expanding the full 
derivative of , subject to  gives: 
  (44) 
However, this expression is implied by the second condition, equation (36). This 
is demonstrated by taking the same steps used to derive equation (41) from (35), 
to derive (44) from (36). 
A further implication of the second condition is that for , . 
For positive values of the access fee, income might not have an effect on the 
demand for calling, which is in contrast to the scenario where  when 
                                                        
248 Note that the utility maximising first order conditions for a subscriber implies 
that . 
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. This result can be inferred from equation (40). If equation (44) 
equals zero, then this is comparable to the term  in equation (40), 
which implies .  
B.3 Income variation 
Income is distributed so that the proportion of a population with income  is 
given by the uni-modal density function . Consumers in the population are 
assumed to have the same preferences. In other words, consumers’ preferences 
for calling and other non-telephony goods are described by the same utility 
function, equation (28). As a result, any variation in demand between 
consumers is solely due to the variation in income. 
The population size is assumed to be large enough for 
 
to be treated as 
continuous and differentiable within the domain . An example of 
 is the log-normal distribution; nevertheless, a specific functional form is 
not necessary to derive the following results. The uni-modal assumption is not 
necessary to derive results, but its inclusion simplifies the exposition by avoiding 
the possibility of multiple solutions. 
The total number of subscribers is then: 
  (45) 
and the aggregate of individual subscribers’ demand for calling is determined 
by: 
  (46) 
where  is the income of the marginal subscriber defined by equation (34), and 
 is the subscribers’ with income  demand for calls that maximises 
their utility for the given access fee  and call price . 
B.4 Supply of telephony service 
A monopoly supplies the telephony service and earns a profit: 
  (47) 
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where the variables ,  and  are respectively the call price, the access fee, and 
a marginal subscriber’s income.  
Network costs are separated into network elements with properties that are 
representative of networks in practice. The marginal cost of providing a 
consumer with access to the network is represented by the parameter .249 The 
marginal cost of access is constant with respect to the number of consumers 
joining the network. In reality, the cost of access is an incremental cost, such as 
the cost of installing an access line. However, as noted, it is assumed here that 
the number of subscribers is sufficiently large to treat  as a continuous 
function.  
In addition to access network elements there are core network elements, which 
in the case of a standard telephone network includes switching and transmission 
equipment. The cost of the core network element is represented by the cost 
function , which is the minimum cost to supply the total demand for 
calling. It is assumed that the marginal cost of a call is positive, and 
concave in calling, . This states the cost of the core network is an 
increasing, concave function of total demand for calling. A key aspect of this 
assumption is that the core network is a common cost.  
B.5 Profit maximising two-part tariff 
By choosing ,  and , the objective of the monopoly supplying the telephony 
service is to maximise profit: 
  (48) 
                                                        
249 Oi (1971), Feldstein (1972), Ng & Weisser (1974), Auerbach & Pellechio (1978), and 
Goldman, Leland & Sibley (1984) also consider the situation where consumers share a 
common cost, but they assume only one input cost that is attributable to individual 
consumers, which is for usage. In addition to the complication of determining the 
optimal recovery of a common cost, the input cost structure analysed by these studies is 
not consistent with a telephony service, as the input cost for providing access to a 
telephony network is significant. Schmalensee (1981), and Brown & Sibley (1986, pp. 
200,201) assume that costs are attributable to an individual consumer and that there is a 
cost to providing access and a cost for a call, as assumed here. 
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As income is distributed heterogeneously, the income of the marginal 
subscriber, , is a choice variable in addition to  and . Of particular interest 
is the effect the income distribution has on the optimal values of and . 
Taking the first order conditions of a suitable Lagrangian function gives: 
  (49) 
The function arguments for the marginal cost for calling have been left out in 
order to simplify the notation. Factoring out  from  and , recognising 
that , utilising Roy’s identity, and rearranging leads 
to: 
  (50) 
Assuming calling increases with income then , and, 
due to (quasi-)concavity of , .  In 
the case of maximising profit this implies that call price is greater than the 
marginal cost of a call. In contrast, if income has no effect on the demand for 
calling, then the call price equals the marginal cost of a call.250 
Now turning to the access fee , the extent of the difference between the access 
fee and the access cost  will depend on the income distribution and the 
demand for calling, and the difference between the marginal subscribers’ 
marginal utility of income with and without subscription. To show this, start by 
                                                        
250 This result is consistent with Schmalensee’s (1981, p. 458) proposition that the profit 
maximising call price equals marginal cost if a marginal subscriber’s demand for calls 
and the average demand for calls are the same. A marginal subscriber’s demand for calls 
and the average demand for calls are the same in equation (50) when calling does not 
increase with demand. 
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assuming that income has no effect on the demand for calling. This assumption 
will be subsequently relaxed in order to examine the effect of the call-income 
effect on the optimal two-part tariff. 
Solution if call demand does not increase with income 
Setting call price equal to the marginal cost of calling, , and factoring the 
Lagrange multiplier  out of the two first order conditions  and gives:  
  (51) 
As  – due to the normal participation equation (42) 
assuming  – and all the functions are positive in value, then .  
Interpreting equation (51) as the inverse price elasticity rule for the aggregate 
demand for access, holding the call price constant, may suggest: 
  (52) 
where  is the access price elasticity for aggregate participation in the telephony 
market, which is determined by the expression: 
  (53) 
The derivative of the market size with respect to access fee, holding call price 
constant, and using equation (13) to derive as an implicit function of  and , 
is: 
  (54) 
Substituting this term into the equation (53) and the result in (52) and 
comparing with (51) shows that the access fee follows the inverse elasticity rule 
for aggregate access demand, assuming the income has no effect on the demand 
for calls, even though it has an effect on consumers’ participation decisions.  
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However, interpreting equation (51) as the inverse price elasticity does not imply 
it is valid to apply the Ramsey-Boiteux pricing principle more generally to the 
call price. The optimal access fee is not related to the inverse of the price 
elasticity of access, and the usage price is not related to the inverse of the price 
elasticity of usage. Even though  and , this does not imply that 
price is above marginal cost in both cases as might be expected in a standard 
application of Ramsey-Boiteux pricing. As equation (50) shows, the size of the 
margin between call price and marginal cost depends on the size of the effect of 
income on call demand, and if income has no effect then the optimal call price 
equals marginal cost. 
Solution if call demand increases with income 
Assuming call demand increases with income, factoring out of and , 
noting that , and rearranging yields: 
  (55) 
Comparing this equation to (51) shows that the contribution to profits from 
calling  has a direct influence on the optimal access fee. That 
is decreases with an increase in . It seems possible that if the 
magnitude of the effect of income on the demand from calling is sufficiently 
large then . Equation (50) implies that the sign of  is 
positive, and its magnitude increases if the effect of income on call demand 
increases. If the effect of income on call demand increases, then signs on 
relevant terms within (55) imply that the magnitude of  will reduce. As 
(55) suggests, whether or not will depend on the particular 
characteristics of the utility function and the distribution of income. 
 168 
B.6 Constrained, consumer-surplus maximising two-part tariff 
The objective is to find the two-part tariff that maximises consumer surplus 
subject to a breakeven constraint on the monopoly and the participation 
constraint: 
  (56) 
The objective function  is the sum of the consumer surplus of the 
population of both non-participants and participants.251 The objective function is 
subject to the breakeven constraint  on the monopoly’s profits and the 
participation constraint . 
The solution to this problem is equivalent to finding the saddle-point of the 
Lagrangian: 
   (57) 
                                                        
251 Ng & Wesser (1974), and Schmalensee (1981), Goldman, et al. (1984), Brown and 
Sibley (1989 p. 200), and Wilson’s (1993, p. 164) analysis of two-part tariffs measures 
the total benefit of a service by aggregating individuals’ indirect utility function. This 
present work takes this same general approach.  
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The first order conditions are: 
 (58) 
The call price can be solved by factoring out from and , then factoring 
from and , taking the resulting two expressions and factoring  out, 
noting that , , the 
breakeven constraint and using Roy’s identity to derive: 
  (59) 
The function arguments have been left out in order to simplify the notation. 
The function  is a marginal subscriber’s demand for calling as 
already defined. The function  is the simple average number of the demand for 
calls per subscriber: 
  (60) 
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is the average cost of the core network per subscriber: 
  (61) 
and the term  is: 
  (62) 
The function  can be interpreted as the weighted average of the demand for 
calls, where the weights are the product of the marginal utility of income and the 
population density normalised by the integral of this product for all subscribers. 
That is, applying Roy’s identity and  to the above 
equation yields: 
  (63) 
If income has no effect on the demand for calling then  and . In this 
case, equation (59) implies that  is the welfare-maximising call price.252 
This is the same as the profit-maximising solution. Of particular relevance is 
that no explicit allowance is made in the price for the infra-marginal cost 
of , as a solution consistent with Ramsey pricing would generally conclude.  
If the demand for calling increases with income, then the sign of  will 
depend on how, with respect to income, both marginal utility of income and 
calling changes.  
To start, if the marginal utility of income and the marginal demand of calling 
with respect to income are both concave functions with respect to income, and 
                                                        
252 This result is consistent with Ng & Weisser’s (1974, p. 340) proposition that the 
welfare-maximising call price equals marginal cost if a marginal subscriber’s demand for 
calls and the average demand for calls are the same. A marginal subscriber’s demand for 
calls and the average demand for calls are the same in equation (59) when calling does 
not increase with demand. 
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that marginal utility of income is more concave than the demand for calling, 
then . In other words, if the increase in calling due to an increase in 
income is greater than the increase in utility then . With respect to 
the total sum of subscribers, this implies:253 
  (64) 
That is, the probability density function  stochastically 
dominates probability density 
function , which in turn stochastically 
dominates the probability density function 
.  
If this is the case, then the two terms which are not multiplied by  are 
either positive or equal to zero and those terms multiplied by  are 
negative: 
  (65) 
                                                        
253 In the particular case of the numerical example examined in section 3.4 of this thesis, 
. There, utility takes the form of a Stone-Geary function, which implies 
that the marginal utility of income and the derivative of demand with respect to income 
are constant with respect to changes in income. That is, the equality holds in (64). 
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By recognising that , the first expression, at the top of this list, is either 
greater than or equal to zero, depending on whether marginal utility of income 
decreases or is constant with respect to income. The second expression is 
positive, due to the assumption that income increases with demand and the 
marginal utility of income is positive hence . In addition, 
because the cost of the core network is an increasing, concave 
function of the total demand for calling. The third expression is negative due to 
the assumption that the marginal utility of income is the same or more concave 
than the marginal demand for calling with respect to income.254 The fourth and 
final expression is negative due to the demand increasing with calling, which 
implies . Taken together, the signs of these terms imply that 
. 
The assumptions set out in (64) are not necessary for . A more 
general but sufficient condition would result in the sum of  the two terms in (59) 
that are not multiplied by  to be positive (negative) and those terms 
multiplied by  are negative (positive): 
  (66) 
These conditions would allow for a broader set of assumptions than in (64). The 
only constraint is that the sum of the two terms in (66) are of opposite signs. If 
the two terms have the same sign then the optimal call price is such that 
. 
                                                        
254 Slutsky’s equation implies that  (Silberberg, 1990, p. 330). 
The assumption that the marginal utility of income is the same or more concave than the 
marginal demand for calling with respect to income implies 
 This can be shown by rearranging the 
terms to give , which is assumed by equation (64). 
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This highlights a qualitative difference between the welfare maximising and 
profit-maximising call price. That is, if demand increases with respect to income, 
then the profit-maximising price will be  as it does not take into 
consideration the effect of a higher call price on the inframarginal subscribers’ 
utility, whereas the welfare-maximising price may be  due to the 
value attributed to the inframarginal subscribers’ utility.  
Where it has no effect on the demand for calling, the infra-marginal cost of the 
core network is recovered by the access fee. The access price mark up over the 
access cost can be determined from the breakeven constraint, , to be: 
  (67) 
Regarding the sign and magnitude of , the profit constraint  implies 
that even if , the sign and magnitude of  will depend on the 
magnitude of the call price and the average total cost of calling: 
  (68) 
If the effect of income on calling is sufficiently large, it seems possible that 
. The sign 
 
depends on the size of the common cost and the 
size of the contribution to common costs from calling. If either the common cost 
is large (small) relative to the contribution from calling then there is an 
increased likelihood that the access fee will be greater (less) than the cost of 
access. 
If income has no effect on the demand for making calls then , as the 
core network is assumed to exhibit economies of scale. The mark up is the total 
cost of the core network less the revenue earned from calls, averaged over the 
total number of subscribers. This result qualitatively differs from the profit-
maximising case, described by (51). Whether or not quantitatively the mark up 
determined by (67) differs from (51) will depend on the particular form of the 
demand and cost functions. 
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This result contradicts the Ramsey-Boiteux pricing rule. Here, the allocation of 
common cost is not determined by a price elasticity of demand for access or 
calling, rather it is determined simply by the presence or absence of an income 
effect. This highlights the qualitative difference between the Ramsey-Boiteux 
pricing rule and an income effect explanation for the optimal recovery of 
common costs. 
B.7 Summary 
A theory of consumer behaviour and two-part tariffs is presented that ties 
together the access fee and call price within a coherent model of consumer 
behaviour. The model of consumer behaviour is based on the standard 
assumptions of utility maximisation, with the additional assumptions that 
consumers have the option to not subscribe to a telephony service, and that 
consumers who do not subscribe will subscribe with an increase of income – i.e. 
normal participation behaviour. The model is used to analyse optimal two-part 
tariffs with endogenous participation.       
The model shows that the optimal access fee and call prices do not correspond to 
prices implied by the Ramsey-Boiteux pricing principle. The welfare-maximising 
and profit-maximising call price is equal to the marginal cost if income has no 
affect on the demand for calls. Whereas, the call price implied by the Ramsey-
Boiteux principle is the sum of the marginal cost and a mark-up that is in 
proportion to the inverse of the price elasticity of demand for the service. 
Furthermore, when the demand for calls does not increase with income, the 
optimal access fee includes a mark up that covers all common costs, including 
profit. For profit maximisation, this mark up is determined by the distribution of 
income and the marginal consumer’s marginal benefit from subscribing. For 
welfare maximisation, this mark-up is determined by the breakeven constraint 
on the monopoly.  
If the demand for calls increases with income, then the optimal profit-
maximising price is greater than the marginal cost of a call, and a numerical 
example suggests that the optimal welfare-maximising price may be greater than 
the marginal cost of a call. The effect of an increase to the call price is to reduce 
the optimal access fee for both profit-maximising and welfare-maximising 
scenarios. 
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Appendix C:  Launch dates of commercial mobile 
and digital subscriber line broadband services 
 Mobile technologies255 Commercial launch of 
digital subscriber lines 
services256 
Australia May 2003 August 2000 
Austria April 2003 November 1999 
Belgium September 2005 October 1999 
Canada February 2002 1996 
Czech Republic August 2004 March 2003 
Denmark October 2003 July 1999 
Finland October 2004 May 2000 
France November 2004 November 1999 
Germany May 2004 August 1999 
Greece May 2004 June 2003 
Hungary August 2005 September 2000 
Iceland September 2007 April 2000 
Ireland November 2004 May 2002 
Italy March 2003 December 1999 
Japan October 2001 September 2000 
Korea October 2000 April 1999 
Luxembourg June 2003 2001 
Mexico January 2003 September 2001 
Netherlands June 2004 June 2000 
New Zealand July 2002 June 1999 
Norway December 2004 December 2000 
Poland November 2002 2001 
Portugal May 2004 December 2000 
Slovak Republic January 2006 2003 
Spain May 2004 1999 
Sweden May 2003 October 2000 
Switzerland December 2004 October 2000 
United Kingdom March 2003 July 2000 
United States December 2001 1997 
 
                                                        
255 (OECD, 2009a, pp. 23-25 Table 1). 
256 (OECD, 2009b, p. 136 Table 4.15). 
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